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Note by the secretariat 
At the Eighth Extraordinary Session of the Committee of the 
Whole, held in New York on 24 and 25 January 1974, the delegations 
of the States members of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) approved by consensus the following conclusions:H 
1. There was full recognition of the concern of Governments 
regarding the energy crisis and its impact on the economies of the 
countries of the region. 
2. It was recognized that the experience of the ECLA secretariat 
in the field of energy resources could be particularly useful. 
Accordingly, the desire was expressed that the secretariat should 
intensify its efforts in this field with a view to submitting to 
member Governments, as soon as possible, its observations and 
conclusions concerning the impact of the energy crisis on the economies 
of the region. 
3" The Office of the Executive Secretary was invited to 
co-operate closely with the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) 
with a view to their assisting each other in the discharge of their 
respective tasks. 
It was noted that for this purpose the Executive Secretary 
should be empowered to carry out the technical analyses in whatever 
manner and with whatever advisory services he might consider 
appropriate in order to bring the results before Member Governments 
for their consideration. 
In pursuance of these aims, the secretariat undertook the 
preparation of a general study on Latin America and the cur-rent energy 
problems (especially those regarding petroleum supplies), together 
with other studies aimed at an in-depth investigation of some particular 
aspects, such as those related to the electricity industry, transport, 
fertilizers, and new investment requirements, and commissioned a 
consultant to prepare a review of the prospects for coal in 
Latin America. 
K Economic Commission for Latin America, Committee of the Whole, 
Report on the Eighth Extraordinary Session, (24 and 25 January, 
197^, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 
Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 7A. 
/As these 
- vi -
As these studies progressed, the need became apparent for an 
exchange of experiences at the technical level with experts working 
in this field in the countries of the region and with specialized 
technical experts from other international agencies. 
The secretariat of the Commission, with the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (I1PES) as joint sponsor, 
has therefore convened a technical symposium to examine the 
repercussions of the current energy situation in the countries of 
Latin America (Santiago, Chile, 23-27 September 19?k)<, 
The present study, which is the central working document 
presented for the consideration of participants in the Symposium, 
will be improved and enriched with the commentaries and information 
presented by the participants. 
It is worth emphasizing that the events which have occurred in 
energy economics since 1970 are so important and have been taking 
place so rapidly that the present situation is one of great fluidity 
and dynamism. Consequently, it is to be expected that some of the 
points analysed in the present document may be overtaken by events 




The pervasive concern over the world energy crisis is 
particularly acute in Latin America today, a region which in 1973» 
contained nineteen net oil importing countries and five net oil 
exporting countries« Governments in both groups of countries are 
now facing hard decisions triggered by recent increases in the price 
of internationally traded crude oil. 
The objective of the ECLA/ILPES-sponsored Symposium on Latin 
America and Current Energy Problems is to provide a forum for a 
discussion of this subject by technical experts from Latin American 
countries. With this context, this paper is intended to provide a 
general treatment of the three basic questions that constitute the 
Symposium's agenda: 
(a) What is the "world energy crisis"? 
(b) What are its immediate economic and financial implications 
for Latin American economies? 
(c) What options are open to Latin American economies for 
confronting these implications? 
The first chapter explores the nature of the world energy 
crisis. Seven conceptions of that crisis are identified and 
evaluated. This discussion leads to the fundamental conclusion 
that th^ key issue in this field which confronts Latin American 
countries today is the price of internationally traded crude oil. 
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the Latin American 
and world oil markets, a statement of the record of world crude oil 
prices since the late fifties, and an indication of the basic forces 
underlying that record. 
The second chapter explores the immediate economic and financial 
ramifications for Latin American economies of a world crude oil price 
structure based on the assumption that the market price of imported 
crude oilnlies in the range of 7„00-US$ 10.00/barrel, FOB 
Persian Gulf. Particular, but not exclusive, attention is focused .on 




This analysis leads to two basic conclusions: first, the threat 
to output and employment in Latin America's oil-deficit countries 
operating through the balance of payments of individual countries, 
and in the aggregate, through international liquidity, is both dire 
and immediate; and, second, if it is to be avoided, this threat to 
output and employment requires inter alia, the immediate creation of 
new international monetary arrangements for channelling the surplus 
funds of the major oil-exporting countries to the developed and 
developing economies. This transfer of funds is of particular 
strategic importance for the developing countries. On a broader 
scale, failure to forge such international financial arrangements 
could induce a severe worldwide recession in the near future. 
The analysis presented in Chapter II is generalized in the sense 
that, while reference is repeatedly drawn, to specific Latin American 
country impacts, it focuses on the effects that the energy crisis 
will have on key macroeconomic variables: domestic prices, production, 
and employment, and the balance of payments; and, on international 
financial stability. 
This general orientation is defensible on two grounds: first, 
it is simply not feasible, for present purposes, to conduct twenty-
four separate Latin American country impact studies; and second, crude 
oil dominates the energy base of every country in the region, and, 
with due respect to its critical nature, the direct and near-term 
effects of a change in its price can be approached using the same 
techniques for analyzing the basic consequence of a change in the 
price of any other resource input. 
The final chapter in this paper explores the policy options open 
to Latin American (and implicitly all other) oil-importing countries 
for confronting the higher level of their energy prices triggered by 
increase in the cost of their crude oil imports since 1970? and, 
particularly, from late 1973 to-date. 
/It begins 
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It begins with a documentation of the obvious: each Latin American 
country is economically unique, and the aggregate of these countries 
is not the geographic unit on which to focus a meaningful discussion 
of policy options; each country must be approached separately in terms 
of policy analysis. 
Additionally, despite its obvious importance, this discussion 
of policy-options does not treat in detail the broad, macroeconomic 
problems triggered by the continuance of the new level of energy costs: 
the problem of domestic price levels, production, employment, domestic 
balance of payments, and international financial stability: to do so 
would explode the scope of this paper to gargantuan and misplaced 
proportions. Rather, the discussion of policy options focuses on a 
narrower field: how each Latin American oil-deficit country can consider 
now acting in a potentially positive way on the heart of the problem: 
the price and foreign exchange commitments for imported crude oil 
supplies. The discussion of policy options is divided into two classes 
of action: one focuses on decreasing the demand for imported crude oil, 
and the other focuses on decreasing the supply cost of imported crude oil. 
The supporting papers commissioned for the Symposium are intended 
to supplement the general analysis presented in this paper. These 
papers are of two kinds. The first explores, in greater detail, the 
immediate industry-impacts of the "energy crisis". This set of papers 
contains impact analyses for Latin America's petrochemical, fertilizer, 
transportation, electric power and coal industries and its agricultural 
sector. 
The second set of papers contains a more detailed examination of 
certain key problems raised by the continuance of the new level of 
world crude oil prices. Topics under this rubric include the impact 
of these prices on changes in the level of domestic investment 
requirements, on the financing of capital imports, and on the pattern 
of international trade and liquidity. Another paper in this group 
places recent trends in crude oil prices in the broader context of 
recent changes in basic commodity prices. There is another paper 
which examines the longer-run prospects for patterns of world energy 
supply, and a final paper examines the subject of Latin America's 
petroleum resources. 
/The focus 
The focus of this paper and the supporting papers as well is 
on the immediate future (197^-1980) in line with the same orientation 
of the Symposium, This is not meant to slight the longer-run 
ramifications of the energy crisis» Clearly, if the new trend in 
world oil prices continues, those effects will be immense. These 
longer-run impacts might be covered specifically in a second ECLA-
Symposiura on the Energy Crisis. 
In short, the focus of the Symposium, this paper, and the 
supporting papers is modest in nature, but, hopefully, an efficient 
vehicle for progress. The overall objectives are: to define the 
problem clearly; to spell out its major near-term implications; and 
to stimulate discussion on what Latin American countries can do now 
to deal with the problem. 
/Chapter I 
Chapter I 
THE PROBLEM: ITS WHYS AND WHEREFORES. 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
1. Seven concepts of. t h e , . e n e r g y , crisis 
Whether the analyst proceeds from the label "energy crisis" to 
a search for its real-world referent, or whether he proceeds from a 
fiat definition of the problem, one thing is clear: different people 
v 
have different concepts of the energy crisis in mind when they discuss 
it. For thi3 reason, if no other, when approaching an analysis of the 
subject, it is necessary, in the beginning, to be clear about what 
one means when he uses that term. 
What, then, are the various conceptions of the problem; and what 
is the defensibility of each when subjected to critical evaluation? 
There are seven widely held conceptions of the energy crisis. 
They are the following: 
1. It is a physical shortage of world energy reserves, imminent 
within a time horizon requiring immediate consideration by 
governments; or, within this same framework. 
2. It is an imminent shortage of economically exploitable world 
energy reserves. 
3« It is a physical shortage of world crude oil reserves within 
a time horizon requiring immediate consideration by 
governments; or, within this same framework. 
4« It is an imminent shortage of economically exploitable world 
crude oil reserves. 
5. It is an insufficient level of proven world crude oil reserves. 
6. It is a worldwide problem, the focus of which is the 
environmental contamination associated with the heavy 
reliance on crude oil and coal in the satisfaction of energy 
requirements. 
7. It is an economic problem, the focus of which is the price 
and security of. internationally traded crude oil. 
/Essentially these 
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Essentially these seven conceptions of the world energy crisis 
collapse into three topical areas: first, the adequacy of the world 
energy reserves, defined variously with respect to fuel content and 
economic dimension (Concept l«*5)j second, environmental pollution 
(Concept 6); and, third, the price and security of internationally 
traded crude oil (Concept 7). 
Additionally, the first five concepts collapse into three classes; 
- One taking a strictly physical approach to an energy reserve and 
applying it to the world's stock of total energy reserves 
(Concept 1), on the one hand, and to the world's stock of oil, 
on the other (Concept 3). 
- Another, taking an economic approach to an energy reserve and 
applying it to total energy reserves (Concept 2), on the one 
hand, and to world oil reserves (Concept *t), on the other; and 
- One focusing strictly on the sufficiency of the world's proven 
reserves of crude oil (Concept 5)» 
Each of these seven conceptions of the world energy crisis will 
now be subjected to evaluation. In examining the first five concepts, 
assumptions will be made that bias the case heavily in their favour in 
each instance. These assumptions will be noted in the text. 
(a) The energy crisis as a physical scarcity of total energy reserves 
- (Concept 1)' ~~ *" 
In 1969, Averitt estimated that the world's original physical stock g 
of coal was 15,2^0 x 10 metric tons.l/ After deducting from this total 
a maximum estimate of the volume of coal consumed through 1973»2/ the 
1/ As cited in Models of Doom, H.S.D. Cole, et alia, (eds.), 
(Universe Books: New York, 1973)» p. 100. This estimate excludes 
deposits of coal located at more than 4,000 ft below the surface 
as well as beds of less than 12 inches in thickness. Also, the 
estimate does not include deposits of peat. 
2j The rate of world coal consumption in I960 (i.e., 2,21*f million 
metric tons) was applied over the period 1950-1966, yielding a 
volume of coal consumption during this 216 year period of 
478 x 109 metric tons. This constitutes a strong upward bias in 
cumulative coal consumption during this period and, therefore, a 
strong downward bias in the estimated current stock of world coal 
reserves. World consumption of coal during 1967-1973» 
17 x lo" metric tons, was taken from table 2. 
/stock of 
stock of oil remaining at the end of 1973 was approximately 
14,74-5 x 109 metric tons of coal, or the equivalent of roughly 
Q 
10,322 x 10 tons of oil» Thus, after satisfying the cumulative 
requirement for total energy during 1974-2000 (i.e., 418,562 x 10 oil 
equivalent metric tons) (table 1) from coal alone, the remaining 
physical stock of coal in 2000 (i.e., 9,903 x 109 oil equivalent tons) 
would represent 283 years of total world energy consumption at the 
level of total energy consumption expected in the year 2000 (i.e.,, 9 
35 x 10 oil equivalent tons, table 1). This is surely not a prospect 
for alarm today. The concept of the energy crisis as a physical 
shortage of energy reserves (Concept 1) must be rejected. 
(b) The energy crisis as an economic scarcity of total energy 
reserves ^'"{Concept 2) ~ 
In January 1967, the world's stock of measured coal reserves was 
about 8,817 x 109 metric tons, or 7$135 x 109 tons of hard coal 
equivalent.4/ After adjusting for the reduction in that stock during 
1968-1973» it was the equivalent of, roughly, 4,984 x 109 tons of oil 
at the end of 1973. Applying a recovery factor of only 50 per cent to 
this volume would yield a level of economically exploitable coal reserves 
of about 2,492 x 109 tons of oil equivalent. Thus, after satisfying the 
world's total energy requirements during 1974-2000 from coal alone, the 
remaining stock of economically exploitable coal would be sufficient 
to meet the world's total energy requirements for an additional 
59 years at the rate of total energy consumption expected in the year 
2000. This does not pose a problem which should worry policy-makers 
today, and, so, this concept of the energy crisis must be rejected. 
j5/ As noted in the footnote to table 1, the projected levels of total 
energy consumption being used here contain a strong upward bias, 
working, in the present context, in favour of those advocating 
the position of an imminent shortage of world energy resources. 
4/ As cited in Models of Doom, H.S.D. Cole, et alia, (eds.), 
(Universe Books: New York, 1973)» P° 99. The figure refers to 
"measured reserves" of hard and soft coal (i.e., 6,714 x 10° and 
2,104 x 109 metric tons of coal, respectively, in 1968). The 
estimate was made under the auspices of the World Power Confereace 
in 1968o On a calorific basis, one metric ton of soft coal 
equals about, 0.20 metric tons of hard coal. Two boundary 
conditions used in this estimate are: a maximum overburden of 
1,200 metres and a minimum seam thickness of 30 cms. Not all of 




WORLD COMMERCIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1?60-2000, SELECTED YEARS AND INTERVALS 
(106 metrlo tons cf oil equivalent) 
Year Coal Oil Natural 
gus 
Hydro and Total nuclear 
76 3 058 
81 3 023 
84 3 187 
87 3 383 
96 3 576 
106 3 768 
114 3 975 
116 k 258 
124 4 358 
129 4 639 
135 4 916 
ll6 5 176 161 5 454 
210 5 751 
. 243 6 0S7 
281 6 405 
325 6 767 
377 7 155 
% 6 7 56? 
505 8 oi4 
587 8 479 
680 
78 7 s? 
911 10 143 
1 055 10 790 
1 222 11 488 
1 415 12 245 
1 639 13 067 
1 898 13 960 
2 198 i4 933 
*2 545 15 991 
2 947 17 149 
3 413 18 4i7 
3 952 19 806 
4 576 21 334 
5 299 2? 017 
6 137 24 873 
7 10 6 26 922 
8 229 29 192 
9 529 31 7io 
11 035 34 509 
2 754 50 456 




























































































































































































Source and Notes; Volumes for I 9 6 0 - I 9 7 0 and for 1980 were taken from» Oil, The Present Situation and Future 
Prospects, (OECD, Paris, 1973) > PP* '0.-48. Volumes for Intervening and subsecycnt years are extra-
polations made by CEPAI. for each fuel separately and, by addition, for total iommevolal energy 
consumption. Volumes for each fuel during I98I-2OOO were derived Dy applying the individual compound 
rate of growth in the consumption of eaoh fuel during 1970-1980 to the intervals up to 2000 and, then, 
summing ror total energy consumption in eaoh year. This method builds in an upward bias in individual 
component and total energy consumption whioh, in the present context, favours the case of those 
arguing for a prospective shortage of world energy resources (i.e.. total energy consumption 
acoelerates from 4,&> p.a. during 1960-1970 to 5.65S during I97O-I98O and to 6.t$> and 8.0# during 
1980-1990 and 1990-2000, respectively). 
Additionally, the OECD« s projections of world energy consumption through 1980 were made in 1972, at 
a time when world oil (and energy) prices were substantially lower than those ourrsntly expected over 
•the forecast period. Downward revisions in the forecast of component and total energy consumption 
presented here are therefore in order, and in fact the OECD has done Just this in a revised forecast 
of energy consumption. By not scaling-dotm these forecast volumes in sympathy with higher expeoted 
energy prices, the argument in biased even further in favour of -those arguing the case for a 




WORLD COMMERCIAL 1KEROY C®SUMPTI(Si, 1560-2000, SELECTED 
YEffiS AND INTERVALS, 31 . WATOML- UNITS 
(Units as indicated) 
Year 
Coal Oil Natural Hydro and 
, gas nuclear 
(106 metric tons) ( l o 9 ffi3j 
1960 2 ZLk 1 015 U63 684 
1961 2 044 1 066 1+94 
1962 2 084 1 156 542 977 
19^3 2 179 1 242 588 1 012 
19^4 2 231 1 31a 64l 1 116 
19^5 2 263 1 459 688 1 233 
19§6 2 300 1 574 752 1 326 
1967 2 329 1 686 807 1 349 
1968 2 291 1 837 881 1 442 
1969 2 371 1 998 91*7 1 500 
1970 2 426 2 160 1 0 2 5 1 5 7 0 
1971 2 484 2 300 l 090 1 8 l 4 
1972 2 543 " 2 450 1 159 2 105 
1973 2 606 2 609 1 232 2 442 
1974 2 667 2 779 1 309 2 826 
1975 2 731 2 959 1 392 3 267 
1976 2 797 3 152 1 480 3 77? 
1977 2 864 3 357 1 573 4 38H 
1978 2 933 3 575 1 672 5 070 
1979 3 033 3 807 1 778 5 872 
1980 3 066 4 049 1 885 6 825 
1981 3 139 4 312 2 004 7 907 
1982 3 2 i 4 4 592 2 131 9 151 
1983 3 291 4 890 2 264 10 593 
1984 3 371 5 208 2 4o8 12 267 
1 9 | 5 3 4 » 5 547 2 559 14 209 
1986 3 534 5 908 2 720 16 453 
1987 3 619 6 292 2 892 19 058 
1988 3 706 6 701 3 074 22 070 
1989 3 796 7 1 37 3 268 25 558 
1990 3 886 7 600 3 473 29 593 
1991 3 978 8 094 3 692 3!+ 273 
1992 4 074 8 620 3 924 39 686 
1993 4 171 9 180 . 4 1 7 1 45 953 
1994 4 273 9 777 1+ 434 53 209 
1995 4 374 10 if l3 4 7 l 4 61 616 
1996 4 430 11 090 5 o i l 71 360 
1997 4 587 11 811 5 327 82 628 
1998 4 697 12 579 5 662 95 686 
1999 4 810 13 397 6 019 n o 802 
2000 4 926 14 267 6 399 128 314-
1974-1980 20 061 23 678 11 089 32 023 
1974-2000 99 438 191 093 87 235 922 409 
Source and Hotesi The source of these data and the interpolation and projection (1981-2000) 
methods used In constructing this table (and the inherent biases as well) are -the 
same as indicated in Table 1 (see Sources and Notes)» 
Conversion factors used ares 1 oil equivalent metric ton x 1,0 • 1 metric ton of oil 
(i.e., the base unit of measurement); 1 oil equivalent metric ton x 0«7 311 nctrio 
ton of coal; 1 oil equivalent metrio ton x 00009=31 cubic meter of natural and 
1 oil equivalent metric ton x 0.086 = 1 000 KKh- of electricity. 
/(c) The 
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(c) The energy crisis as a physical or as an economic scarcity of 
world oil reserves - (Concepts 3 and k-) 
An estimate of the world's physical stock of oil was not 
available, and, so, an indirect approach had to be taken in evaluating 
Concept 3« 
In 1965, the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that, under 
very relaxed economic assumptions, the world's ultimately recoverable 
9 
stock of crude oil from conventional sources was 838 x 10 metric 
tons-5/ This is many times a multiple of a number of other estimates, 
which are cited below, of these reserves that were made by other under 
more stringent economic assumptions. 
The USGS's estimate will be taken as a minimum estimate of the 
world's physically available crude oil reserves. It is important to 
note that this estimate excludes the volume of crude oil extractable 
from oil shales and oil contained in bituminous rock. Subtracting 
cumulative oil consumption during 1963-1973 (i.e., 18 x 10^ tons of 
oil), the USGS estimate suggests a minimum physical stock of world oil q at the end of 1973 of about 820 x 10 tons. This volume of oil would 
g 
satisfy world oil requirements during 197^-2000 (i.e., 191 x 10 7 metric 
tons of oil: table 2), with years left over at the rate of world oil 
consumption in the year 2000 (i.e., Ik x 10^ metric tons of oil). In 
this context, and noting the strong downward bias in the stock estimate 
employed, the concept of the world energy crisis as an imminent physical 
shortage of oil reserves must be rejected. 
3/ As cited in Energy in the World Economy, J. Darmstadter et alia, 
(Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, Md., 1971)1 P- 50. These 
• reserves are labelled worldwide "possible ultimate recoveries". 
/Estimates of 
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Estimates of the stock of economically exploitable crude oil 
reserves (the focus of Concept 4) vary widely. In 1950, Pratt's 
estimate was 82 x 109 tons of crude oil, and the most recent estimate, 
made by Warman in 1971» presents a range of 164-274 x 10^ tons» 
Pratt's figure and lower limit of Warman1s would not support world 
oil requirements through the year 2000; and, while Warman1s upper limit 
would, there would remain only 6 years of economically exploitable 
world crude oil reserves beyond the year 2000 at the rate of oil 
consumption anticipated in that year« The remaining estimates of the 
world reserves of economically exploitable crude oil have implications 
for world crude oil sufficiency falling within those of Pratt's and 
Warman's.6/ 
None of the above estimates of economically exploitable erud© 
oil reserves includes the volume of "known recoverable reserves" of 
crude oil extractable from "undiscovered and/or marginal and 
submarginal resources", that is, from shale oil and oil contained in 
12 
bituminous rock: about 15 trillion barrels, or roughly 2.1 x 10 tons 
of crude oil.7/ This volume of oil alone would satisfy world crude 
oil requirements to the year 2000 with the equivalent of 134 years 
left over at the rate of world oil consumption anticipated in the year 
2000. When added to the lowest estimate of the stock of economically 9 
exploitable conventional crude oil (Pratt's in 1950: 82 x 10 tons) 
the resulting aggregate would satisfy world crude oil requirements 
through the year 2000 with 140 years left over at the rate of world 
oil consumption projected for that year. 
6/ These estimates are presented in the following source; 
Models of Doom, H.S.D. Cole et alia, (eds.), (Universe Books:. 
New York, 1973), P- 95- The estimates (in barrels of crude oil) 
are the following (date of estimate in parenthesis): Pratt, 
600 x 10 (1950) ; Levorsen, 1,500 x 10? (1950); Shell, 1+800 x 10y 
(1968) ; Moody, 1,800x 109 (1970); Weeks, 2^200x 109 (i960); 
Hendricks, 2,480 x 109 CL968); King Hubbard, 1^50-2,100 x 109 
(1969); Warman, 1^200-2,000 x 109 (1971)« One metric ton of oil 
is taken to equal 7°3 barrels of oil. 
2/ As cited in Energy in the World Economy, J. Darmstadter et alia, 
(Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore," Md."), p. 50. 
/These calculations 
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These calculations prompt two general conclusions. If the 
concept of the energy crisis is stated in terms of an imminent shortage 
of economically exploitable reserves of world crude oil, including 
deposits in oil shales and bituminous rock, the position is outlandish 
in terms of a policy focus today. But, if that conception of reserve 
adequacy is drawn only with respect to conventional sources of crude 
oil (i.e., excluding oil shales and oil deposits in bituminous rock), 
there appears to be a strong case for anticipating a shortage in these 
reserves toward the end of the century, or shortly thereafter. The 
reserve estimates on which this conclusion is based may be hopelessly 
in error: no one really knows. But, even though the empirical case 
for the assertion of this situation by the turn of the century is 
weak, it must be taken seriously. 
Still, even if this were the case, a doomsday attitude would be 
misguided.8/ Long before the world's reserves of economically 
exploitable oil from convention crude oil sources are exhausted, new 
technologies will be available that will ease the pressure on these 
reserves. This statement should not be construed as any easy dismissal 
of the problem: these technologies are already identified and in 
various stages of technical development. The liquification of coal 
alone, a technology that is probably viable economically today at 
many sites, could remove the exhaustion of oil supplies so far into 
the future as to eliminate it as a serious threat.9/ Additionally, 
electricity supplied from breeder reactors and other improved generating 
technologies together with price-induced deceleration in oil demand 
stemming from efficiencies in its use in household, transport, and 
industrial application as well as shifts out of oil to other fuel in 
8/ This topic is discussed in two other Symposium papers which focus 
on the long-run prospects for world energy supply. 
9/ One technology, now in the pilot plant phase in the US., consists 
in effect, of spiking coal with hydrogen (and, in the process, 
reducing the sulphur content of the coal per unit of weight)., 
A coal is then produced with a higher btu content per unit 
of weight. This technology is of particular relevance to Latin 
America, given the region's relatively large reserves of coal, 
typically of low calorific value. For an extended discussion of 
this technology, refer to the Symposium paper by JR. Suarez: 
El carb6n latinoamericano y sus perspectivas. 
/many energy 
- 13 -
many energy markets could stave off depletion in conventional sources 
of world oil to a point in time long after virtually unlimited energy 
supplies could be secured from such sources as nuclear fusion, hydrogen, 
or solar energy. 
(d) The energy crisis as a shortage of world proven reserves of 
I W ' a M l a M M M M H a M U M i M crude oil - (Concept 5) 
At the end of 1971, the world's proven reserves of crude oil 
were estimated at 584 billion barrels, or about 80 billion tons of 
crude oil, or 33 times the level of oil consumption in that year 
(table 3)»10/ A t projected levels of crude oil consumption, and with 
no addition to these reserves, they would be exhausted in 1989« This 
spectre, and the imminence of its timing, constitute the heart of the 
argument that the world energy crisis should be viewed as an inadequate 
level of the world's proven reserves of crude oil. 
The argument is falacious, despite the widespread respect 
accorded it. It reflects an erroneous approach to the economic 
dimension of a resource. Moreover, it is based on a naive conception 
of investment in oil inventories. Finally, it fails to put the 1971 
ratio into historical perspective. 
A proven reserve of crude oil is a rough, and conservatively 
biased, estimate of the volume of crude oil that could be produced 
from known fields under the economic conditions existing at the time 
it is made. Estimates of proven oil reserves exclude that volume 
of crude oil which is known to exist, but would not be lifted under 
existing economic conditions. 
10/ As cited in Oil, The Present Situation and Future Prospects, 
OECD,Paris, 1973, p. 55« The Oil and Gas Journal cites an 
end-1971 world proven crude oil reserve figure of 6 .>1.9 billion 
barrels, and, implicitly, a reserve production figure in that 
year of 36.1 years. About 63 per cent of these reserves were 




WOULD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND WORLD PROVEN 
1944-1973, SELECTED YEARS 
CRUDE OIL RESERVES, 
Year End-of-Year ^ . , . _ Production Reserves 
Ration of Reserves 
to Production 








631.856 (583 .500) 17.479 





3 6 . 8 
31.2 
Source: Data for 1944 and 19^3 were taken from American Petroleum 
Institute, Facts and Figures (various editions) as cited in 
J. Mullen, Energy in the Japanese Economy, (1868-196**)» 
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, 1972), 
p. 181; and, the data for the remaining years were taken from 
Oil and Gas Journal (December 1971 and 1972 editions). The 
end-1971 figure for proven world oil reserves (in parenthesis) 
is that cited in the O.E.C.D. source, Oil. The Present 
Situation and Future Prospects, 0„E.C.D., Paris, 1973, p. 55» 
Since the end of 1971» the world's crude oil price structure 
has increased sharply. For example, the average market price 
(FOB, Persian Gulf) of Saudi Arabian light crude oil in 1971 was about 
US$ 1.33 per barrel while, in January, 1974 that price was about 
US& 7.65 per barrel. Ia short, throughout the world, the volume of 
economically extractable crude oil known to exist in specific fields 
has jumped sharply in response to the increase in crude oil prices, 
and this constitutes an automatic increase in the world's proven 
reserves of crude oil. No one knows the volume of the world's proven 
oil reserves under economic conditions existing now, as opposed to 
1971. One thing is certain, however: reference to the exhaustion of 




Another important aspect of this conception of the energy crisis 
lies in the inadequacy of the underlying idea of how decisions are 
made to invest, or not to invest, in proving a reserve, and, hence, in 
the lack of appreciation of what a proven reserve really is, economically. 
A crude oil producing company needs an in-ground inventory of 
oil for normal business reasons. That oil may be in one of two 
physical forms. First: in a known field containing: (a) a more or less 
known volume of crude oil recoverable at given prices and costs 
(i.e., proven reserves); or (b) in the form of an imperfectly known 
quantity of oil which, with increasing development expenditures, can 
be defined with increasing accuracy (i.e., the conversion of a probable 
crude oil reserve into a proven crude oil reserve). The second form in 
which oil inventories may be held, (at least, conceptually in a 
probabilistic sense) is in unknown fields open, either now or in the 
future, through negotiation with its owners, to exploration and possible 
exploitation by the oil company. 
In this context, the crude oil producing company has a choice, 
then, of holding in-ground crude oil in one or more of several forms: 
(a) In the form of a proven reserve, the supply of which will 
require immediate incremental production costs varying with the volume 
of oil produced, but not incremental development or incremental 
exploration costs. 
(b) In the form of a probable reserve in a known, but imperfectly 
defined, field, the incremental supply from which will require both 
incremental development and incremental production expenditures. 
(c) In a known field containing an unknown volume of oil, the 
incremental supply from which will require incremental exploration, 
development, and production expenditures. 
As an economic maximizer, the crude oil producing company will 
choose the least-cost of these three routes for satisfying its crude 
oil inventory requirement. It makes no sense for it to spend money 
now to convert probable to proven crude oil reserves for subsequent 
production from them unless this route is expected to be cheaper, at 
the margin, than to produce directly from proven reserves. Likewise, 
/it makes 
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it makes no sense for a crude oil supplying company to invest in 
finding and proving reserves in fields now unknown if the expected 
costs of so doing are higher than the cost of converting probable 
reserves in known fields to proven reserves for future production 
or of producing directly from proven reserves in the future«, 
Viewed in this context, it is absurd to look at the level of 
proven oil reserves either as: Cl) the only form in which an oil 
company can hold an inventory of oil; or (2) the necessarily desirable 
form in which an oil company should hold that inventory. 
But, even putting aside the falacious interpretation of published 
estimates of world crude oil reserves, the concept of the energy crisis 
as an inadequate level of these reserves, doesn't square with the 
historical record of oil inventories held in this form. The data 
below show that the OECD-based ratio of 33:1 in 1971 is, in . 
fact, consistent with recent historical levels of this ratio. Moreover, 
in 1944, that ration was only 20:1, and the world avoided catastrophy. 
The conception of the world energy crisis as an insufficient 
level of proven world reserves of crude oil (Concept 5) is not at -all 
convincing, and it is rejected. 
(e) Five scarcity interpretations of the energy crisis: Summary 
Five conceptions of the energy crisis have been examined which 
interpreted that crisis in terms of a scarcity in energy reserves, 
variously defined. 
A scarcity in total energy reserves, in either a physical or 
an economic context, was found to be clearly indefensible. 
Two concepts of a scarcity in world oil reserves were also 
examined. The first was stated in physipal terms. It was tested 
using a grossly underestimated stock of world oil reserves. Even so, 
the concept of a physical scarcity in world oil reserves was found 
to be an inadmissible subject for alarm today. 
The concept of the energy crisis as a shortage of economically 
exploitable reserves of crude oil was found to be unacceptable if those 
reserves are defined to include the economically exploitable oil 
/contained in 
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contained in shale and bituminous rock. If, on the other hand, these 
two unconventional sources of world oil supplies are excluded, a 
scarcity in the volume of economically exploitable reserves of world 
crude oil is a possibility by the turn of the century, or shortly after. 
But, apart from the indefensibility of excluding this component of 
world oil reserves, the estimates on which this expectation is based 
leave much room for doubt. Even in this case, however, new 
technologies of energy supply, such as coal liquification and breeder 
reactors, for example,'suggest good grounds for anticipation relief from 
the spectre of inadequate reserves of conventionally defined sources 
of economically exploitable oil long before the threat becomes a reality. 
The assertion of an inadequate level of the world's proven oil 
reserves was evaluated and found indefensible. Current levels of the 
reserve: production ratio are comparable with levels recorded in the 
post-war period. Additionally, the widespread misunderstanding of the 
significance of proven oil reserves has supported indefensible 
interpretations of the published figure of the world's proven reserves 
of crude oil. 
In evaluating each of the first five concepts of the energy 
crisis, assumptions were made that biased the case in their favour 
at every step. No account was taken of the additions to energy reserves 
triggered, in an economic sense, from the increased price of oil since 
the reserve estimates used in this paper were made. The projection of 
world energy and oil consumption was based on oil prices existing 
several years ago. Current oil prices call for a downward revision 
of those projected levels of consumption. But, even in their best 
form, none of these five concepts of the energy crisis should excite 
policy-makers today to alarm. 
Finally, none of these five concepts of the world energy crisis 
penetrates very deeply in an analytic sense. None focuses, for example, 
on the location of an energy reserve, either in a physical, political, 
or economic sense. The two conceptions of the energy crisis that were 
stated in strictly physical terms treat as quantitatively identical 
an energy, or oil reserve 2,000 metres below the south pole and a 
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similar reserve 500 metres below the surface in Saudi Arabia: this 
is clearly absurd from an economic and political point of view. 
Likewise, the conceptions of the energy crisis that were stated in 
terras of an imminent economic scarcity in total energy and in crude 
oil reserves also ignored the geographic location and political 
dimension of an energy reserve and, so, they must also be viewed as 
analytically naive in their formulation. 
(f) Environmental deterioration and the energy crisis 
The destructive impact on the environment associated with the 
satisfaction of world energy requirements is a topic of strong and 
valid concern in many countries. A good deal of this concern has 
focused on the deletarious consequences on the environment of the 
world's continuing heavy reliance on coal and crude oil for 
satisfying its commercial energy requirements. 
There is a wide variety of environmentalist positions. But, in 
the present context, two basic ones can be indentified: one which 
places emphasis on the scarcity of total or component energy reserves; 
and, a second, and not mutually exclusive one which views the problem 
of environmental quality in a much broader perspective, an important 
component of which is the polluting aspects of the world's energy use 
pattern. 
With respect to the first position, the empirical basis for 
arguing in favour of an imminent world crisis in energy reserves 
takes several forms. But, the major ones have been covered in the 
previous evaluation of five concepts of reserve inadequacy. They 
were rejected on the basis that none of them constitutes a convincing . 
case for identifying a crisis situation today. 
With reference to the second position, it would be erroneous 
to equate the broadly oriented environmentalist position with a narrow 
focus on the polluting1 impact of the world's energy consumption pattern. 
In fact, the environmentalist is focusing on a problem which,;while 
encompassing this latter relationship, is much broader: the negative 
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environmental e£fects_of economic growth, not only in the form of 
chemical pollution, hut also in terms of resource deterioration, 
biologic pollution, physical and social disruption as well. 
It is obvious that the environmental impact of actions triggered 
by the world energy crisis (however defined) will be of the utmost 
importance to environmentalists along a broad front. If the problem 
is defined, for example, as the current price of internationally traded 
crude oil (relative to past prices and/or its long-run supply costs), 
some environmentalists will view positively the resulting substitution 
out of crude oil, say, to hydropower in the world electric power 
industry. Others, anticipating a substitution of higher sulphur crude 
oil and coal for lower-sulphur, but higher-priced crude oil may be 
dismayed on purely physical grounds, but understand and, in some cases, 
perhaps, grudgingly accept the immediate economic case for the shift. 
But, the basic point should not be overlooked: whatever actions are 
taken to confront the world energy crisis, they will surely have their 
consequences for environmental deterioration. However, this, in and 
of itself, is not sufficient to equate that crisis with the more 
broadly oriented problem of economic growth and environment on which 
many environmentalists are focusing. 
(g) The world energy crisis: The price and security of internationally 
traded crude oil 
Table 4 presents data on the current price and long-run supply 
cost (constant 1968 prices) of crude oil produced in the major export 
centres of the world crude oil industry. This comparison shows that 
the price of crude oil exported from these countries is many times a 
multiple of long-run supply cost. The comparison in the case of 
Saudi Arabian crude oil reflects the general pattern: estimated per 
barrel market price (January, 1974) US$ 7*65, vis-à-vis its long-run 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
United States, 1960-1963 2 28O 1.048 0,l68a/ 1,22 • • • • • » • • • • • • 
Venezuela, 1966-1968 kl7 0.351 0.101 0,462 0,42 0,64 1.83 
Africa, 
Libya, 1966-1968 129 0.074 0.085 0.159 • • • 0,34 0.54 • « • 
Algeria, 1966-1968 293 0,180 0,100 0,280 • • • 0,37 0.57 • « • 
Nigeria, 1965-1966 165 0„094 0.070 0.164 « • • 0.26 0.46 • • « 
Persian Gulf 
Iran Consortium, 1963-1969 90 0,047 0.050 0.097 0,l4 « • • 0.20 • • » 
Iraq, 1966-1968 47 0.025 0.045 0.070 0.12 • • • 0.20 1,22 
Kuwait, 1966-1968 114 0.060 0.045 0.105 0,20 • • • 0,20 I . 0 9 
Saudi Arabia, 1966-1968 78 0,041 0,045 0,086 O.18 • •• 0,20 I.30 7.65 
Source and Motes: The figures in columns (8) and (9) were taken from Table 5 , The rest of the entries in 
the table are reproduced in their entirety from! M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Johns 
Hopkins Presss Baltimore, 1972), p. 76» Long-run supply price refers to incremental operating-
development costs under -the condition of increasing output. The calculations include consideration 
of the physical decline date of reservoirs, the cost ef capital and risk, and the conventional 
economic costs for orude oil development and operation, which do not include taxes, royalties and 
similar financial, but not economic, charges to cost. For a more detailed explanation of the 
methodology underlying the derivation of the figures in columns (l) - (7), the reader is referred to 
Chapter II of the book aitsd above« 
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Table 5 presents price data since 1958 for some of the major 
crude oils imported into Latin America's oil-deficit countries» 
Taken in conjunction with the data in table 4, these figures support 
the conclusion that, for many years, the oil-importing countries 
- both developed and developing - have been paying a unit price for 
their imported crude oil many times a multiple of its long-run 
economic costs of supply. During 1958-1969, this price/cost gap 
declined consistently, but, since then, it has been rising, and, in 
1974, it has reached unprecedented proportions. 
The previous comparison between the market price of ' 
internationally traded crude oil and its long-run supply cost 
reveals the extent of the economic rent involved in the crude oil 
supplying business. Increasingly, a larger fraction of this 
economic rent has been accruing to the host oil countries relative 
to the international oil companies (table 6). 
But, this is only one component of the economic rent 
generated in the oil business, from the production of oil to its 
sale in the form of refined oil products in final markets« The 
other major component of this economic rent is taken by the 
governments of the oil-importing countries in the form of revenues 
derived from their taxation of crude oil and refined oil products. 
As estimated later, and shown in table 7, in Latin America's oil-
deficit countries, average tax revenues per barrel of refined oil 
products sold in 1973 in the domestic market probably fell within a 
range, of USi 0.84-USS 2.44/barrel, in comparison with the difference 
between market price and the cost of supplying, for example, Saudi 
Arabian crude oil in 1973: US& 2.20-USS 0.15=US& 2.05 per barrel. 
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Table 5 
ESTIMATES OP MARKET PRICE OP THE MAJOR CRUDR OILS IMPORTED 

















1958 2.48 I . 8 3 1.73 1.60 0.25 
1959 2.19 1.70 1.44 1.31 0.38 
i960 2.08 1.53 1.41 1,27 0.37 
1961 2.10 1.45 1.37 1.24 0.35 
1962 2.06 1.42 1.34 1.21 0«38 
1963 2.02 1.40 1.32 1.19 0,4o 
1964 1.95 1 .33 I . 25 1.12 0.47 
1965 I . 8 9 1.33 I . 2 5 1.12 0.47 
1966 1.06 1.33 I . 25 1.12 0 .47 
1967 1.84 1.33 1 .25 1.12 0.47 
1968 1.83 1.30 1.22 1.09 0.50 
1969 1.79 I . 2 8 1.20 1.07 0,52 
1970 1.78 1,26 1.18 1.14 0 .54 
1971 2.25 1.33 1.25 1.62 0 .47 
1972 2.43 1.75 I . 9 0 I »S3 0,54 
1973 • » « 2.30( April) 3.27(A?ril) 2.29{April) 0.44 
1974 • •• 7.65(Jan. ) ... 7 .55( J«» . ) 4.00 
Source and Hotest Venezuela (average realized selling price of a variety of crude oils, FOB) 
Minlsterlo de Mla&s e Hidrocarburos, Oficina de Egonotaifa Petrolera, Patroleo y Otros Da,tog 
Estadi'sticos, (Caracas, 1973), p. 169. Saudi Arabia? IBRD, Fublio U t i l i t i e s , The Changing 
Energy Scene, P.U. Note N° 7» draft dated December 15, 1973» ?able 1 , (page not numbered) 
and reproduced in this text as table 12. Iraq and Irani The annual average discounts off 
the posted price of Saudi Arabian l ight crude o i l given in tiie above IBRD stu4y (shown 
above in l a s t column) were subtracted from the annual average posted prices of these two 
crude o i l s as shown in l i inisterio de Minas e Hidrocarburos op .c i t , p. 205. 
The resulting figures for average annual market prices for these two crude o i l s are 
therefore only approximations. 
The January 1974 figure for Kuwait (34° API) wag taken from Petroleum Economist, May, 1974, 




ESTIMATED LEVEIS OF POSTED PRICE, MARKET PRICE, COST, GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND CffiPANY 
MARGIN FOE SAUDI ARABIAN LIGHT CRUDE OIL* 1958 - JANUARY lT/b 
($ per barrel) 
Posted Market Production Government Company 
price price cost revenue: (a) margins (b) 
Average, 1958 2.08 I .83 0.15 l . o o 0.68 0.60 
Average 1968 1 .80 1.30 0.15 0.86 0.29 0.75 
April 1, 1973 2.74 2.30 0.15 1.57 0.58 0.73 
January 1, 1974 U . 6 5 7.65 0.15 7.00 0.50 0.93 
jJour^&nd 'jo teg: See Table 13 for source. Coqparjr norgin equals market prioo less governaent revenues 
(i.e., taxes and royalties) and production costs: $0.15/barrel, the meaning of whioh is not 
defined in the source document. In 1963, this figures is roughly coiipara&le with Adelman's 
esoltaate of development and operating costs of $0,18 per barrel (in l$6d prices) for Saudi Arabian 
crude oil (see table 4). Adelnan's Saudi Arabian estimate is based on 1966-1968 data, and it is 
stated in 1968 prices. It refers to supply flows in the mid-eighties. Sees M.A. tdelnsn, The 




ESTIMATED CHAHG23 IN THE AVERAGE FINAL 2-MUS2T VALUE CF OHE B/ßlffiL CF {RUDE OIL SOU) 
OH THE DOMESTIC luIRKETJ IWmm AÌB il&Em LEV2LS, 1973-1574 
(US$/bbl)' 













1) Import, FOB 2,20 2,20 7.00 7 .00 10.00 10.00 
2) Freight, insurance, etc. 1.30 1.5 6 1.30 1.56 1.30 1.56 
3) Refining 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 .50 
4) Ilarketing O.05 1.05 0.35 1.05 0 .85 1,05 
5) Margin 0.73 0,80 1.45 1.52 1.90 1 .97 
6) Taxes 0.84 2.44 1 .66 4.65 2.18 6 .03 
Total 6.42 8.55 • 12.76 I0 .28 ìéHl 21.11 
ITotes: Une 1: For Saudi Arabian light, FOB, Persian Gulf. Data for 1973 taken from Tobia 12. 
Line 2-J}: ECLA estinates. 
Line 5: Sstiaated at 15$ of the sum of lines 1, 2, 3 and 4, for both the niniaun and aaximun cases. 
Line 6: In the miniaun case, a tas: rate of 1 ffi on the sum of lines 1 — 4 v&s aosum&d; in the maxinum case 
a 40fi tax rate was applied to the same base. 
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B y way o f c o m p a r i s o n , i n many E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s t h » a v e r a g e t a x 
r e v e n u e p e r b a r r e l o f r e f i n e d p r o d u c t s s o l d i n f i n a l m a r k e t s i s 
h i g h e r t h a n i n many o f L a t i n A m e r i c a ' s o i l - d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s . T h i s 
i s due l a r g e l y t o t h e r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e r t a x r a t e s a p p l i e d o n m o t o r 
g a s o l i n e i n t h e f o r m e r g r o u p o f c o u n t r i e s t h a n i n t h e l a t t e r . 1 1 / 
When t h e p r i c e o f a commodi ty o f s u c h p e r v a s i v e i m p o r t a n c e a s 
c r u d e o i l q u a d r u p l e s o v e r a t w o - y e a r p e r i o d , i t i s a s u b j e c t f o r 
i m m e d i a t e d i s c u s s i o n b y t o p p o l i c y m a k e r s , i n d i v i d u a l l y and s e v e r a l l y 
on a w o r l d - w i d e s c a l e . T h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f t h i s p r i c e change e x t e n d 
t o e v e r y c o u n t r y i n t h e w o r l d i n t e r m s o f i t s i m p a c t on p r i c e s , 
p r o d u c t i o n , e m p l o y m e n t , i n v e s t m e n t , c o n s u m p t i o n , and t h e b a l a n c e o f 
p a y m e n t s . C o l l e c t i v e l y , i t p r e s e n t s a m a s s i v e s h i f t i n t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w o r l d income and i n t e n s i f i e s t h e p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g 
and g r a v e p r o b l e m o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i q u i d i t y , w h i c h a l s o i m p a c t s each 
n a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d , a l t h o u g h u n e q u a l l y i n t e r m s o f t h e s e v e r i t y 
i n v o l v e d . E v e n o n t h e s l i g h t e s t r e f l e c t i o n , one c o n c l u s i o n i s 
u n s h a k e a b l e : i n t e r n s o f p r o b l e m i m m e d i a c y and t h e p o t e n t i a l n e g a t i v e 
economic and f i n a n c i a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f i t s c o n t i n u a n c e , t h e p r o b l e m 
r a i s e d by t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e s r e c e n t l y r e c o r d e d i n t h e " p r i c e o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d e d c r u d e o i l i s now among t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g i n 
t h e w o r l d economic a r e n a . 
T o what e x t e n t i s t h e s e c u r i t y o f w o r l d o i l s u p p l i e s a v a l i d 
s u b j e c t f o r d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ? I n a p p r o a c h i n g t h i s 
q u e s t i o n , i t i s b e s t t o a s k a p r i o r o n e : v.hat i s meant by t h e s e c u r i t y 
o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d e d c r u d e o i l s u p p l i e s ? 
1 1 / I n 1 5 ^ 9 , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a v e r a g e r e v e n u e a c c r u i n g t o W e s t 
E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s f r c i s o i l t a x e s was U S 3 5 . 1 0 / b a r r e l , o r a b o u t 
4 ? p e r c e n t o f t h e a v e r a g e f i n a l m a r k e t v a l u e p e r b a r r e l o f o i l 
p r o d u c t s s o l d . T h e c o m p a r a b l e r a t i o f o r L a t i n A m e r i c a ' s o i l -
d e f i c i t c o u n t r i e s i n 1 9 7 3 was between 1 3 p e r c e n t ~ 2 9 p e r c e n t 
( t a b l e 7 ) . T h e 4 7 p e r c e n t f i g u r e was t a k e n f r o m : L a I n d u s t r i a 
d e l P s t r o l e o e n A m e r i c a L a t i n a : N o t a s s o b r e s u E v o l u c i S n R e c i e n t e 
y P c r s p e c t i y a s , E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n f o r L a t i n A m e r i c a , U n i t e d . 
N a t i o n s , Kev Y o r k , 1 9 7 3 ( E / C N . 1 2 / 9 4 0 ) , p . 5 4 . D a t a f o r 1 9 7 2 , 
p r e p a r e d b y S h e l l , c o v e r i n g W e s t E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s and t h e U . K . 
i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e w e i g h t e d a v e r a g e t a k e o f c o n s u m e r g o v e r n m e n t s 
was 5 4 p e r c e n t o f t h e a v e r a g e p r i c e o f a b a r r e l o f r e f i n e d 
p r o d u c t s s o l d i n f i n a l m a r k e t s . S e e : P e t r o l e u m I n t e l l i g e n c e 
W e e k l y , A p r i l 2 9 , 1 9 7 4 , p . 6 . 
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The concept, security of imported crude oil supplies, is rarely 
clarified by its users. It is generally employed in reference to the 
widespread desire by governments for continuously assured access to 
requisite volumes of imported oil, implicitly, under any and all. 
circumstances. Such a desire is as widespread as it is chimerical. 
The simplest reflection will suggest that oil-importing countries 
can never achieve security in this absolute sense. If they have crude 
oil-producing ventures abroad, one conventional approach to the 
security problem, difficulties with host producer countries can endanger 
them: the post-war history of the international oil industry offers 
many examples. Long-term crude oil contracts may be ruptured for 
various reasons. In such a situation, international buyers, in general, 
face the prospect of sharp increases in oil prices, such as occurred in 
late 1973. 
Domestic stockpiles of crude oil do provide real physical 
security in the above sense, but only for relatively short periods, 
which may, of course, be their objective. But, even in this potentially 
viable solution to the security problem in the immediate future, its 
economic evaluation requires an explicit assumption on expected crude 
oil prices (and on capital and other costs). To the extent that a 
policy of domestic stockpiling of imported oil is pursued on a broad 
international front, it constitutes an immediate upward pressure on 
the price of internationally traded crude oil. Hopefully, this effect 
would be offset in the future by a downward pressure on crude oil 
prices in periods of disrupted world oil markets. Once again, price 
and security are conceptually close relatives. 
If security is approached in terms of the ability to satisfy 
all future oil consumption from domestic reserves of crude oil, 
conceived by some as the absolute in security, it is an approach which 
needs to be defended. Whether or not this approach makes sense 
economically turns on a comparison of the expected present value of 
savings over time associated with this strategy, on the one hand, with 
the costs of its adoption on the other. Fiat adoption of this policy 
/is not 
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is not its own economic defense: its defensibility rests largely on 
the expected price of imported crude oil. Here again, one cannot 
realistically approach the problem of security in crude oil supplies 
without focusing squarely on expected crude oil prices. 
Aside from self-sufficiency, the ultimate in security is the 
ability to pay for imported crude oil available from international 
sellers in a strong bargaining position. Viev/ed in this context, it 
makes sense to include security of supply as a topic both related and 
subordinate to the more critical issue: the price of internationally 
traded crude oil. 
B. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
This section places the world problem of the recent jump in 
world crude oil prices in brief historical perspective. It documents 
the pattern of change in the world and Latin American energy bases 
since the mid-fifties, and it indicates the pivotal forces underlying 
this record. Within this context, it also presents data on the trends 
in the price of internationally traded crude oil since the late 
fifties, and it suggests the key factors that have accounted for 
these trends as well. 
In this latter regard, the emphasis of this discussion is not 
on explaining the level of crude oil prices at any one point-in-time 
since the late fifties. It is, rather, on explaining the main forces 
that have conditioned the basic trends in world crude oil prices since 
that time. To do the former would expand the scope of this paper 
unnecessarily. To omit the latter would not only obscure the dynamics 
of the crude' oil price problem, but, also, it would leave unclear the 
strategic basis for Latin American oil-deficit countries for confronting 
that problem in the future. ' 
/l. The 
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1. The world shift to oil 
The data in table 8 underscore the rapidity of growth in world 
oil consumption and the increasing global reliance on oil since the 
fifties. These data also indicate that Latin America's energy base 
has been dominated by oil longer than any other region in the world. 
On the other hand, in absolute terms, the volume of Latin 
America's oil consumption is minor in world terms. The region 
accounted for only 6.6 per cent of world oil consumption in 1965 
(6.3 per cent in 1971), and for approximately the same share in the 
increment of world oil consumption during 1950-1965. Latin America's 
low share in world oil consumption reflects its comparatively small 
share in total world income, the relatively high proportion of non-
industrial activity in the economies of the region, the widespread 
reliance on comparatively low energy-intensive techniques of production, 
and the relatively high reliance on vegetable fuels in the region's 
total energy base (i.e., about 20 per cent in 1972). 
The increasing world dependence on oil in the postwar era has 
been the result of many interacting forces, chief among which have 
been: the strong declines in its (real) price-relative to those of 
other energy sources: the reductions recorded in the (real) unit cost 
of its transportation and marketing; the increasing world reliance 
on transportation media technologically locked to the use of refined 
oil products such as automobiles, trucks, and airplanes; the broad 
array of physical efficiencies that oil offers (relative to coal) 
in its transport, handling, burning, and disposal, for example; and 




UORLD ENERGY C OK SUMPTION: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUÌ 1013 BY SOURCE A HD MAJOR REGION, 1J25, I95O AMI I965 
Solid fuels Liquid fuels Natural gas Hydroeleotricity Total 
Region • — 1 • 
1925 I950 19̂ 5 I925 1950 1965 I925 I95O 1965 I925 I950 1965 I925 I95O 19̂ 5 
As per pent of each region's total energy consumption 
Latin America 37.6 13.0 6.4 56.6 73.2 70.9 4.2 11.0 19.5 1 .6 2.7 3.2 100.0 100,0 100,0 
North Am eri ce 74.5 43.0 23.6 16.9 37.5 43.4 6.0 18.0 31.1 0 .6 1.5 1.9 100.0 lOQ.O 100.0 
of which: 
United States 74.2 42.3 24.3 19.2 37.7 42.9 6 .2 18.9 31.5 0.5 1.1 1.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Western Europe 96.O 83.8 47.1 3 .2 I3.5 47.1 - 0.3 2.5 0.7 2.4 3.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Oceania 92.6 72.0 51.7 6.9 26 . I 44.7 - - - 0.5 1.9 3.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Asia 83.I 68.4 37.6 14.4 24.8 54.2 0.8 1 «U 5.0 1.7 5.1 3.2 100.0 100.0 100,0 
Japan 92.4 83.2 35.5 4.4 6.1 58.4 0.1 0.2 1.4 3.1 10.4 4.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Other Asia 73.7 57.0 39.6 24.6 . 39.0 50.2 1.5 3.0 8.4 0.2 0,9 1.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Africa 91.6 67.7 57.2 8.3 31.9 39.4 - - 1.6 0 . 1 0.4 1.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
World 82.9 61.0 41.Ö 13.3 27.7 39.4 3 .2 9.7 16.7 0.7 1.7 2.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
B . As per cent of world consumption of each energy source 
Latin America 0.8 0.5 0.6 7.1 6.7 6.6 2.1 2.9 4.3 4.0 4.1 5.7 1 .7 2 .5 3.6 
North Amerioa 45.4 34.4 21.0 7I.9 66 .3 41.0 93.9 91«3 69.5 45.0 44.1 34.8 50.4 48.9 37.3 
of which: 
United States 43.3 31.9 20.0 69.9 62.7 37.3 92.6 90.2 65.0 34.0 29.6 2I.9 4 M 46.0 34.4 
Western Europe 30.7 23.0 8.5 IO.9 24.4 - 0.7 3.1 39.2 32.0 32.6 34.8 22.4 20.4 
Oceania 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.5 1.1 1.3 - - _ 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.1 1.1 1,1 
Asia 4.1 4.5 6.3 4.4 3.6 9.7 1.0 0.8 2.1 10.1 12.3 11.1 4.1 4.1 7 .0 
Japan 2.3 2.4 2.9 0.7 0.4 5.1 0.1 - 0.3 9-7 11.0 7.8 2.1 1.8 3 . 4 
Other Asia 1.8 2.1 3.4 3.7 3.2 4.6 0.9 0.7 1.8 0.5 1.3 3.2 2.0 2 .3 3 .6 
Africa 1.0 1 .3 2.3 0.6 1.9 1.7 - - 0.2 0 .1 0.4 1.5 0.9 1.6 1 . 7 
Uorld 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
World (mill. met. 
tons eoal equiv.) (1 230.0)(1593.2)(2 290.8) {I96.7) (722.2) (2 I59.I) (47 .9) (252.1) (912.1) (9.8) (43.4) (112.6) (1 434.5) (2 610.9) (5 474.6) 
Source; This table ia reproduced fraa: J, Darmstadter et alle., Energy In the Uorld Econoay, (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1971), P» 86. 
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In Latin America, these same forces were also operational, 
and the region's comparatively earlier shift to, and greater reliance 
on, oil is explained, to a great extent, by three additional factors: 
the relative scarcity of high grade coal deposits in the region taken 
in conjunction with relatively high transport cost of coal; the 
prohibitive effect of the pronounced capital scarcity in the region 
on the rate of exploitation of its abundant hydropower potential; and 
the immense reserves of crude oil available in the region at 
comparatively low transport cost to its leading centres of production 
and consumption. 
The data in table 9 underscore the high reliance of many Latin 
American economies on imported oil and, as shown in table 10, on 
oil imports from Middle Eastern sources, in particular. 
On the other hand, in strictly volumetric terms, Latin America's 
oil import requirements are relatively minor when compared to the 
aggregate volume exported from the world's major oil exporting 
countries. In 1972, for example, the region's imports of crude oil 
and refined products constituted only 6.8 per cent and 10.0 per cent, 
respectively of OPEC-country exports of these products; and its oil 
imports from Middle Eastern countries accounted for only 4.2 per cent 
and 2.2 per cent of their exports of crude oil and refined oil products, 
respectively, in that year.12/ 
12/ These percentages were calculated on the basis of data presented 
in the Annual Statistical Bulletin of OPEC, 1972, 
/Table 15 
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Table 9 
DEGRES CP ^nSTJMl, IKP-JiaEKCE Oil CRUDE OIL li! SEE3CT3D 
LATIil &EIICAN COttlTRISS, IflZ 














Argentina 25 193 1 736 28 2é 904 6 . 3 
Bolivia 2 539 - 1 740 827 -
Brazil 9 712 28 453 1 203 38 009 7 3 . 6 
Colombia 11 395 m 2 373 3 008 -
Costa Rica 435 - 4 3 5 a / 100.0 
Cuba 203b/ 5 500b/ - 5 700b/ 96.4 
Chile 1 991 4 256 - 5 996 66.8 
Ecuador 4 544 1 356 4 019 1356 -
El Salvador - 483 « 4 8 3 ^ 1 0 0 . 0 
Guatemala «X* • •• - 883 100,0 
Guyana - • • • - «.* 
Haiti - _ - si 
Honduras - 699 - 659a/ 100.0 
Jamaica - 1 567 - 1 567a/ 100,0 
Iis;:ico 25157 1 835 - 30 524 4 .5 
Nicaragua - 552 - 552a/ 100.0 
Panana - 4 510 4 510 100.0 
Paraguay 161 - 16 la/ 100,0 
Per ti 3 759 1 903 171 5 476 29.1 
Dominican Republic - - - 9— SJ 
Surinam - • •• m 9 • • • «« 
Trinidad and Tobago 8 142 16 946 3 426 22 084 
Uruguay - 1 794 - 1 899 100.0 
Venezuela 187 365 «* 124 085 65 475 -
Total 284 000 72 191 137 045 222 540 42 . a ^ 
Source; ECLA, on the basis of official date.. 
a/ In the absence of data on the volume of crude oil refined, it •was assumed that all imported 
crude oil was refined, 
b/ Estinate, 
c/ Imported only refined oil products in 1572« 
d/ deluding self-sufficient countries. 
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Table lo 
CRUDE OIL EIPCRTS INTO SELECTED LATI M AIERICAN C0U1TTRI23 AID IÏJPO CENTRAL 
AIERICA, 1370-1972, BY EIPCRTIIS REGIOII Ai ID COüHKff 
(ip3 subie metres) 
Total Middle Vene- Colora Ecuador Peru Boli- All Country crude oil 
imports East 
Africa zuela bic. via others 
Argentina I970 1 684 623 22 386 - 44 42 530 32 
1971 2 5^3 1 338 - 282 - 53 27 6.13 230 
1972 1736 522 346 - 35 5 828 -
Brazil 1970 18 675 11 466 4 519 2 634 - - 56 - -
I971 24 ¡400 15 372 6 271 2 757 - - - - -
1972 28 458 21 194 4 632 1 736 - 107 — 2 67 522 
Chile I970 2 385 971 _ 554 854 - - 6 
1971 3 740 2 112 — 779 7c4 « - 145 -
1972 4 256 3 070 - 574 143 235 - 234 -
1973 3 883 2 411 506 38 652 275 
Ecuador 1970 1 132 - » 1 132 - - -
1971 1 4l4 - - 1 414 - - - - -
I972 1356 - 1 35%/ - - - - -
Hexico 1970 - - - ** - - - -
1971 107 - - 107 - - m -
1972 1 835 - - 1 835 - - - 0* -
Panama I970 4 179 - - 4 179 - _ 
1971 4 459 - 4 459 - - - -
1972 4 510 233 - 3 706 571 m -
Peru 1970 791 - 791 - - - - -
1971 1 761 m 1 76I - - 9* <*• <•* 
1972 1 903 - 777 577 139 4l0 
Trinidad and Tobago I970 17 978 7 135 2 46o 8 255 128 - - -
1971 16 980 8 155 3 971 4 805 49 m - - -
1972 16 546 4 179 4 410 2 147 58 1 084 - - 5 068 
Uruguay 1970 1 925 1 177 646 106 - - - - -
1971 2 003 1 348 573 82 - - - m -
1972 1 794 1 068b/ 482b/ 244b/ - m - -
Jamaica I970 1 826 „ - ' 1 826 - - _ - M 
1971 1758 - - 1758 m •• - - -
1572 1 567 « - 1 5 67 - - - - -
Central Anerica _c/ 1970 2 600 - 2 600 - - - - a» 
I97I 2 615 - 2 6I5 - - - - -
1972 2 700b/ - - 2 700b/ - - - m -
Total 1970 53 179 21 377 7 647 22 463 982 44 98 53 6 32 
1971 61 780 28 325 10 815 20 819 753 53 27 758 230 
1972 68 061 30 266 9 524 16 988 778 2 171 5 1 739 5 590d/ 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data, 
a/ Includes supplì' from Colombia, 
b/ Estimate. 
0/ Includes Costa Rica*,El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and i'iocragua. 
d/ Includes a relatively laxce portion from Indonesia. /But, the 
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But, the degree of collective leverage of Latin America's oil-
importing countries on the price of internationally traded crude oil 
should not be assessed on the basis of these proportions« The bulk 
of oil refining in Latin America takes place in state refineries 
(tables 11 and 12), and these entities confront the international 
crude oil sellers as arms-length competitors« On the other hand, 
the bulk of internationally traded crude oil moves through the 
integrated channels of the major oil companies without a competitive 
interface between the oil producing and oil refining segments of the 
industry. In 1969, the ratio of international arms-length crude oil 
sales, (i.e., 4,0^9 millions barrel/day) 13/ to the total volume of 
crude oil produced for the world market (i.e., 19,500 TBD) was about 
21 per cent. In that year, Latin America's crude oil imports, much 
of which falls in the arms-length category, was about 827 TBD, or 
roughly one-fifth of the world arms-length crude oil market. In view 
of the fact that the erosion of world crude oil prices occurs, to a 
great extent, because of forces operating in this competitive segment 
of the world crude oil market, Latin America's role has been, and will 
continue to be, substantial, and not, as many think, the contrary. 
This leverage on pri-ce is, of course, heavily concentrated in the 
Latin American countries that enter the world crude oil market with 
absolutely large crude oil purchase contracts in-hand, such as Brazil, 
for example. 
13/ M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, (Johns Hopkins Press; 
Baltimore, 1972), p. 90. This is a rough, but convincing 
estimate of the volume of crude oil traded under arms-length 
conditions. It includes, however, an unknown volume of crude 
oil moving between independents under fixed contracts and, so, 
it is an over-estimate of the real extent of the international 
arms-length crude oil market on this account. 
/Table ljt 
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Table 11 
CCS'iPOSITIOM CF OWERSHIP IN VARIOUS PHASES CP TII2 DŒESTIC OIL AI® NATURAL 
GAS INDUSTRIES IN SEtiCÏED LATIM AliERICAir COUNTRIES, VflZ 
(Per oent) 
Country Company Production Oil 
Harke ting 
Oil Gas refining Oil Gas 
Argentina YPF 99»$ 100.0 71.0 67.0 100.0 
joint M - - -
Bolivia YPP3 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOOíO 100.0 
Joint - - - - - -
Brazil P2T3.CBRAS 100.0 100.0 31.0 «« . • > I 
Joint 1.3 •«» 
Colombia ECOPETROL lS.o 20,0 60,0 15.0 10.0 
Joint - - m m -
Cuba Empresa Consolidada 
del Petróleo 
Joint 
100.0 100.0 100.0 -
Chile EHAP 
Joint 
100,0 100.0 100,0 25.0 100.0 
Ecuador (EPS - -
Joint - - -
Mexico PEKEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.0 87.0 
Joint M» - 8.0 
Peru PEIROPBEU 28.5 ... 92.0 35.0 30.0 
Joint 36.0 ... m». - 70.0 
Uruguay AIÍCAP m - 100,0 62.0 ••m 
Joint - " - -
Venezuela OTP 2.0 1.1 2.0 23.0 71.0 
Joint - - - -
Source: ARPELj Datos 2sta dísticos de las líirpresas Petroleras Estatales Latinoamericanas, November, 1973, 
Vols. I and II. 
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Table 12 





companies Total (TBD) 
8 Largest 
companies Esso Uobil Shell SoCal Texaco Gulf BP CFP 
(TBD) m (TBD) m Percent 
Venezuela/!?. A. 1 4o6 1 346 96 1 909 1 945 98 46 4 36 2 ' 3 5 0 0 
Other Latin America 1 238 363 29 2 294 773 34 9 0 7 0 15 2 0 0 
Persian Gulf 1 1^5 1 064 93 1 662 1 363 82 7 4 4 13 13 10 30 2 
Other Middle East n é 23 20 293 117 40 1 16 8 4 4 4 2 2 
Morth Afrioa 77 14 13 303 47 15 5 1 3 0 0 0 1 4 
Other Africa 21 21 100 402 274 68 3 12 20 5 6 0 20 2 
Australia, ¡I.Z., ilalaysia 257 242 94" 758 632 83 6 14 26 7 7 0 22 0 
Japan s/ 430 101 23 2 211 402 22 5 3 5 4 4 0 0 0 
Japan ^Si • • • • • • • 2 211 1 125 51 • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • * • • • 
Other Asia 401 330 82 986 345 35 14 5 7 3 3 2 1 0 
European Eoonomio Coununity 2 083 1 433 69 6 551 3 858 59 16 4 16 2 3 1 9 7 
Other Uurope 820 52? 65 2 976 2 030 68 22 3 20 2 2 1 18 0 
Total 'iorld 7 ??4 5 46? 68 20 426 11 8 Qj rn 16 4 i i 2 1 2 1 1 
S puree; The table m s taken in its entirety fro-i: Adalran, fee Vorld Petrolem Marital; (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1972), p. $6. 
e/ Including o-wnership shares in Joint ventures. 
b/ Including crude supply rijvts in exoess of ownership rights. 
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2. Recent crude oil prices 
What has been the trend in the FOB price of internationally 
traded crude oil since the late-fifties; and what have been the key 
forces underlying this pattern? 
To approach this question, one needs a measure of the trend in 
the price of crude oil traded under arms-length, competitive conditions 
(i.e., a market price). Posted prices are useless for this purposes 
on the one. hand, they are an accounting device for calculating host 
government revenues and, on the other hand, they are often used to 
book the price of crude oil sold from a producing to a refining 
affiliate of an international oil company. 
Since 1953, two trends are evident in the evolution of the market 
price of internationally traded crude oil: first, between 1958-1970, 
it declined consistently, but gradually; and, second, since then, it 
has increased sharply. 
The pattern of the market price of Saudi Arabian crude oil 
during this period is revealing in this regard: as shown in table 13» 
between 1958-1970, that price declined by 35 per cent (i.e., by 
3.2 per cent per annum) 14/ from US& 1.93 to US$ 1.26/barrel. In 
January 1974, that price, at about US$ 7.65/barrel, was unprecedently 
high, and, as noted previously, far above its estimated long-run 
supply cost. 
With regard to the first trend, what were the key factors 
underlying the progressive closure of the gap between the market price 
of crude oil and its long-run supply cost between 1958-1970? 
14/ This 3.2 per cent per annum decline in price is measured in 
current dollars. The increase in world prices recorded during 
this period, implies an even sharper decline in the real price 
of internationally traded crude oil. For example, the price of 
exports from the developed countries, as reported in International 
Financial Statistics (IMF), increased by 1.3 per cent per annua 
during 1950-1970. For a further discussion of this general topic 
refer to the following source: ECLA, Economic.Survey for Latin 
America, 1973. publication No. 74-40579, Vol. I, Part I, Chapter 7. 
/Table 19 
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Table 13 
EVCLUïTlii OP „KABI.iïï LIGHT CRUDE OIL PRICES, 1955-1573 
(USy per barrel) 
Posted 
p r ioe 
Estimated 
ua rke t 






































January 1 1974 
1.93 
1 .93 
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Source t Reproduced in its entirety fro:.;: I3RD, Public Utilities Department, T.ie Cheuyfln- ̂ îsrpr 
Scene. P.U. IJote W° 7 > draft dated deoeuber 17, 1973» Table 1 (pa<je not numbered). 
«¡/Approximately equal to "Government talcs'1 (taxes plus royalties) minus production oocts of 
about $0.15 per barrel. ' __ 
/ T h e f o l l o w i n g 
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The following factors appear to have been particularly important: 
first, the growth in the number of independent crude oil supplying 
companies selling crude oil in the world market; second, the increase 
in the number of large, independent refiners (state, private, and 
mixed) in the oil-deficit countries buying crude oil in the world 
market; and, third, the closure of the US crude oil market to 
unlimited crude oil imports, and particularly to imports of crude oil 
from Middle Eastern sources. These forces reduced the control of 
the major international companies over the market price of oil and 
progressively eroded the crude oil price/cost gap. On the other hand 
the continuing, absolute dominance of the majors in the international 
oil market tempered the rate of price erosion during this period. 
In 1950 and in '1957, the eight major international oil 
companies accounted for roughly 99 per cent and 8k per cent respectively, 
of the crude oil produced in the major crude oil exporting countries 
of the world. By 1969, this share had declined to about 80 per 
cent.15/ Adelman calculates that, between 1957-1969 (first half), 
the concentration ratio for the eight largest oil companies in the 
world's major oil exporting countries declined from 0.13 to 0.10; 
that is to say, that, in 1957» these eight companies were the 
equivalent of about 7 . 6 equal-sized companies, and, by 1969» the 
comparable figure was 9.6.16/ 
These figures reflect the entry into the world crude oil 
producing industry of new companies: these included not only 
international oil companies, but foreign governments, a variety of 
consortia, and the host oil governments themselves as well. This 
entry process stimulated the growth in the arms-length component of 
the world crude oil export market from 6.9 per cent in 1950, to 
15/ M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Johns Hopkins Press: 
Baltimore, 1972)» pp. 80-5l. The eight companies are: Esso, 
Mobile, Socal, Texaco, BP, Gulf, Shell, and CFP. 
16/ M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum, (Johns Hopkins Press; 
Baltimore, 197*2}, p. 81, The "concentration ratio" is the. 
reciprocal of the sum of the squared market percentages of the 
firms in the market. 
/17.7 per 
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17«? per cent in 1957, and to 20 per cent in 1968.17/ In short, the 
high price (relative to long run supply cost) of internationally 
traded crude oil induced an increase in its supply, not only within 
the circuits of the major oil companies, but, proportionally more 
rapidly, outside of those circuits as well; and this process exerted a 
strong downward pressure on crude oil prices. 
Related to this increasing entry in the crude oil production 
segment of the world oil industry, there was a parallel growth in 
refining capacity outside the orbit of the major oil companies. To a 
great extent, this growth reflected the rapid increase in world oil 
consumption coupled with the commitment in many countries to nationally 
owned refineries. Between 1957-1966, the share of the eight largest 
oil companies in the total refinery crude runs (excluding the USA and 
Communist countries) declined from 6 7 . p e r cent to 6l„6 per cent. As 
shown in table 12, Latin America (excluding Venezuela N.W.I.) increased 
its refining capacity by 85 per cent during 1957-1966, and, in 1966, 
the region's dependence on the eight large oil companies was far below 
the world average. The decline in this latter ratio from 68 per cent 
in 1957 to 58 per cent in 1966 mirrors the growing competition in the 
world crude oil market during this period and the strong downward 
pressure on price associated with it. 
In 1959, after the failure of the voluntary import controls, the 
US crude oil market was sealed off from competition by the imposition 
of a mandatory crude oil import restriction scheme. In the present 
context, one major effect of this programme was to increase the downward 
pressure of crude oil supply on price in markets outside the 
United States. 
If the increasing force of competition was exerting a strong 
downward pressure on crude oil export prices during 1958-1970, the 
continuing dominance of the eight largest international oil companies 
was moderating the rapidity of the price decreases. The mechanism is 
not difficult to identify; when a small crude oil selling company 
17/ M.Ao Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, (Johns Hopkins Press: 
Baltimore, 1972), p. 90. 
/considers reducing 
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considers reducing price, it does so in the expectation of significant 
penetration into otherwise unattainable markets; and the price 
reduction on its existing market, which will eventually emerge, can 
be offset by the large additional sales (at a price far above cost) 
that it expects to achieve by cutting price. In comparison, when a 
large international oil company considers a price reduction (to add 
to sales or to prevent their loss), it must consider the negative 
financial impact that the price reduction will have on the whole block 
of its existing sales. So, with crude oil export prices far above 
costs, the small companies are typically more eager than the large to 
cut price for immediate gain. 
The downward trend in crude oil export prices was reversed in 
mid-1970. Several factors combined to place the OPEC countries in a 
strong bargaining position! the closure of the Suez canal followed by 
the closure of the Trans-Arabian pipeline, cutbacks in Libya's crude 
oil exports, the pressure of low oil inventories of Europe, the rapid 
growth in world oil demand, and the relatively high concentration in a 
few countries Of the world's proven reserves of oil available for export. 
They exploited this position skillfully, with little in the way of 
effective resistance from the oil companies or the oil-deficit 
governments. 
A series of agreements (i.e., Teheran, 19?1; Geneva 1972; 
post-Geneva, 1973; and the participating agreements, 1973) were 
negotiated between host governments and the oil companies which drove 
up posted crude oil prices and government revenue per barrel. 
Additionally, the host government participation rights were strengthened 
and compensation was agreed on for currency revaluations and for 
inflation. As shown in table 13, between (average) 1971-August 1 1973» 
the posted price of Saudi Arabian light crude oil increased by 71 per 
I 
cent: from US$ 1.80 to US$ 3.07 per barrel; and government revenue per 
barrel increased from about TJSl 0.96 to US$ 1.73 per barrel. 
In September, 1973» the fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted, and the 
previously prevailing state of expectations on oil prices and security 
of supply was thrown into instant confusion. 
/In October 
-.Ju-
in October, 1973» the Teheran Agreement was effectively terminated. 
The governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and 
Iraq defined the '.«market price" (FOB) of Saudi Arabian light crude oil 
at US$ 3.65 as of October 16. Additionally, they made future levels 
of posted crude oil prices a function of future market prices, which 
they were to define. Saudi Arabian light was to be the pivot crude oil, 
on which the posted and market prices of other crude oils would be based. 
The posted price (FOB) of Saudi Arabian light increased from US# 3.01 
(October 1) to USS 5.11 (October 6), and government per barrel revenue 
from US$ 1.73 to US« 3.00. 
In December, 1973, the governments of the same six Middle Eastern 
countries announced that, effective January 1, 197^1 the n e w posted 
price of Saudi Arabian light would be US® 11.65, or 128 per cent above 
the level on October 16, 1973. Moreover, government revenue per barrel 
was set at US$ 7.00, six-tenths of the new level of posted prices: in 
short, between October 1972, and January 197^, government revenue 
per barrel had increased by 133 per cent. These new price, and revenue 
levels were generalized, after adjustments for inherent yield, quality, 
sulphur and freight differentials, to the crude oils.of the world's 
oil-exporting countries. The new crude oil export price structure was 
to remain in effect for three months, to March 31, 197^-
On March 17, 197^» the oil ministers of the OPEC countries 
announced, in Vienna, that the posted and market prices for their 
crude oils existing on March 31 would continue for another three months, 
from April 1 to June 30, 197^. In June, the OPEC oil ministers met in 
Quito, Ecuador to review the prices of crude oil for the third quarter 
of 197^. They decided to maintain through end-September the current 
structure of posted prices for world crude oil (based on the 
US$ 11.65/barrel posted price of Saudi Arabian light). Eleven of these 
twelve government, Saudi Arabia dissenting, also agreed to increase by 
two percentage points the royalty charge on crude oil exported from 
their countries by international oil companies, this increase to be 
/effective on 
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effective on July 1» 1974. One observer estimates that this will 
increase the price of crude oil exported from these eleven countries 
by about US$ 0.11 per barrel.18/ 
Two other major developments bearing on the price of 
internationally traded crude oil in "recent years have been: first, 
the increasing ownership rights of host governments in crude oil 
produced in their countries,19/ and, second, the sharp increase in 
the price at which international oil companies have agreed to "buy-back" 
participation crude oil from the host governments. By 1973» for 
example, governments in the Arab countries had secured ownership 
rights in the range of twenty-five per cent of crude oil produced in 
their countries with buy-back prices for participation crude oil that 
were slightly in excess of tax-paid costs.20/ By comparison, in 1974 
BP and Gulf agreed in a path-breaking contract with the government of 
Kuwait to a 60:k0/government: company crude oil participation rights 
arrangement. Although the buy-back price for this crude oil was not 
fixed, the government did reject the company's offer of 
US& 8.50/barrel 21/ (i.e., 72 per cent of posted price), and it was 
pressing for 93 per cent of posted price,22/ the price ratio then 
covering Saudi Arabian buy-back crude oil sales and which was becoming 
generalized in the Middle East and North Africa. Sr.udi Arabia, 
Following the Kuwait lead in this area, has recently called for 
renegotiation of the participation agreements with the oil companies.23/ 
18/ Joseph Novitski, "OPEC Raises Royalties on Oil 2 per cent" 
New York Herald Tribune (Paris edition), June 18, 1974, p.l. 
19/ This increased ownership has been achieved through several 
routes: participation and royalty crude oil, confiscation, and 
purchase by governments of oil company assets in their countries. 
20/ "Changing Ownership of Crude", The Petroleum Economist, March, 
1974, p. 85. 
21/ Ibid, p. 85. 
22/ Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, June 3» 1974, p.2. 
23/ Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 20, 1974, p.3» 
/With hos t 
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With host governments selling an increasingly large volume of 
crude oil back to the producing oil companies at these premium prices 
the effect is to raise, and provide an umbrella for, the average price 
of crude oil sold by the international oil companies. Thus, with 
tax-paid cost to the oil company for Saudi Arabian equity crude oil 
at, say, US| 7.15/barrel and buy-back price of US| 10.83/barrel 
(93 per cent of posted price) for the remaining 60 per cent of the 
volume of sales of this crude oil, its average acquisition cost to 
the oil companies buying it would be US$ 9.36/barrel (i.e., US$ 7»15 
(O.k) + 0.93 (USS 11.65) 0.6)} adding another US$ 0o50/barrel. for 
company margin would suggest an average selling price for Saudi Arabian 
crude oil of USif 9.86/barrel. 
A comparison of the FOB market price of Saudi Arabian crude oil 
in early 197^, US$ 7.65/barrel (table 13), with the US& 9.36/barrel 
figure presented above, shows the strong upward pressure on average 
market price that is built into the recent developments in the area of 
participation crude oil sales by the host countries to the oil companies. 
3. Summary 
Since the late sixties, there have been two critical developments 
in the market for internationally traded crude oil: first, the reversal 
in 1970 and the subsequently 6harp rise in the price of crude oil 
traded in the international market; and second, ths increasing ownership 
and control of the oil-exporting countries over the volume of crude 
oil produced in their countries. 1 
The increased ownership of the host oil countries over 
indigenously produced crude oil has taken several forms: payments of 
royalties in oil in lieu of cash, expropriation of oil company 
properties and, especially in recent years, tiro other means; the 
increasing volume of participation crude oil and the purchase of oil 
company assets in the oil-exporting countries by host governments. 
/Taken together 
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Taken together with the rapid growth in world demand for imported 
crude oil and the extreme concentration of proven oil reserves in a 
relatively few countries (about 64 per cent in the Middle East at 
end-1971), these forces have supported a dramatic transfer in the 
control over the volume of crude oil traded internationally from the 
international oil companies to the oil-exporting countries in the 
profitability of supplying this crude oil (table 6). This shift in 
ownership and control was accompanied by, and interrelated closely 
with, the sharp upswing in the price of internationally traded crude 




THE IMMEDIATS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RAMIFICATIONS TO LATIN 
AMERICA'S OIL-DEFICIT COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINUANCE OF 
THE WORLD ENERGY CRISIS 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the immediate economic and financial 
consequences to Latin American oil-deficit economies of a price for 
world crude oil in the range of US# ?,00-US$ 10.00 per barrel (in 197^ 
prices), FOB, Persian Gulf« 2ft-/ By comparison, the market price (FOB) 
of Saudi Arabian crude oil was about USfJ 2.20 per barrel (in current 
prices) in early 1973. 
The analysis focuses on the direct economic and financial 
consequences as they impact on the following maeroeconomic variables 
in these countries: the general price level, production, employment, 
and the pressure on foreign reserves. The implications of the energy 
crisis for international liquidity and immediate economic growth in 
the region are also discussed. 
2 V The use of the US-ti 7.00-US3 10.00 range requires explanation-
As shown in table 13, the market price of Se.-.̂ x Arabian crude oil, 
FOB, in January 197k was about US3 7.65/barrel* Presently, the 
price is, probably, in the range of USi? 9"00 ^er barrel* The 
lower limit figure of USi'7.00 per barrel would apply to countries 
which are importing considerable volumes of their crude oil 
requirements under contracts made prior to the sharp rise in 
crude oil import prices. These countries would be mixing cheapcr 
crude oil imported under these contracts with crude oil imports 
acquired at higher, current prices. The US« 10.00 upper limit 
would represent a price somewhat above that which would emerge if 
Saudi Arabian crude oil, the pivot world crude oil, were sold 
under a k0:60 companyigovernment participation agreement, with 
a buy-bacl: price of 93 per cent of posted price, a tax-paid 
cost of US-.» 7.15 pei" barrel, and an average oil company margin 
of US$ 0.50 per barrel; this_would yield ¡an average price of 
US8 9.86 per"barrel (i.e., / US3 7.15 (O.'+O) + U3i 11.65 
(0.93) (O .60)/ + US:] 0.50 = USii 9.36). The USi> 10.00 figure 
is taken as a price above which, it is assumed, the major crude 
oil export countries would expect massive substitutions working 
to their financial disfavour. 
/The analysis 
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The analysis is static in character. It examines the impact 
of the increased price of imported crude oil on each of these variables 
separately, step by step. It does not include a dynamic approximation 
of the impact of the increased price of oil on these variables, 
taken jointly, for any one of the region's nineteen oil-deficit 
countries. This would be desirable, but, given the lack of the 
requisite statistical data, the number of countries involved, and 
the timing of the Symposium, a formal mathematical approach of this 
sort is simply not possible. Instead, rough calculations are 
presented that suggest the range of change that can be expected in 
certain critical variables such as the price of refined oil products, 
the degree of direct and indirect upward pressure on the general 
price level, the range of the direct increase in the price of various 
classes of domestically produced goods and services, the likely oil 
import bill for specific oil-deficit countries, and the degree of 
pressure on their foreign reserve position. The supporting papers 
provide additional, and more detailed, quantitative perspectives, 
but, again, using static frameworks of analysis. 
The discussion of the impact of the increased price of imported 
crude oil on domestic prices is the entry point of the analysis. This 
discussion proceeds in two steps: the first examir.PR the impact of the 
increase in the price of imported crude oil on the price of refined 
oil products, and, then, on the price of fuels in Latin America's oil-
deficit countries; and the second examines the consequences of the 
increased price of domestic fuels on the general price level, on 
the price of specific classes of products and, then, on production, 
employment, and on the foreign reserve position of the region's 
oil-deficit countries. 
Chapter II closes with a review of the world energy crisis 
from the point of view of the international economy and a discussion 




1. The price of refined oil products 
To the extent that the increased cost of imported crude oil 
is passed on to domestic refiners, it constitutes an immediate 
Increase in their variable costs,and on a scale that cannot be 
absorbed by them financially, given the structure of refined product 
prices in the domestic market. If the supply of refined oil products 
is to continue, the domestic price structure for these products must 
rise, or, if this increase is mitigated, in whole or in part, by 
public policy, subsidies must be extended to the oil refining 
industry, either in the form of special oil import exchange rates 
or by covering refinery financial deficits, or by a combination of 
both. Alternatively, if governments choose to mitigate the increase 
in, or freeze, the market price structure of refined oil products,, 
this can be done by reducing tax revenues on these products as a 
counterbalance, in the aggregate, to the increment in crude oil 
import costs. In discussing the macroeco»omic implications of the 
increased cost of imported crude oil, it will be assumed that the 
increased cost of imported oil is passed forward to consumers of 
refined oil products.25/ 
However, this assumption alone is not sufficient to approach 
an analysis of the macroeconomic implications of ti"? postulated 
increase in the cost of crude oil to the region's oil-deficit countries. 
For this, one also needs to specify how the domestic price of refined 
petroleum products will change in response to the increase in the 
cost of imported crude oil. 
Oil refining is an industry of joint costs. Since refiners 
Cannot assign a marginal cost (either financial or economic) to ca 
a change in the production of any one refined product, production 
decisions by private refiners turn on a comparison of total incremental, 
revenues and total incremental costs. Where the State is in the 
domestic refining business, as a monopolist or otherwise, public 
25/ The discussion of policy options with respect to fuel pricing 
for confronting the increased cost of imported crude oil is 
reserved for later discussion. 
/policy on 
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policy on the pricing of refined products may not be oriented to 
financial flows, with subsidies to state and/or private refiners 
being extended to close the gap between cash inflows and outflows 
of refiners. But, the state refiner can no more calculate a cost 
for the production of a specific refined product than can the private 
refiner. Assignation of costs in the oil refinery business to a 
specific refined product is a logically arbitrary operation. 
With no guidance from the point of view of costs, what can 
be said about the pattern of price increases for refined oil 
products in Latin America's oil-deficit countries? 
As opposed to what one believes should be the allocation of 
industry costs and taxes to refined products in response to the 
increased cost of imported crude oil, it is instructive to see what 
the pattern of these allocations has been in the recent past. 
Statements of refining and marketing costs reflect price policy at 
the oil industry level (public, private, and mixed), and the 
imposition of taxes is a clear reflection of public, policy, without 
the cover of bookkeeping. And, if the State controls the structure 
of refined product prices (either directly or indirectly), the actual 
structure of refined product prices is really the publicly approved 
structure. 
The data in table l4 show the key features of industry cost i 
allocation and tax incidence as well as the price of four major 
refined petroleuo products in five oil-deficit countries in 1972.26/ 
26/ In 1972, these four products accounted for about 97 per cent 
of total refined product consumption in energy applications 
in the five countries covered. Additionally, these five 
countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru) 
accounted for 85 per cent of the volume of oil consumed in 
1972 in the region's oil-deficit countries. 
/ T a b l e 19 
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Table l4 
COUNTRY STRUCTURES AIID U2IGET2D AVERAGE COttlTRy STRUCTURE OF EDUSTRY COST ALLOCATIOii, T/uC 
mciDaicr:, AHD PRICE FOR FOUR P ^ F B E D OIL PRODUCTS LT F I V S U T E T A I S U C A I : couirr.ES, 1 9 7 2 




Kerosene Gas and 
diesel o i l s 
ì\ieì o i l Total 
A. Structure of industry cost allocation: Per oent 
Argentina 30 .3 29.2 27.0 13.5 100.0 
Brazil 35.0 32.7 24.2 8.1 100.0 
Chile 29,4 15.9 28.7 22.0 100.0 
Ilexioo 60.7 12.1 19.3 7 .9 100.0 
Peru 37.0 14.5 29.3 19.2 100.0 
Weighted averase Ü 2 ¿ Ihl 11.6 100.0 
B. Structure of t a x Inoidencei Per cent 
Argentina 52.2 20.3 26.1 1 .4 100.0 
Brazil 49.0 17.7 33.1 - 100.0 
Chile 65.6 6.4 17.S 10.2 100.0 
Mexico 59-7 12.4 19.9 3 .0 100.0 
Peru 3C.1 2.7 5.5 3-7 100.0 
Weighted average SLà .12.8 26.4 3& 100,0 
C. Prices of rotined o i l products: § / l i t r a 
Argentina G 5 5 2 
Brazil 15 11 10 2 
Chile 8 3 5 4 
Mexico 3 2 3 1 
Peru 6 2 3 2 
Weighted average 11 4 6 2 
Sources; Argentina: Cost,ta::, and price de.+a as per Decreto 5940 in force f - on Beoobber 15, 1971 
to Ootober 9, 1972. Brazil and Chile; data taken from Institute -qnttnn del Petróleo, 
Pjtrotecnla. I!0 1, January, 1973, P* 23. I'exioo: data taken frou Institnto Argentino 
del Petroleo, Petrotecnla, N° C, August, I973, p. 1+3. Peru: data taken fro;.i PETRC?ERU, 
Mercp do de !Iidrocarburosf Frecios de Derlvados en el Hercado Interno, (prepared for ".T-HI1 
neeting of ARP-L experts, Quito, Eouador, liay, 1974), Tables 15, 15& and 15b (pages not 
numbered). 
Notes: Motor gasoline includes regular grade only. Kerosene includes domestic kerosene only. In 
the case of Brazil, Chile, He;doo and Peru, fuel oil refers to "heavy" fuel til, but in 
the oase of Argentina, it refers to "fuel oil aercado". The figure for gas oil and diesel 
oil, in the case of Argentina, is a consumption-weighted average of the prices of these 
two fuels. In "fee oase of the other four countries, the prices of gas oil and diesel oil 
were identical and required no such weighting. 
The "weighted average" structures of cost allocation and tax incidenoe are the result 
of weighting separately the cost end tax 8<&ruetures for eaoh country in two nays: first, 
weighting the;.: separately by the share of each country in the consumption, of each of the 
four refined produots, and second, weighting then separately by the share of each of the 
four refined produots in the total oonsuuption of those four products in each oountry. 
In this iiannar# the weighted average figures were roightod for each country and for-, each 
refined produot. 
A. The 'freighted average?' price for eaoh refined oil product is the result of weighting 
the price of each refined product by the ratio of consumption of that product in a given 
oountry to the total consumption of that product in the five countries covered. 
B. Prices of refined oil products in 1972 in local currency were converted to US$ 
equivalents using the average, offioial rate of exchange for that year as reported in: 
The International ¡lonetaiy Fund, International Financial Statistics» June, 1974. 
In the case of Argentina, the "trade conversion factor" for 1972, as reported in the 
•«•*"«»- „„„Hod. /V-i r>a¥. . Tot-or 
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First, motor gasoline bears the major burden of industry costs 
and taxes in each of the five countries covered in the table. 
Moreover, the comparative burden on motor gasoline, in both respects, 
is severe. The share of motor gasoline in the weighted industry cost 
allocation for the five countries shown in table 14 (i.e., 43.7 per 
cent) was 3«8 times higher than the comparable share of fuel oil 
(i.e., 11.6 per cent); and motor gasoline's share in the weighted 
tax incidence for these same five countries (i.e., 57.4 per cent) 
was 16.4 times higher than that of fuel oil's (i.e., 3-5 per cent). 
Second, from the point of view of industry impact, the 
structure of industry cost and tax allocation in each country is 
especially discriminatory against road and rail transport 
(i.e., motor gasoline and diesel oil) and, relatively speaking, it 
discriminates heavily in favour of the fuel oil-consuming industrial 
sector, the thermal power industry, the output of which, in turn, 
is heavily geared to industrial consumers,27/ and the household 
sector (i.e., household kerosene). 
Third, the allocation of industry costs and taxes to refined 
oil products varies, more or less, with their individual short-run 
price elasticities of demand. Motor gasoline and diesel oil, with, 
presumably, relatively low price elasticities of d^uand in the short-
run, have the highest allocation of industry, costs snd taxes. Fuel 
oil, on the other hand with, presumably, a higher short-run price 
elasticity of demand, has the lowest assignation of industry costs 
and taxes. 
Fourth, there is a wide variation among countries in the level 
and structure of refined oil product prices as well as in the component 
patterns of cost assignation and tax incidence. Thus, there is a wide 
dispersion about the weighted average figures shown for prices, 
costs and taxes, 
2.2/ In 1973, for example, preliminary figures indicate that 
industry and mining accounted for about 55 per cent of 





GENERATION A1JD COIBUKWIOH CF ELECTRICITY IK SELECTED 
LATH! ¿IERIOAII CQUMKGS, l^Z 
(Uhits as Indicated) 
Total Consumption (lo6 kllb) Consumption (ft of generation) 
Country generation Residential Residential jjjdug 
0°6ktih) Industrial Others Losses ̂  ^ Others 
Argentina. 25 373 7 984 11 206 2 866 3 317 31.5 44 .1 11.3 13.1 
Bolivia 874 188 502 80 104 21.5 57.4 9 .2 11.9 
Brazi l 57 6oo 16 100 25 000 6 700 3 800 28.0 43.4 11*6 17.0 
Chile 3 354 1 606 5 316 1 036 976 I 8 . 0 59.5 11.6 10.9 
Coloobia 11 315 4 570 4 091 1 043 1 611 40.4 36.2 9.2 14,2 
Costa Rloa I 224 534 495 27 168 43.6 40.5 2,2 13.7 
Cuba «>• • •• • M •»• 
Eouador 1 113 477 375 104 162 42.7 33.5 • 9.3 14.5 
El Salvador 8l4 350 268 70 126 43.0 32.9 8*6 15.5 
Guatemala m 275 371 105 124 31.4 42.4 12.0 14,2 
Cyyana 333 87 210 7 35 25.7 61.9 2 ,1 10.3 
Haiti 1& 42 70 12 4o 25.6 42.7 7 .3 24,4 
Honduras 394 114 163 24' 93 23.9 41.4 6 .1 23.6 
Jamaica 1 9B2 482 1 194 97 205 24.3 60.2 4.9 10.6 
Mexico 35 085 5 054 21 395 3 563 5 073 14,4 61.0 10,2 14.4 
llicexagua 726 246 314 89 77 33.9 43.2 12.3 10,6 
Panama 1 060 569 197 58 196 53.7 13.6 9 .2 18,5 
Paraguay 279 37 122 22 38 34c 8 43.7 7 .9 13.6 
Peru 6 154 1 383 3 330 445 496 22.5 62,2 7 . 2 8 , 1 
Dominican Republic 1 195 458 312 103 322 38.3 26.1 8,6 27.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 308 286 848 10 21.9 64.8 0 .8 12,5 
Uruguay 2 332 1 292 74o 79 271 54.2 31 .1 3 .3 11.4 
Venezuela 15 029 3 088 7 338 1 914 2 689 20.6 48.8 12.7 17.9 
Latin America 174 224 282 34 357 18 494 26 091 26.0 48.4 10.6 
Source; ECLA, on the basis of official doouaents. 
/Tablo 16 
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Table 16 presents an estimate of the change in the price of 
the four major refined oil products associated with the postulated 
changes in the cost of imported crude oil. The major assumptions 
underlying these calculations are the following: First, the cost 
of imported crude'oil increases from US$ 2.20 per barrel in early 
1975 to US$ 7-00 and US$ 10.00 per barrel, FOB, Persian Gulf, in 
197^; second, the average final market value per barrel of crude 
oil in 1973 in the region's oil-deficit countries falls within the 
estimated minimum-maximum range as presented in table 7i third, 
the change in each of the two estimates of 1973 final market value 
per barrel of crude oil (i.e., USiJ 6.42 and US$ 8.55 per barrel) is 
limited to the following items: (a) the cost of the crude oil 
(FOB, Persian Gulf), (b) the change in taxes triggered by that change 
in crude oil cost, and, here, it is assumed that oil taxes are 
levied on an ad. valorem basis; and, (c) that the average rate of 
profit (i.e., 15 per cent) on the value of sales less taxes ia 
applied to the increased base occasioned by the increased cost of 
crude oil. Fourth, per barrel costs of freight, insurance, refining, 
and marketing do not change, by assumption, in order to isolate the 
impact on refined product prices occurring uniquely due to the 
increased cost of imported crude oil. Fifth, the increment in 
final market value, in the 1973 minimum and maximum cases presented 
in table 16, is allocated to refined products by holding constant 
the 1972 weighted average allocation structures of industry costs and 
taxes shown in table 14, and the resulting price increases are added 
to the weighted average prices for each refined product in 1973 as shown 
in that table.^8/ Sixth, in calculating the increment in refined product 
prices, it is assumed that domestically produced crude oil is priced at 
its opportunity cost, a figure which varies, of course, between countries. 
Given the wide dispersion about the weighted average price, cost, 
and tax data for these five countries (table 14), this approach 
imparts a considerable loss in generalizing power. The figures 
presented in table 17 on the prices of refined oil products in 





¿¡STDIATED MMGZ OP INCREASE H ! C E PRICI: OP S2LECTED REFUGD OIL PRODUCTS, 1973-1574, 
I N LATH: AMSRICA»S OIL-DEFICIT COUNTRIES 
(Units as indloated) 
A) Pinal oarket value, early 1973 ($/b'ol.) $ 6.42 $ 8 .55 
B) Pinal rjarket value, avg. 1974 ($/bbl.) 12.76 16.73 16.28 21.11 
C) Cost of crude oil, 1974 ($/bbl.) 7.00 10.00 7.00 10.00 
D) Increase in prioe of refined produots, 1973-1974 
(i/litre): 
Hotor gasoline 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.11 
Kerosene 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.24 
Diesel &nd gas oil 0.04 0.07 0.05 0«08 
Fuel oil 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
2) Weighted average structure of prices, 1972-1973 
(§/litre); 
' liotor gasoline 0.11 
Kerosene O.O3 
Diesel and gas oil 0.07 
Fuel oil 0.02 
Notes; Lines A, B, and C refer to table 7 . . 
Line D; These price increases were derived by passing on the increased cost of inported orude 
oil (using Saudi arabian light, FOB Persian Gulf, as the base (see table 7)) to domestic 
consumers of refined oil products in accordance with the weighted owi'-age systems of cost and 
tare allocation prevailing in 1972, as shown in table l̂ ., allowing for a mark-up on the increased 
oost of that crude oil. 
Line Hie local currenoy prices of the four refined products for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru were taken from the same sources as noted in the footnote in table 14. These 
prices were converted to dollar equivalents, using offioial rates of exchange in effect at the 
tirae of the prioe datum for each country. The price of each refined product in each country 
va3 then weighted for the share of oonsunption of that, product in the total consunption of the 
four produots in the five countries. The resulting volur.ie-weighted structure of refined oil 
products, which is based largely on 1972 data (but including 1973 data as well), m s taken as a 
representative struoture for the situation in early 1973. 
Tlie sheip increase shwn c-bove-for kerosene does not nscji that the prioes indloated ftp "Bat refined 
produot (or any others, for that Matter) will, necessarily energe. It simply reflects the ohanoo 
in prioe that would accur if the increased cost of crude oil were passed forward to consumers 
within fixed (\reighted-average) systeas of industry cost allocation and tax incidence. Because 
. of its relatively low share in refined produot consumption in the four oountries covered and 
the large absolute increases in oosts and taxes it bears, the price of kerosene jumps sharply. 
Price policy aay, in fact, not peruit such a sharp increase in the price of kerosene, allocat-
ing to motor gasoline and other produots sons of the oost and tax burden that would fall on 
kerosene if the previous system of oost aad tax allocation xrere retained. /Tlio cost 
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The cost of imported crude oil (CIP) is taken as a rough approximation 
of the opportunity cost of indigenously produced crude oil. Insofar 
as this measure ignores the role of differential transport costs in 
establishing the structure of export prices for indigenous crude 
oil, it is a biased estimator. But, for present purposes, the 
distortion introduced is not prohibitive. 
Summarized in table 17 are the prices of the four major 
refined oil products associated with the case in \ihich the cost of 
imported crude oil increases from US$ 2.20 per barrel, in early 
1973 to US# 7.00 and US$ 10.00 per barrel in 1974. These prices 
are presented for the minimum and maximum cases of the final market 
value of a barrel of crude oil in 1973 as shown in table 7« 
(i.e., US$ 6.42 and US$ 8.55, respectively). 
Table 17 
PRICES OF SELECTED REFINED OIL PRODUCTS ASSOCIATED WITH" 
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF FINAL MARKET VALUES OF A BARREL 
OF CRUDE OIL IN THE DOMESTIC ECCKOMY, 1974 
(In units as indicated) 
Final market value, early 1973 
(USii/barrel) US$ 6.42 US# 8.55 
Final market value, average 1974 
(USil/barrel) 12.75 16.73 16.28 21.11 
Cost of crude oil (FOB Persian 
Gulf), (USli/'barrel) 7.00 10.00 7.00 10.00 


















Source: Table 16 
/These summary 
- 55 -
These summary figures prompt several observations: 
First, bocause of the low absorption of costs and taxes taken 
jointly vrith its relatively high weight in the consumption of 
refined oil products, the price of fuel oil is not significantly 
changed as the cost of crude oil increases to US$ 7*00 and US$ 10.00 
per barrel. In comparison with its price in early 1973, 
US$ 0.02/litre, the price of fuel oil rises to US$ 0.03-0= O V ü t r e 
at a TJSrf 7«00/barrel crude oil cost and to US$ O.OVlitre at a 
US$ 10.00/barrel crude oil cost. Clearly, price increases on this 
order tirould not constitute a significant depressant on the consumption 
of fuel oil. 
Second, and at the other extreme, because of the small share 
of kerosene in the structure of final product demand and its 
relatively large share in allocated costs and taxes, the increase 
in the price of kerosene is comparatively sharp. If the cost of 
crude oil rises from US« 2.20 to US« 7.00/barrel, then the price 
of kerosene falls in the range of US$ O.I7-US4P 0.lS/litre. 
Alternatively, if the cost of crude oil rises to US'? 10.00/barrel, 
the price of kerosene falls in the range of US$5 O^'l-US^ 0.2o/litre. 
At these prices, one would expect restrictions by many consumers in 
their purchases of kex-osene in many oil-deficit cô rri ries, and, 
particularly, by lower-income families living in rut¿.l areas. 
Third, falling between the extremes of fuel oil and kerosene, 
lie the new prices of motor gasoline and diesel oil. At US^ 7°°0/barrel, 
the price of gasoline would range betv/een US& 0.16--US3 Odo/litre, 
and, at US$ 10.00/barrel, the range would be USC? 0.19-USii 0.22/litre. 
In the case of diesel oil, the comparable ranges are US$ 0ol0-US# 0.11/ 
litre (US# 7.00/barrel) and US$ 0.13-US8 O.lVütre (TJSÍÍ 10.00/barrel). 
While these higher prices may trigger cutbacks in the consumption 
of motor gasoline, especially by private households, the degree of 
this deceleration in any one country, is, of course, a highly 
spaculative matter. The empirical basis simply does^not exist to 




But, whatever the reaction it will have its implications for 
the rate of growth in crude oil imports in countries satisfying 
domestic oil product requirements by refining imported crude oil. 
In these countries, refining strategy is typically oriented to 
minimizing motor gasoline imports. Hence, if domestic consumption 
of motor gasoline is not significantly reduced by the higher prices 
for motor gasoline, then governments of oil-deficit countries may 
find it necessary to increase motor gasoline prices even higher in 
an effort to reduce, to desired levels, their payments in foreign 
exchange for imported crude oil. 
2. The price of fuels 
What effect will the increase in the price of refined oil 
products have on the price of fuels in the region's oil-deficit 
countries? This question is taken as logically prior to a more 
general one: what will be the immediate increase in the general 
price level in these countries triggered by the increase in the 
price of imported crude oil? 
Of the region's 19 oil-deficit countries, three are completely 
dependent on imported oil in meeting their total energy requirements 
(excluding vegetable fuels): Barbados, Cuba,29/ and Guyana. For 
these countries, the increase in the market price of oil is the 
increase in the price of their fuels. 
In eleven of the remaining sixteen oil-deficit countries in 
the region the only energy source used, other than oil, is hydropower. 
In ten of these eleven countries, imported oil constitutes more than 
four-fifths of the volume of total energy flows, and, in Costa Rica, 
it represents about three-fifths of that total. In each of these 
eleven countries, the increase in the price of refined oil products 
should also be a statistically close approximation to the increase in 
the average price of fuels. 
29/ Actually, Cuba does produce crude oil, but the volumes 
involved are negligible. (Refer to table 18). 
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There are five oil-deficit countries in the region which 
draw on indigenous reserves of oil, gas, coal, and hydropower in 
satisfying their (non-vegetable fuel) energy requirements. These 
countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. 
In the other 14 of the region's 19 oil-deficit countries, 
the heavy reliance on imported oil in the structure of their 
(non-vegetable fuel) energy consumption, taken together with the 
relative inability to change this pattern in the near future, makes 
it very likely that the increase in the price of refined oil products 
in these countries will be a close approximation to the increase in 
the price of fuels iiu !;hem. 
To what extent can an increase in fuel prices in the 
five just cited countries be moderated by a substitution of 
hydropower, coal, and natural gas for imported oil and of indigenous 
for imported critde oil supp] ies? 
In the case of hydropower, supplies of this fuel are drawn upon 
by pox^er companion; before other fuels, and, gi/en the lead-time involved 
in hydropower projects, no significant acceleration can be expected 
in the supply of this energy source beyond^ currently planned levels 
to the end of the decade. Consequently, hydropower cannot be viewed 
as a marginally significant moderating influence on the upward 
pressure on fuel prices stemming from the original increase in the 
price of imported crude oil. 
A major, potential source of relief from the increased cost 
of oil in the ' electric power industries of the oil-importing countries 
lies in the conversion of oil-fired thermal power plants, both those 
already operational as well as those in the pipeline, to indigenous-
based fuels, particularly coal and natural gas. Fortunately, as the 
data in table 19 indicate, plans made in the region's oil-importing 
countries in the early seventies for expansion of generating capacity 
through 1930, envisaged a displacement of oil-fired plants by both 




mCEUHNE CF EXPANSION CF INSTALLED GSiHUTBD CAPACITY BY IYPE CF FUEL, 
IN SEL2CESD LATIN ¿SffiRICAii 0IL-D3PICIT COUNTRIES, 
(In m ) 
Thernoelectrie Other 
Country Hydroe lec t r i c 
Oi l 
n a t u r a l 
gas 
Coal Nuclear Gecthernal 
T o t a l S / 
Argentina 6 680 1 200 565 920 - 2 685 
B r a z i l 14 ooo 1 499 « - 625 2 124 
Costa Rica 180 30 - - - 30. 
Cuba ,«• ... - - «9 •«* 
Chile 820 275 - 360 - 15 650 
E l Salvador I89 - - 33 33 
Guatemala 1G8 157 - - - mm 
Ovyana ,,, M - - - • »« 
H a i t i - - «H «». 
Honduras 34o 24 - - - - 24 
Jomaica M 68 F"F - m 68 
3 300 ( 1 322) (3 500) 3C0 1 340 285 7 407 
Nicaragua 200 - - mh 200 
Panana 470 238 4M - - 238 
Paraguay 30 40 - 4o 
Peru 1 9 ® 216. - - - 216 
Dominican Republic 4o 269 •* - - - 269 
Uruguay 570 375 - M - 375 
T o t a l programme 1974-1980 28 832 4 713 4 700 1 88|> 2 885 M 14 501 
I n s t a l l e d capacity, t o 1973 21 824 16 157 3 154 1 110 •• (25) 20 496 
To ta l 50 656 20 870 7 854 2 995 2 835 ¿08 2 2 J S 2 
Sources SCLA, on the basis of official infornation. 
a/ Represents sua of thsrmoelectrio, nuolear and geothernal stations. 
/'J?iat arc 
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What are the possibilities for substituting domestic coal 
for fuel oil in these five countries as a means of tempering the 
increase in fuel prices? The prospects seem bleak. There seems 
to be little, if any, competition in the determination of the price 
of domestic coal and its oil-based competitor, fuel oil, in these 
countries. The data in table 20 indicate that the per-unit cost 
of energy purchased in the form of coal in these countries was 
higher than that of energy purchased in the form òf fuel oil, not 
adjusting for the advantage which fuel oil has over coal in burning 
and other sources of efficiency. In short, the relative price of 
coal to fuel oil is fixed administratively. It is not determined 
by competitive n-nrket forces: if it were, the coal industries of 
these countries would be under far more severe financial pressure 
than they are now. 
Additionally, given the spread between the price per-unit of 
energy purchased in the form of coal and fuel oil in 1973» "the 
increase in the price of fuel oil in 1973-1974 (table 16: about 
US$ 0.01-US'J 0.02/litre, or US$ 0.90-US8 1.30 per million kilo-
calories) would still place the price of fuel oil in 1974 below 
the price of domestic coal in the coal producing/oil-deficit 
countries in the region for which data are available. The implication 
of this is obvious: even if the price of domestic coal remained 
constant during 1973"197^» (actually, it has risen sharply), while 
the price of fuel oil increased by US$ 0.01-US$ 0.02/litre, there 
still would be no financial incentive for private manufacturers or 
private thermal power plants to substitute indigenous coal for fuel 
oil in the region's major coal producing, oil-deficit countries. 
In short, the bulk of domestically produced coal in these 
countries flows to markets protected from price competition: the 
publicly-owned (or administratively controlled) metallurgical, 
thermal power, and railroad industries.30/ Private companies 
simply do not have the financial incentive for substituting out 
of fuel oil into coal, given coal/fuel oil price relationships. 
30/ See BarnSn Suarez; The Prospects for Coal in Latin America, 
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(Units as Indicated) 














Prices DS$ per 
m3 10° koals 
Coal (locally produced) 
Calo- i 






argentina 10 500 0,26a/ 0.026 26 2.48 9.300 0.025b/ 0.012c/ 
2.09b/ 
1.290/ 6 200 
37.0 5.96 
Brazil 10 500 0,1583/ 0.026 26 2.48 9 300 O.OlÇd/ 1.61 5 000 30.4d/ •vi
 
» a 
Chile 10 500 1 .30e/ 0.019 19 1,81 9 300 ,,, 6 900 3 1 . 0 e / 4,4? 
Mexico 10 500 o.l4f/ 0.011 11 I . 05 9 300 0.0084 0,30 6 300 25,Q§/ 3.98 
Peru 10 500 o.78f/ 0,020 20 I.90 9 300 ,,, 
Souroet ffuel oil and natural gas; In the case of Peru, the prices were taken fron FBTROEERU, op.cit., 
Table 12« Prices for the four other countries vers supplied to ECLA ty UN regional offices« 
Coal: Por Brazil, price was taken froa: Congresso Brasileiro de Siderurgia, vol* II, p. 24. 
For Chile, price date, were supplied by Cía. Carbonífera de Lota-Schwaaer. Price data for Argentina* 
Mexico and Peru were provided by Sr. R. Suarez of ECLA, táio obtained theta in discussions at the 
IL4FA Symposium on Coal and Coke in Latin America's Iron and Steel Industry, Caracas, May 1J72« 
Motes The folio-wing exchange rates were used to convert fuel prices in looal currency to VS$: 
Argentina 3.98 pesos » 1, the trade conversion factor. 
Brazil 6,160 oruzeiTos m US$ 1 
Chile 70 escudos ES US$ 1 
I-Iexioo 12,49 pesos = US$ 1 
Peru 38«70 soles a BS$ 1 
Calorific values of fuels estimated by ECLA 
y June, 1973. 
Jj/ 1972; covers household use up to 200 m^/day, 
0/ I9723 for consuuption up to 100 000 n¿fyday. 
d/ ilovenber, 1973 for fuel oil and natural gas; deceuber, I973 for coal used in the iron and stsel industry, 





For such substitution to be realized, coal must be channelled to 
private companies at prices sufficiently below fuel oil to pay-out 
the costs involved to those incurring them in the conversion from 
fuel oil to coal. But, even if coal prices were reduced with this 
in mind, it would not follow that private companies would make the 
switch from oil to coal. For this to take place, potential coal 
consumers would also have to expect a continuation in the future 
of a favourable price of coal relative to fuel oil. Practically 
speaking, this shift in relative price expectations is not a simple 
one to effect. 
In any event, to what extent can, in fact, the domestic coal 
industries in these countries increase production now in an effort 
to displace oil (assuming the proper price incentive and a permissive 
set of price expectations by potential coal consumers)? 
The prospects on this account are quantitatively minor even 
if, from the public point of view, it iirere desirable to substitute 
indigenous coal for oil. A combination of antiquated technology, 
minimal spare production capacity, and typically difficult extractive 
conditions renders easy increases in coal supply in the coal 
industries of these countries more or less out of the question in. 
this decade. Major investments are required in them to increase 
supply capacity, and the long lead-time between capital investment 
and increased supply blocks substantive increases in production in 
the coal industries of these countries in the near future. 
i 
The foreign coal market, which, in 19?2, supplied about 
one-quarter of the region's coal consumption, offers little 
relief to Latin America's oil-deficit countries seeking to substitute 
coal for oil. The export component of the world coal industry 
which the United States dominates, is already pushing full capacity, 
and world coal export prices are rising sharply; and, at present 
levels, they have probably already eliminated the financial incentive 
to substitute imported coal for fuel oil throughout the region. 
/Plans to 
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Plans to increase coal production will undoubtedly multiply 
in Latin America's coal-producing countries. But, significant 
expansions to present capacity should not be expected prior to the 
end of the decade. Until then, one can expect: that the initial 
increase in the cost of internationally traded crude oil will trigger 
a sharp rise in the price of imported coal; that the (administered) 
price of indigenous coal will rise under the umbrella of the 
increased price of imported coal and domestic fuel oil; that 
relatively minor volumes of coal substitution (largely in publicly 
controlled industries) will quickly exhaust spare capacity in the 
domestic coal producing industry, and that private industry will 
not have the financial incentive to substitute domestic coal for 
oil; and, finally, that the price of coal will provide little, if 
any, offset to the increased price of fuels '.'.n general in Latin 
America's oil-deficit countries. 
Table 21 indicates the relatively large volumes of natural gas 
flared in some of the region's oil-deficit/natural gas-producing 
countries. To.these volumes of immediately available supply should 
be added the additional volumes that automatically will be made 
available from accelerated production of indigenous crude oil, since 
oil and gas reserves are often found together in these countries. 
Thus, unlike the situation in the case of indigenous coal 
supply - where the production segment of the industry is the immediate 
bottleneck to increased supply - the natural gas producing industries 
in the region's oil-deficit countries can generate significant 
increases in supply using existing facilities. The major obstacle 
to the substitution of indigenous natural gas for refined oil products 
(e.g., fuel oil, kerosene, and, oil-based electric power) appears to 




PRODUCTION AMD USES OF NATURAL GAS M SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 19^5, 197^ AND 1972 
(M3 x IO6) 
Covai try Year Production 
Reinfection 
a/ 





Argentina 1965 6 236 230 4 502 1 763 — _ 
1970 7 665 8 6 102 1 598 - - -
1972 7 862 8 6 235 1 619 - -
Bolivia 1965 212 76 80 56 - -
1970 866 551 39 169 - -
1972 3 424 l 575 32 812 1 005 -
Brazil 19^5 683 263 50 330 - -
1970 1 264 246 ll8 900 - -
1972 1 242 4oi 228 612 - -
C olombia 1965 2 658 795 875 • * • - l 337 
1970 2 971 937 1 343 569 - 1 931 
1972 3 274 862 1 721 691 - 1 970 
Chile 19^5 6 215 4 M86 517b/ • M - 4 448 
1970 7 628 4 954 520b/ • • • - 4 ill 
1972 8 073 3 993 54ob/ • • • - 4 351 
Ecuador 19^5 251 • « « • • • » - • •• 
1970 104 13 66 22 M 172 
1972 88 13 54 14 - 167 
Méxioo 1965 13 965 1 251 8 930c/ 2 813 1 539 -
1970 18 839 294 12 2060/ 4 908 1 260 -
1?72 18 697 396 12 5O4O/ 5 554 243 M 
Peru 1965 1 847 439 341 599 - 933 
1970 2 119 205 395 1 033 - 655 
1972 1 831 . l80b/ 420b/ 870b/ 55»/ 
Trinidad gnd Tobago 196$ 3 263 392 1 174 * • * _ 273 
1970 3 053 539 1 600 296 - 488 
1972 2 768 261 1 618 397 - 549 
Venezuela 1965 4o 846 17 720 6 538 16 052 - 536 
1970 48 427 20 110 8 979 18 444 - 881 
1972 46 020 20 514 9 524 14 527 - 1 455 
Total 1965 76 176 25 622 23 o47 •̂21 613 1 539 7 527 
1970 92 936 27 857 31 368 27 939 1 260 8 238 
1972 93 279 28 203 32 866 25 096 1 248 9 042 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
a/ Includes dry gas in countries where natural gis a s processed into liquefied gas. 
b/ Estimate. 
c/ Includes imported natural 
/ I n BOS1G 
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In some cases, this pressure might be alleviated, however. 
Additional pumping capacity together with new gas distribution 
facilities, in some markets, might be a feasible means for 
substituting natural gas for refined oil products in the relatively 
near future. Investment might also be feasible, in some areas, to 
increase gas storage capacity at consumption sites, newly linked 
to the gas distribution system, and, otherwise unmarketable gas, 
now available at producing sites, could be pumped during off-peak 
periods for storage in these facilities for eventual- use.31/ 
But, such investments, even where they are economically 
defensible, will probably take several years to effect, and, so, 
this source of relief may be viewed as quantitatively marginal in 
potential terms for the rest of the decade. Plans made 
now for incremental natural gas transmission and distribution.facilities 
(as opposed to distribution facilities alone) are virtually impossible 
to realize physically much before the end of this decade, and 
substitution potentials requiring such joint facilities, beyond scales 
already envisaged, can be ignored, for all practical purposes, for 
the rest of the seventies. 
In short, an increase in the demand for natural gas triggered 
by the increased price of oil products will quickly put a strain 
on existing nattiral gas marketing facilities, checking the potential 
rate of physical substitution of domestically produced natural gas 
for oil. Otherwise surplus natural gas at production sites, however,, 
will, undoubtedly, find economically useful application, in greater 
volumes than in the past, in reinfection for oil-well pressure 
maintenance, as indigenous crude oil production is increased under 
conditions of rising unit cost., 
Jil/ i<iquification facilities at natural gas production sites combined 
with de-liquification facilities at sites close to markets is 
an investment alternative to be compared with incremental 
investment in natural gas transmission facilities. But, for 
the same reason as presented in the paragraph below, this option 
will probably not provide much in the way of accelerated 
substitution potential of indigenous natural gas for oil during 
the rest of the decade. 
/Since the 
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Since the State controls natural gas tariffs in these five 
countries, its price does not emerge from competitive forces in 
the energy markets in which this fuel is sold. The fragmentary 
figures in table 20 suggest that natural gas is priced below fuel 
oil, its major competitor on an energy content basis. Given the 
continuing pressure to conserve foreign exchange in the region's oil 
producing/oil-deficit countries, this approach to the pricing of 
natural gas (vis-a-vis fuel oil) will, undoubtedly, continue. Thus, 
the increase in the price of fuel oil associated with an increase in 
crude oil cost to US$ 7=00 and US$ 10.00 per barrel, US& 0.01-US& 0.02/ 
litre respectively, or US$ 0.90-US$ 1.80/million kilocalories, could 
be taken as a rough approximation to the upper limit of the increase 
in the price of natural gas in markets where it competes with fuel 
oil. Incremental supply costs ;iot covered by this increase will, 
probably, be passed on to the relatively smaller and more price 
inelastic household market for natural gas in these countries. 
The major source of financial (but, not economic) relief from 
rising fuel prices in the region's oil-deficit/oil-producing countries 
appears to lie, not so much in a substitution of indigenous gas, or 
coal, or hydropower, for oil over the next several years as in a 
substitution of indigenous for imported crude oil. In the region's 
five oil-deficit countries, where this substitution potential is 
immediately present, it is most easily captured when the State is 
the sole participant in the domestic oil business. The degree of 
state participation in the major segments of the oil business in 
these five countries is shown in table 11. 
The increased price of imported crude oil constitutes an 
immediate incentive to produce more domestic crude oil from indigenous 
proven reserves of crude oil. The economic cost of not producing 
an additional barrel of indigenous crude oil is given by the cost 
of importing that barrel. And, once produced, the economic value of 
a barrel of indigenous crude oil is given by its opportunity cost 
(i.e., the value of that barrel if sold in the international crude 
oil market). So, production of indigenous crude oil from state 
/facilities can 
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facilities can be economically defended up to the point that the 
economic cost per barrel of indigenous crude oil equals the price 
of a barrel of imported crude oil (GIF) to the domestic refiner. 
It is clear that the postulated increase in the price of 
imported crude oil to US$ 7-00 and US& 10„00/barrel (FOB, Persian 
Gulf) between 1973-197k constitutes a massive stimulus to indigenous 
crude oil supply in these five countries. Shut-in wells can be brought 
into production, and virtually all wells can be operated using 
maximum recovery techniques and, probably, still be profitable from 
the national point of view. In fact, the major bottleneck to increased 
indigenous crude oil production during the seventies, from a now-
increased level of proven crude oil reserves in these countries, may 
not stem so much from the additions to cost triggered by increased 
indigenous crude oil production from existing rigs as from the 
physical availability and price of required equipment, most of which 
is imported from oil-equipment supply companies that are probably 
operating at high-capacity rates. 
The increased price of imported crude oil will not only 
stimulate the time rate of production from (historically) "proven" 
reserves; it will also provide a stimulus to convert (historically) 
"probable but not proven" reserves to (revised levels of) "proven" 
reserves of indigenous crude oil and, then, to produce from them. 
The simple reality is this: a wide array of crude oil production 
and development schemes will make sense economically in these five 
countries, or by them elsewhere, at an economic cost to 
US® 7»00-US$ 10.00/barrel (FOB, Persian Gulf), plus transportation 
and insurance, for imported crude oil. The major obstacle to the 
implementation of crude oil development projects during the rest of 
the seventies will probably be the same as in the case of crude oil 
production projects: the availability and price of the requisite 
physical equipment from largely foreign oil-equipment supply 
companies already operating at high levels of capacity. 
/When analysis 
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When analysis proceeds from production and development to 
the exploration stage of the crude oil supplying industry, the 
decision to enter or not is heavily contingent on the estimated 
probability of success in finding crude oil, insofar as it conditions 
the expected cost of finding new reserves of crude oil relative to 
the expected cost of developing more proven reserves. But, in the 
context of the present analysis, the impact of crude oil exploration 
projects in these countries on the price of their fuels will probably 
be minor during the rest of the decade; the lead-time involved will 
probably be too long to make these incrementally lower-cost crude 
oil flows, if realized, volumetrically too important during this 
period. 
What effect will the increased supply of indigenous crude oil 
have on the pricc of fuels in these five countries? By and large, the 
State is i-n control of the production and refining segments of the 
oil business in these countries (table 11). Basically, it can either 
book its indigenous crude oil at its financial cost into domestic 
refineries and, by assumption, pass on the lower financial cost of 
domestic crude oil to domestic consumers of refined oil products; or,, 
it can book domestic crude oil into domestic refineries at the price 
at which it could sell that crude oil in the export market (i.e., at 
its opportunity cost, the economic value of that crude oil).3.2/ 
The calculations that follow will show.the implications for the 
general price level if the State books its domestically produced crude 
oil into domestic refineries at its financial cost per barrel, and, 
32/ Obviously, the State can book this crude oil into its 
refineries at prices between its opportunity cost and its 
financial cost of acquisition. Additionally, the State also 
has the option of booking domestically produced crude oil into 
its refineries at levels below the financial cost incurred per 
barrel to produce that crude oil (i.e., it can subsidize oil 
consumers, the extent of the subsidy being measured from the 
opportunity cost of domestically produced crude oil). For 
purposes of this analysis, it is assumed, however, that, at a 
minimum, the financial cost of indigenous crude oil supply is 
passed forward to refiners and, then, to final consumers of 
refined oil products. 
/alternatively, at 
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alternativelyj at its opportunity cost as well. To the extent, 
then, that a country can produce indigenous crude oil cheaper 
that it can import it, that country can potentially reduce the 
average financial cost of crude oil to its domestic refineries which, 
it is assumed, will be reflected in a lower refined product price 
structure than \irould emerge either in the case of the opportunity 
costing of domestically produced crude oil, or in the situation where 
a country is completely reliant on imported oil. Thus, countries like 
Mexico and Argentina, which are, at present, close to self-sufficiency 
in crude oil supply, can substantially mitigate the upward pressure 
on domestic energy prices stemming from the higher cost of imported 
oil. On the other hand, the other fourteen of the region's nineteen 
oil-deficit countries, which are completely reliant on imports for 
their domestic oil supplies, do not have available this means for 
mitigating the increase in the structure of refined oil produce 
prices. 
By way of summary, then, it is concluded: first, that, in each 
of the region's nineteen oil-deficit countries, the increase in the 
price of refined oil products may be taken as rough approximation 
of the increase in the price of fuels in them; and, second, that in 
the five oil-producing/oil-deficit countries in the region, the 
increased price of fuels will be heavily conditioned, in a financial, 
but not in an economic sense by the degree to which cheaper domestic 
crude oil can be substituted for more expensive supplies of imported 
crude oil. Whatever its price in the domestic economy, the economic 
(net) value of a barrel of indigenously produced cx-ude oil is given 
by its export price less, of course, any economic costs incurred 
by exporting it. 
/3. The 
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3. The general price level 
Table 22 presents a rough estimate of the upward pressure on 
the general price level in 1973-1974 associated with a movement 
to the highest level of refined product prices under each of the 
US$ 7.00 and USy 10.00 (FOB, Persian Gulf), crude oil cost assumptions. 
In the TJS$ 10.00/barrel case, this increase occurs as the final market 
value of a barrel of crude oil increases from US$ 8.55 in 1973 to 
USif 21.11 in 197^, and in the US 8 7.00/barrel case, it occurs with 
a comparable increase from US$ 8.55 to US$ 16.28/barrel. (Refer to 
table 16.) Other assumptions underlying this estimate, in addition 
to those specified in tables 7, 14 and 16, are: first, that indigenous 
crude oil is booked into domestic refineries either at its opportunity 
cost, on the one hand, or at its financial cost, on the other; and 
it is assumed that this latter cost does not change significantly 
during 1973-197^» The second assumption is that the mix of imported 
and domestic crude oil stays constant during 1973-197^» 
These two assumptions impart a bias in the estimated upward 
pressure on the general price level,33/ only in the case of the five 
oil-producing/oil-deficit countries in the region. In the near future, 
since the crude oil-supplying industry is one of increasing costs, 
the first assumption biases the calculation of the price pressure 
downward in the case where indigenous crude oil is booked into 
refineries at its financial cost of supply; and the second assumption 
imparts a downward (upward) bias to the extent that indigenous crude 
supplies increase less (more) rapidly than imported oil supplies, again, 
when indigenous crude oil supply is booked into refineries on a 
financial basis.34/ 
53/ Technically speaking, the concept of the general price level used 
here is not the same as the usual concept. The usual concept is 
based on a measuring technique which weights the changes in the 
price of individual products by their share in domestic consumer 
expenditures. On the other hand, the concept of the general price 
level employed here weights the changes in the price of specific 
products by their relative energy content. 
34/ Refer to the discussion in the footnotes to table 22 for a more 





ESTIMATED IMMEDIATE UPWARD FRESSURE CN THE GENERAL PRICE LSTffiL IN THE REG-ION'S 
OIL-DEFICIT COUNTRIES FROM AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF IMPORTED CRUDE OIL FROM 
$2.20 IN EARLY 1973 TO $7.00 i\ND $10„00/bBL (AVERAGE) IN 19?4 
(1973 = 1 0 0 ) 
Estimated (per coat) 
levels of s 
A crude oil throughput: per cent a/ 
Country A B 
Argentina 3 ~ 4 5 
Value-added in 100 71 & a 1 Brazil 3 - 4 75 
the energy seotor Chile 3 - 4 65 
as per cent of 1 101 101 101 100 100 Ifexico 3 - 4 5 
total value added Peru 2 - 3 30 
5 107 106 105 102 100 Others b/ 2 - 4 100 
Notes? By way of example, the 107 and 106 entries are derived as follows: 
107 t= 100 (O.95) + 100 (0C05) + 100 [ (1 .47 ) (i®oo) (0 .05)] ; 
loé = 100 (0„95) + 100 (0,05) + 100 [ (1 ,47) (o„75) ( 0 . 0 5 ) ] . 
The figures presented sieve assume -that the price of imported oruda increased by 355$ from $2,20 in early 
1973 to $10.00 in 1974. This was transformed into a maximum inorease in the final market value per barrel 
of crude oil of 147$, from $8.55 in 1973 to $21.11 in 1974 (table 7).This 1470 increase was takan as a 
rough approximation of the maximum increase in the price of fuels. 
The assumption nade here that the average cost per barrel of crude oil to domestio refineries is equal to 
-the cost of international oruda oil implies that either all crude oil is imported or that indigenous crude 
oil is sold to domestio refineries at its opportunity cost. If indigenous crude oil is booked to domes-
tic refineries at its financial oost of supply, "then the inflationary icpaot of h3.gh.sr prices for imported 
oruda oil is cushioned to the extent that supplies of cheaper indigenous orude oil are mixed with more 
expensive imported orude oil. 
More specifically, the average cost per barrel (C) of crude oil to domestic refineries is given by the 
volume of domestic orude oil produced (a) relative to total orude oil throughput (r) multiplied by the 
financial cost per barrel of domestic orude oil (D) plus the share of imported oil in domestio refinery 
throughput (l « a/r) multiplied by -the average cost of imported orude (1)5 or 
C = D + ( 1 - ) I, where a + (l « a) = 1 a 
r r 
Thus, as governments try to increase the volume of domestio crude oil (a), bsth absolutely and in ref-
lation to domestio refinery runs (r) as ire 11, in response to the increase prioe of I, and witìi D rising 













da • r 
- 3 
With I teken as constant at the new level of, say, $7«00/bbl„ or $10«00 FOB Persian Gulf, this expression 
shows that the rate of inorease in the wei$vfced average cost of orude oil to domestic refineries will be 
heavily dependent on the degree to which the finenoiel cost of domestic orude oil rises in response to its 
increased output. Vltien D = I, there is no longer any mitigation of the inflationary impact by using 
domestic orude oil. This is the case either immediately if domestio orude oil is priced at its oppor-
tunity cost, in which oase -the entries under the 10C$ column are relevant or eventually, when, with in-
creasing domestio orude oil production, its increased supply cost equals the prioe of imported crude oil 
to domestio refiners. Beyond this point of equality, inflation is associated with higher levels of use 
of domestio crude oil» 
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Table 22 (concluded). 
In this context, the estimates of the upward pressure on prices presented in •this table constitute minimum 
estimates because they do not include the inflationary effect stemming from the increased cost of dorjestio 
crude oil as its production inoreases: (a) and (d) were held constant in the calculation of the upward 
pressure on the general price level. Unfortunately, no data vara available for any country with which to 
treat these variables in the estimates of upward pressure on the general price level. 
The sharo of energy in total valuo-added flews presented in this teile are only estimates. The presenta-
tion enables the reader to insert his own estimates, if he is in disagreenant with those presented hers. 
The shares of inported crude oil in total refinery runs of the five oil»produeing/cil-deficit countries a 
are based on the data for 1972 (1573 i n the case of Kbxieo) given in tables 36 and 38 . 
¿3 noted previously, the direct upward pressure on the general price level presented above is based on an 
increase in the average final martet value of a barrel of crude oil from $8=55 to $21.11 during 1973-1574. 
If that increase were from $8«55 to $l6.28/bbl. (with the prise of crude oil FOB rising from $2„20 to 
$7«>00/bbl8) the direct upward pressure on tho general prloe level would be as shown below. The other two 
oases presented in table 17 (where the final markst value of a barrel of crude oil increases from the 
minimum range level of $6.42 in early 1973 to $16#3 and $12.76 in 1974) generate direct upward pressures 





m 2£ & 2° 1 
101 101 101 100 100 
105 101+ 103 102 100 
Additionally, it should be noted that tile figures on upward price pressures in this table refer to the 
direot upward pressure on the general price level due to the increased 00st of fuels! they include only 
"the impact of the increased price of fuels, not the increased price of other inputs which will also rise 
in price due to the increased prloe of fuels. These indirect effects on the general prioe level are also 
considered in this seotion. Jh brief, for countries with a 5$ level .of energy-intensivsness and facing 
the maximum level of fuel prices, the upward pressure on prices, taking these indirect effects into aoooutrt, 
would rise from 7$ to and for "this same group of countries facing the minimum increase in fuel prices, 
the upward pressure on prices would rise from 5$ to 10j5. 
Finally, these calculations do not take aooount of pressures on the general price level stemming from 
changes in the prioe of any other commodity or from changes in the efficiency with which oommbdities in 
general are used in the eoonony. They are highly approximate in character. 
0/ For countries without refineries, the referent is the percent reliance on imported oil products, 
(i.e., 100¿)„ 
b/Refers to the l4 other oil-deficit/oil-consuming nations in the region. 
/ T h e f i g u r e s 
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The figures in table 22 suggest the following basic 
conclusions:35/ 
(a) Owing to the combined effect of a relatively high level 
of energy-intensive economic activity and a high degree 
of reliance on imported crude oil, 3razil and Chile vrould 
face a maximum direct upward pressure on their general 
price levels of about k per cent-5 per cent and 3 per 
cent-^ per cent, respectively, if the increase in the 
energy prices liere limited to the maximum increase 
specified, and if domestic crude oil was booked into 
refineries at its financial cost of acquisition, If, as 
in the case of some countries, refined product prices were 
increased more sharply than would be required simply to 
cover increased crude oil costs, this estimate of direct 
upxfard pressure on the general price level would, of 
course, be exceeded. 
(b) Taken as a group, the Caribbean, Central American Republics, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay would probably face an immediate 
upward pressure on prices in the neighbourhood of 
3 per cent-6 per cent. In these fourteen countries, the 
upward pressure on prices due to the increased cost of 
imported oil is significantly moderated by the typically 
low energy-intensiveness of economic activity in them. 
While this immediate upward pressure in prices is not an 
alarming prospect for this group of countries taken as a 
whole, the implications vary liidely between countries: 
for example, during 1972-1973, Uruguay's consumer price 
index increased by 119 per cent,in comparison with the 
increase in the case of Honduras, 6 per cent. 
35/ The upward pressure on the general price level being discussed 
at this point should not be confused with an actual movement 
in the general price level. The forraer pressure is being 
discussed here only with reference to the increased price of 
fuels while the latter, obviously, reflects all factors impinging 
on the general level of prices, only one of which is the 
price of fuels. 
/(c) From 
- -
From a financial point of view, the remaining three of 
region's 19 oil-deficit countries will probably experience 
relatively minor increases in consumer prices due to the 
assumed maximum increase in the cost of imported crude oil: 
about 1 per cent in the case of Peru, and virtually zero 
in the case of Mexico and Argentina, reflecting, by and 
large, their relative self-sufficiency in crude oil 
supply, given the assumption that domestically produced 
crude oil is booked to domestic refineries at its financial 
cost, not at its opportunity cost. 
If domestically produced crude oil is booked into domestic 
refineries at its opportunity cost, then the immediate 
upward pressure on prices for the five crude oil-producing/ 
crude oil-deficit countries in the region is also given 
uncer the 100 per cent column in table 22. In this case, 
the immediate upward price pressure will be in the range 
of 3 per cent-6 per cent, for these five countries, as it 
would be for the remaining oil-deficit countries in the 
region (see (b) above). It will probably be difficult 
to reduce substantially the immediate upward pressure on 
the general price level in these five countries by a 
substitution of domestic for imported crude oil when the 
domestic market for refined oil products is growing rapidly« 
Although domestic crude oil output can be increased in the 
immediate future in them, strong percentage growth in the 
domestic market for refined oil products could strain the 
indigenous crude oil industry's ability to maintain its 
share in total crude oil requirements. And, as indigenous 
crude oil output is increased, so will the unit cost of 
its supply, \irhich, in turn, will increase the extent of 
inflationary pressure. (Refer to the discussion of this 
point in the footnote to table 22.) 
/(e) Although 
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(e) Although, the immediate inflationary pressure of the 
increased price of fuels varies country-by-country, the 
overall pattern of increase for the region's oil-deficit 
countries does not suggest a case for grave alarm. This 
would not be the case with oil-deficit countries in the 
region which, with extremely low reserves of foreign 
exchange, choose to increase oil prices much higher than 
those being discussed here in an effort to cut back on 
imports on oil account. 
The estimates of direct inflationary potential presented in 
table 22 reflect a situation in which the increased cost of crude 
oil is passed on immediately to domestic consumers within a given 
system of industry cost and tax allocation. 
These estimates relate to the immediate, upward pressure on 
the general price level due to the increased cost of fuels. They 
do not include the effect of the increased cost of fuels on the cost 
of inputs other than fuels into intermediary industries. 
Table 23 presents a rough estimate of this indirect, upward 
pressure on the general price level. The figures in this table show 
that, at a maximum, with domestic crude booked at its opportunity 
cost, this indirect upward pressure on prices will probably be about 
the same order of magnitude as the direct upirard pressure: roughly, 
7 per cent, given the maximum level of fuel prices and a 5 per cent 
level of energy-intensiveness; and about 5 per cent in the case of 
the minimum level of fuel prices and the same level of energy-
intensiveness' of production. 
The direct upward pressure on prices due to the increased 
cost of fuels is the more significant source of price change for 
many products. It will occur more or less simultaneously, if 
increased fuel costs are passed on to consumers. On the other hand, 
the indirect upward pressure on prices, on the order of 5 per cent-
7 per cent for countries with a 5 per cent level of energy-intensiveness 
of production, will evolve over a longer period of time: say, one or 
two years. In other words, the annual impact of the indirect pressure 
on prices is temporally diluted, while the 5 par cent-7 per cent 




DIRECT,, INDIRECT# AND TOTAL UPWARD PRESSURE ON THE GENERAL PRICE 
ISVEL DUE TO THE INCREASED PRICE OP FUELS, 
(Peyoentage increase in tbfl generp.l prj oa ?.eval) 
Iharoase in the final market value of a barrel of crude oil 
between early 1573 and (average) 1J71* 
Direot Indirect Total 
JVora i 8^55 to $21,11 (see table 1$) 
1 0o01 O3OI 0«02 
Level of energy- 5 0*07 0.07 0»l4 
intonsivonsss of 
8«55 to $16,-28 (see table ?.$,) From i production» 
(percentage) 1 0o01 0 ,01 0..02 
5 0»05 O.O5 OolO 
Notes The two estimates presented above of the direct upward pressure on prices were taken from table 22»(undar 
the 100$ columns in the tey.t and footnote, respectively)» Tha total upward pressure on prioes over a 
period of time (ioQa, the sum of the immediate direct and the subsequent indirect pressures) was oalsulated 
in the following way; Firsts the average combined direct and indirect energy ooeffioieat for Intermediary 
industries was calculated separately for Argentina, using 1?71 input-output data, and for Peru, uetrg 
data» Sesondj each of these total energy coefficients was thsn divided by its respective average direct 
energy coefficient, yielding a ratio of 1»J in the case Qf Argentina aad 1*6 for Peru« Third.» the lc? 
factor was applied to the direct upward prise pressure factors presented above, yielding an estimate of the 
total upward pressure on prices over time» Fourth, the indirect upward pressure on prices triggerad by "fee 
increased price of fuels was calculated as the difference between the total upward pressure cn prises over 
a period of time and the direot upward pressure oocurring mors or less quickly, if increased fuel costs are 
passed on to final consumers« In view of the method used, the estimates of indirect effects presented here 
must be taken as highly approximate« 
Because of the relatively high oapital intensity af Argentina8s production pr«aesses? the application of 
the 1»9 faotor should be taken as an upper range estimate cf the extent of the indirect upward pressure oa 
prices« 
In maŝ y of -the regionls oilwdefioit countries, the indirect upward pressure on prioe will be substantially 
less on this account« 
Finally., as noted in the text, tha oonoept of the general price level being used here is not the same as 
tfee usual one. The usual statement of the general prioe level applies oonaimes* expenditure weights to 
changes in product prices, while; implicitly, the concept of the general price level used here uses energy 
consumption weights. The difference in reported pressure between these two systems of weighting is proba-
bly minor in most cases« howevera 
The figures presented refer to the situation in which a country is wholly dependent on Imported oil o? 
prices domestically produced oil at its opportunity cost» 
/A government 
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A government may, of course, decide to keep constant, or 
restrain the increase in, fuel prices to avoid what it views as the 
disruptive effects of inflation triggered by the increased price of 
oil«. The main devices available for this include compensatory 
reduction in taxes on refined oil products; manipulation of oil 
import exchange rates; and the imposition of maximum refined oil 
products selling prices (or letting public sector price leadership 
achieve this same objective in a mixed energy sector) coupled with 
the extension of subsidies to oil refineries. 
If taxes are reduced on refined oil products, then there will 
be, on this account alone, a decline in the level of central 
government revenues without a comparable reduction in manufactures, 
which is, at the margin, inflationary, unless financed by the sale 
of debt instruments to the private sector or by.increased taxes. 
Additionally, this approach does not record in the market the increased 
economic scarcity of oil, leaving its consumption and importation 
unchecked, either in whole or in part. Finally, this option reduces 
the incentive for domestic consumers to substitute domestic energy 
sources for imported oil. If such substitution is desirable, subsidies 
would have to be extended to achieve it, adding further to the 
inflationary pressure associated with this policy option. 
Governments may choose, on the other hand, to hold refined 
product prices constant (or to mitigate their increase), covering 
resulting energy industry deficits directly by subsidies. The' effect 
is, clearly inflationary to the extent that such subsidies are paid 
and financed without increased taxes or the sale of debt instruments 
to the private sector. Additionally, it provides no brake on the 
consumption of refined oil products or, therefore, on oil imports. 
If preferential import rates are extended by the State to oil 
importers, the immediate inflationary impact of the increased price 
of imported oil could be mitigated, or eliminated completely, by 
drawdowns of foreign exchange holdings by the central government for 
this purpose. For this reason, this option is open to countries with 
an initially strong foreign exchange position and/or with immediately 
/bright export 
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bright export prospects. It would dampen, or leave unaffected, the 
rate of growth in the domestic demand for refined oil products, and 
drawdowns on foreign exchange for oil imports would be, in whole or 
in part, unattenuated. Strong export growth could compensate for 
drawdowns of foreign exchange for this purpose, but, lacking this, 
the increasing pressure on reserves could lead, ultimately, to 
increased inflationary pressure and devaluation. 
With the exception of this last option, and, even here, with 
reservation, the original increased cost of imported oil will trigger 
an immediate upward pressure on the general price level. But, there 
are important differences, however, between an inflationary process 
caused by passing on increased oil costs to consumers and an 
inflationary process caused by compensatory reductions in taxes of 
energy flows or by the extension of subsidies to the oil industry 
to mitigate, or eliminate, an increase in the price of refined oil 
products. 
In the first case, there is a check on the rate of growth 
in domestic oil consumption, although the quantitative force of 
this check will vary between countries; and, second, when increased 
fuel costs are passed on to consumers, the overall pattern of resource 
allocation, (i.e., not just of energy resources) in an economy is 
open to change in reflection of the higher price of oil and of fuels. 
By comparison, these two adjustive mechanisms are absent, in 
whole or in part, with the adoption of compensatory tax reduction 
or direct subsidies in support of price cut-backs for fuels. Both 
fail to record the extent of the increased economic scarcity of oil 
and fuels in the economy. Consequently, consumer reactions to this 
reality is blocked, and drawdowns of,foreign exchange will be more 
intensive than if market prices were allowed to reflect that increased 
scarcity in the first place. Finally, since the market does not 
record the increased scarcity of oil and fuels under these two 
policy options, the probable consequence will be that energy consumers, 
both final and intermediate, will continue to combine economically 




k. Production and employment 
What impact will the increased costs of fuels have directly 
on production and employment in the region's oil-deficit countries? 
The increased cost of fuels constitutes an immediate increase 
in the variable financial costs of supply of every producing unit 
in the economy. Assuming these increased costs to be passed forward 
consumers will face an increase in the price of every good and 
service available to them for consumption. This constitutes an 
immediate reduction in their real income. This could trigger changes 
in .consumer demand to which, in turn, producers would respond in 
terms of changes in the volume of their production and employment. 
Within this simple scheme, the pivotal variables are the extent of 
the initial increase in the price of specific goods and services due 
to the increased cost of fuels (or, the extent of reduction in real 
consumer income) and, then, the severity of consumer reaction to 
these price increases. These two variables will impact on production 
and employment decisions in each producing unit in the economy. 
What can be said of the impact on the price of specific goods 
and services of the increased cost of fuels when these cost increases 
are passed forward to consumers? 
A 7 per cent direct increase in the general price level 
(table 22), on this account alone, constitutes an immediate reduction 
in consumer real income by the same amount. V/ith consumers spending, 
say, about k per cent of their total expenditures on fuels, and the 
price of fuels increasing by, say, 1̂ +7 per cent (i.e., US$ 21.11/ 
US$ 8.55, table 17), the reduction in real income stemming from 
the increased price of fuels would be about 2.4 per cent (i.e., 
0.0^-0.0^/2.^7). The rest of the direct reduction in consumer real 
income would be associated with the higher prices of goods other 
than fuels which consumers purchase from intermediary industries, 
¿¡-.6 per cent (i.e., 7»0 per cent-2.4 per cent). 
In the immediate future, it is likely that the consumption of 
fuels by households would be adversely affected by the price increases 
suggested in table 16, but there are forces operating to modify the 
/severity of 
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severity of this effect. The cost to households of providing heat, 
light, motive power, and private transportation in the immediate 
future is given, more or less, by the variable fuel (and maintenance) 
costs involved, since the capital costs have already been incurred. 
Some efficiencies will surely be triggered by domestic final consumers 
/ 
in their use of kerosene, natural gas, electricity and other fuels, 
but these may be minor in terms of their impact on total, direct 
domestic demand for fuels in many countries. In rural areas where 
average income per family is often close to subsistence levels, the 
cutback in household energy consumption could be quite severe, and 
it could trigger a reversion to the use of fuel wood and other 
traditional energy sources. 
The impact on the demand of domestic final consumers for the » 
product of intermediary industries other than the energy industries 
will be quantitatively more important, since about seven-tenths of 
the 7 per cent, direct reduction in real consumer income is concentrated 
in this component of demand (i.e., 4.6 per cent/7.0 per cent = 66 per 
cent). The average decrease in consumer real income on this account, 
4.6 per cent, implies that some products will increase in price 
less rapidly than this average rate while others will increase 
more rapidly. Table 24 presents an estimate of the upward pressure 
on the price of various classes of products due to increased energy 
costs. With increased energy costs being passed forward to consumers, 
the pattern of differences in product price increases due to those 
increased costs, is not difficult to identify. Because of their 
relatively low energy intensive production techniques, primary 
industries (i.e., agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting) will 
experience below-average price increases due directly to rising 
energy costs. The major qualification here is, of course, the 







• Table 24 
ESTIMATED M G E OF DIRECT 0 Ri ABU PRESSURE ON PRICES OP VARIOUS CLASSES OP PRODUCTS 
DUE TO VARIOUS DEGREES OF INCREASE IN ENERGY COSTS, 1973-1974 
(Units as indicated) 
Estimated direct 
energr coefficients 







Percentage increase in the cost of production of given 
produot classes due to the direct inoroaee in the 
cost of energy associated with an increase in the 
f.nal market value of a barrel of oil in 1973 from: 
Low High ^6.42/bbl. to 1974 level of; $12.7é/bbl. $lé.73/bbl. 





Forestry, hunting, fishing 















Wood and cork 
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fU (a) Direct energy coefficients taken as the sun of sectors 9 (Energía), and 25 (Fabricación del petro'leo y carbón) as presented in! Instituto 
4 Nacional de Planificación, I'iodelos__Int3i'' •—- ">- m.«- r r,—j. tc¿a /r¿— 1 1 « 
rt- (b) Direot energy coefficients taken as the presented ini Secretaría de Planeamiento „ t _ 
Actual iza ci on dê  la Matriz da Insumo -tr oduoto_ a 197° > Cuadro 4§. 
(c) Each of the coefficients in coíunaTTa) was ircrcased by a 5«Cj® cowpound annual growth factor, as a maximum allowance for increasing energy-intensiveness of production during 1968-1J73. A reduction was then made for each adjusted coefficient in 1973 to establish a "low" energy coefficient (i.e.., below which few, if any, Industries in the country would fall). 
o 5 
ri-al 
(d) Each of the coefficients in column (b) was increased by a 5>C/J oompound annual growth factor, as a maximum allowance for increasing energy-
intensiveness of production dur'.mg 1970-1973» A 10$ increase was then made for each adjusted coefficient in 1973 "to establish a "high" 
energy coefficient (i.e.. above which few, if any, industries in the country would rise). 
[e) Coefficients in oolumns (c) and (d) multiplied by I.59 (i.e., §12.¿6 per barrel -i- $6.42 per barrel), 
»6.42 per barrel). 
58,55 Per barrel). 
(h) Coefficients in columns (c) and (d) multiplied by 2.47 (i.e., $21.11 per barrel -i- $8.55 per barrel). 
,, l J1*»/,0 
Coefficients in ooluims (c) and id) multiplied by 2.61 (i.e., fl6.73 per barrel  ....
[c) and (d) multiplied by I .90 (i.e., $16.28 per barrel -5- $8, 5 per ba rel). 
- . . . - - . > - -
Fg) Coeffioiants in ooluims 
[e) - (f) The $/barrel figures on which the percentage increases in energy prices used here were based were taken from Table 13« Figures may not tally, due to rounding. 
Legend: (r;: less than 0.005 as reported in original source data. calculable due to prior (r) or (n»a.) entry. •> / "* l.-Acv '--sf-r-- -t, •.-.ij-ohoun'nT »•«>. "omwn'loe.tj en*. 




fertilizer costs.36/ 37/ Price increases, directly triggered 
by rising energy costs, will probably be less than average in some 
of the tertiary industries as well (e.g., banking, insurance, and 
wholesale and retail trade). On the other hand, price increases will 
be higher than average in the whole range of intermediate products, 
especially those which have high metal content (e.g., producers' 
and consumers1 durables); or a directly high energy content (e.g., 
\ 
transportation, paper, mining, and chemicals); or a high degree 
of reliance on fuels as a raw material input (e.g.,* petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, 38/ synthetic rubber). The data in table 2k show the 
pattern of direct upward pressure on prices for a broad group of 
product classes. 
The reaction of consumers to the higher price of these products, 
caused by the direct effect of producers passing on to them higher 
fuel costs, could provide an immediate downward pressure on aggregate 
demand. If prices rise more or less simultaneously, the potentially 
negative impact on production and employment will probably be less 
than if these prices rose in a jerky fashion. With prices rising 
smoothly, price differentials would be less drastric than if prices 
rose jerkily, and, therefore, the resort to domestically 
produced substitutes would probably be less, as would the Rupture 
over time in the pattern of intermediate output and employment. 
¿6/ Due to a combination of insufficient growth in capacity and 
increased oil prices, the cost of urea fertilizer has increased 
from US§ 62 per ton in 1968 to about US 3 225 per ton in 
December, 1 9 7 3 « Source: Memorandum to Executive Directors, 
dated March.5, 1974, by Robert S . McNamara, President, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 2 . 
37/ This subject is developed in more detail in the Symposium 
paper entitled: The Energy Crisis and Agriculture - A Background 
Assessment. 
¿0/ Refer to the Symposium paper entitled: Fertilizantes: Perspectivas 
de abastecimiento y precios. 
/Where prices 
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Where prices rise more or less simultaneously, the major threat 
will probably be an increased pressure for the substitution of 
imports for domestic production, a threat which is also present 
in the situation where prices rise jerkily.39/ 
When the indirect upward pressure on price (or downward 
pressure on real consumer income) is introduced (table 23), the 
immediate upward pressure on prices is aggravated substantially. 
If, for example, it took 1-2 years for these indirect upward price 
pressures to work themselves out,on the average, in the form of 
higher product prices, then the increase in the price of intermediate 
goods on this account would be about *U7 per cent (i.e., 7 per cent/ 
1.5 years). Hence, the immediate maximum upward pressure on prices 
due directly to higher fuel costs would be about 12 per cent in the 
first year (i.e., 7 per cent direct plus k.7 indirect) followed by 
a reduction to h»7 per cent in the following year. 
22/ shift from relatively more to less energy intensive products 
of domestic industry (e.g., from synthetic to natural fibres) 
in response to an initial change in relative product prices 
would quickly drive up the price of the substitute goods, 
throttling the initial impetus to substitute them in the first 
place. In the meanwhile, a rupture in the pattern, and levels, 
of output and employment could be induced that might provide 
littls, if any, net benefits in an economic sense. In general, 
the potential scope of this kind of substitution seems quite 
limited in the region's oil-deficit countries. In this same vein, 
a more serious threat, however, is the substitution of imported, 
relatively high energy-intensive goods (such as machinery and 
equipment) for the sane goods produced by domestic intermediary 
industries but with far lower levels of efficiency in the use of 
energy inputs; a;xd, in addition, the threat of the substitution 
of imported, natural end low energy-intensive products for 
domestically produced and relatively high energy-intensive products 
(such as imported natural for synthetic rubber, imported lumber 
for domestically produced plastic products, and so on). Unless 
moderated by tr?de policies, this source of pressure could 
aggravate the pervasive and severe pressure on balance of payments 
account in many of the region's oil-deficit countries. 
The supporting papers provide detailed analyses of the 
impact of increased fuel costs on specific industries; agriculture, 
fertilizeiAs, transportation and electric power. 
/It is 
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it is impossible to translate these conclusions into 
quantitative changes in the volume of production and employment. 
The data simply do not exist to do so in a convincing empirical 
way, either on an individual oil-deficit country basis or on a 
regional level. But, two sets of implications seem clear, 
nevertheless: first, domestic fiscal and monetary policy in the 
region's oil-deficit countries must be prepared to deal immediately, 
although in different degrees of severity depending on the country, 
with the prospect of reduced levels of output and employment triggered 
by the increased cost of fuels; and, second, on the one hand, foreign 
trade policy must be prepared to deal with a possible increase in 
the demand for imports in substitution of higher price domestically 
produced outputs (and intermediary inputs as well) induced by the 
increased cost of fuels; and, on the other hand, continuing high 
priority will have to be given to the area of export promotion as 
part of an effort to reduce the possibly severe impact on domestic 
output and employment in some of the region's oil-deficit countries. 
5« The -b_alanc.e_ of payments 
Table 25 presents information that is useful in gauging the 
immediate severity of the increased cost of imported oil on the 
international financial position of the region's oil-deficit countries. 
It provides a comparison of the increase in the level of payments 
by specific oil-deficit countries in the region for imported oil 
during 1974 with their individual international reserve position 
in January, 197k, net of the estimated level of the international 
debt service in that year. It also presents for these countries the 
share of (net) oil imports in their total imports (CIF) in 1973» 
and the ratio of (net) foreign reserves at the beginning of 197^ 
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Millions of $ US (*) (DS$ min) fci) - to MIR (0) 
A B C D & F G H I 
Argsntina 1 316(a) 512 804 2 100 170 38 205 8 25 
Bsazil 6 109(b) 329 5 780 6 650 780 87 1 325 12 23 
«hile 134(m) 312 1 500 120 280 8 
Mexico 1 290(a) 517 773 3 960 229 20 250 6 29 
Peru 64é(n) 174 472 1 100 80 -43 110 7 23 
Uruguay 228(a) 30 198 250 47 126 98 23 49 
Paraguay 56(c) 13 43 125 9 34 15 7 35 
Guyana 16(h) 175 19 56 il 
Guatemala 234(g) 16 218 4oo 28 55 68 7 31 
Costa Rioa 4l(d) 15 26 410 26 6 34 6 169 
El Salvador 63(f) 11 52 360 20 14 31 6 60 
Honduras 42U) 11 31 235 17 13 54 7 174 
Jamaica 117(a) 24 93 64o 86 . 15 71 13 76 
Nicaragua 128(k) 21 107 240 21 45 22 8 21 
Panam 1 212(1) il 1 201 525 73 229 75 14 6 
Dominican Republie 59(e) 44o 56 94 13 
Barbados 162 12 15 7 
Haïti I8(i) 85 5 7 6 . 






(a) International Financing Statistics, (IBS), June, 1974, P. 19« 
(b) Ibid, p. 19; the figure is for February, 197*+. 
(0) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 291. 
(d) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 197*+. Ibid, p. 105. 
(e) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 117. 
(f) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 129. 
(g) Refers to Bank of Guatemala reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 159« 
(h) Refers to Bank of Guyana reserves in January, 1974» Ibid, p. 163. 
(1) Refers to National Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 167. 
(j) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. 171. 
(lc) Refers to Central Bank reserves in January, 1974. Ibid, p. '271. 
(1) Refers to reserves of deposit money banks, second quarter, 1973« Ibid, p. 287. Of this total, foreign 
exchange was $ 1 200 sn, 
(m) Estimate given in IBRD report dated 5 May 1974, entitled "Interim Report on the Additional External 
Capital Requirements of Developing Countries to Deal with the Effects of the Increased Prlcos of Oil 
. and Other Commodities", Table VIII. The figure is for end-of-year, 1973. 
(n) IFS, June, 1974, p. 19. Figure is for November, 1973. 
EGA,.. on the basis of different sources. 
(A - B ) . Preliminary estimates made by EC LA Statistical Division on the basis of IMF data. 
IDB, Economic and Social Development Depariaaent, Country Studies Division, Impaoto de la Crisis del Petroleo 
en America Latlna en 1974. dated 24 February 1974, Table I. Data for Guyana takenfi-om source noted below in(Cr;. 
(C -E). 
ECIA, on the basis of different sources. 
s ( E - D ) . 
î (G - C ) . /The estimâtB B 
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The estimates are rough in several senses. First, they do 
not include the indirect, upward pressure on the value of imports 
associated with the increased cost over time of inputs other than 
fuels required in the production of imported goods. This is a 
particularly serious ommission when account is taken of the sharply 
increased cost, over 1973 levels, of many imports, such as artificial 
fertilizers, producers' and consumers' durables, for example. Second, 
the estimates do not consider off-setting gains in the form of 
increased foreign exchange earnings from re-exports or the export 
of indigenously produced energy sources in the form of product exports. 
Third, the estimates do not account for changes in the balance of 
payments of a country that may arise because of reasons analytically 
distinct from the higher price of internationally traded oil. For 
example, strong gains in export earnings from coffee would cushion 
the balance of payments pressure on oil account in Brazil, Colombia, 
31 Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti, for example, as would a buoyant 
* 
export market for copper in the cases of Chile and Peru, for beef in 
the case of Argentina and Uruguay, said for timber in Paraguay. 
Likewise, ready access to international credits and favourable 
developments in the terms of trade in specific countries would 
obviously relieve the degree of financial pressure on oil account. 
Finally, as will be discussed subsequently, the estimates presented 
in table 25 implicitly assume that there will be no drastic reduction 
in the level of world production and trade owing to higher energy 
prices or other causes. 
The figures in table 25 suggest that Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru will be in a relatively 
strong position to withstand the initial direct financial impact of 
the increase in the cost.of oil imports during 1973-1974, although 
this ability varies widely between these countries. In all of them, 
however, the pressure on foreign reserves will become increasingly 
severe beyond 1974. In each of these countries, the increment in 
the oil import bill during 1973-1974 is less than about one-third of 
/foreign reserves, 
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foreign reserves, net of international debt service. Additionally, 
the share (1973) of oil in total imports will be increasing from 
relatively low bases. 
Panama is in a particularly favourable position, given its 
strong external financial position and the relatively small scale 
of its inland oil consumption. This is also the case with Brazil, 
given this country's strong international credit position. It is 
especially the case if strong growth in coffee export earnings is 
projected into the near future. 
Peru's payments position on oil account, would also be 
favourably cushioned by strong export prices for copper, fish, 
and other primary products, and it should be imp-oved further, in 
1976, when with the completion of the crude oil pipeline to the 
Pacific, it will be possible for Peru to become an oil exporter. 
In the case of Argentina, its relative self-sufficiency in 
oil, a comparatively strong reserve position, continued access to 
foreign credits, and the prospects for continued favourable earnings 
from exports of wheat and beef, place this country in a relatively 
strong position to withstand the transition to a higher level of 
international oil prices. 
The relatively strong international reserve position and low 
share of oil in total imports in the case of Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay should also cushion the immediately negative impact 
of their increased oil imports during 1973-197**« This is also the 
case with Mexico, but to a lesser degree. However, a decline in 
tourist receipts, threatened by increased energy costs internationally, 
would increase substantially the strain on Mexico's transition to 
higher world oil prices. On the other hand, Mexico's relative access 
to international credits provides an additional source of potential 
relief. But, here again, as is the case, in general with Latin 
America's oil-deficit countries, the ease of transition ii/ill hinge 
largely on the performance of world commodity prices, which, in 
Mexico's case, covers a wide array, including cotton, sugar, coffee, 
shrimp and a variety of metals, for example. 
/Many of 
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Many of the Caribbean and Central American Republics together 
with Chile and Uruguay face far harsher financial pressure in 1974 
from the expected increase in their oil import bill. The expected 
increment in the value of oil imports during 1973-1974 in four of 
these countries is close to, or greater than, the level of the 
international reserves, net of international debt service in 197^» 
These countries are Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras 
and Guyana. In two other countries in this group (i.e., El Salvador 
and Jamaica), the incremental oil import bill expected in 1973-197^ 
is greater than three-fifths of net foreign exchange reserves. Only 
partial data are available for Haiti and Barbados, but they suggest 
severe financial pressure as well. 
The actual, level of Chile's international reserves at end-
1973 was not available, but the IMF estimate shown in table 25, 
suggests a severely adverse financial impact on this country stemming 
directly from the higher price of imported oil: even if international 
debt service in 1974 were reduced to zero, the value of oil imports 
by Chile expocted in 1974 would be 2.5 times the level of those 
reserves. Hot/ever, if copper prices remained strong and the rate 
of inflow of foreign credits accelerated, this would alleviate the 
balance of payments pressure arising from increased oil prices in 
the case of Chile. In any case, the pressure will be extremely 
intense. 
In the case of Uruguay, the increase in the oil import bill 
expected during 1973-1974 represents about one-half of foreign 
reserves, net of debt repayments in 197^» If world prices for meat, 
wheat, and hides continue strong in 197^> Uruguay's pressure on oil 
import account will be eased, but it will be severe, nevertheless. 
In 1973» Uruguay had the highest ratio of oil to total imports 
(i.e., 23 per cent) of the countries covered in table 25, and the 
sharp rise in this share expected in 1974 implies a reduction in the 
imports of many essential goods. While this effect will be a general 
one in the region's oil-deficit countries, the degree of restriction 
will be particularly severe in Uruguay. 
/The previous 
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The previous remarks relate to the increased pressure on 
international reserves in Latin America's oil-deficit countries 
occurring solely due to the expected increase during 1973-197^ in 
the oil import bill. If these first-year impacts are projected into 
the future, the conclusion is apparent that all of these countries 
could face severe payments pressure in the near future, threatening 
in turn, the viability of their economies and the wellbeing of their 
populations. 
The increased price of oil and energy is a world-wide phenomenon, 
which means that the price of a wide variety of goods and services 
moving in international trade will rise in response to higher energy 
costs. For Latin America's oil-deficit countries, this will provide 
an additional, and important negative balance of payments pressure. 
Basically, as the data in table 26 indicate, these countries exchange 
land and labour intensive goods in the international market for 
capital and energy intensive goods. 
Table 26 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS (FOB) AND IMPORTS ( C I F ) , 
BY COMPOSITION, 1970 
(In units as indicated) 
Exports (8ma) 15 500 Imports 13 609 
Primary products (%) 87 Consumer durables (%) 5 
Manufactures '(.%) 13 Producers durables (.%) 36 
Fuels {%) 6 
Other (%) 53 
Source: CEPAL, América Latina: Exportaciones de Productos Primarios 
y ManufacTurados según Destino, tables 3 and Y;' and°" CEPÁlT*' 




Vlhea account is taken of the increased cost, not only of 
imported fuels, but of imported durables as well, the conclusion 
is further reinforced that virtually all of the region's oil-deficit 
countries will be strongly and negatively impacted by the increased 
cost of imported oil supplies.kO/ 
These estimates of external financial pressure implicitly 
assume that changes in the value of exports from the region's oil-
deficit countries do not aggravate the financial pressure occasioned 
by the increased cost of fuels. It is still too early "to judge the 
accuracy of this assumption, but the sharp reduction.(5«8 per cent) 
in the annual rate of growth in real GNP recorded in the United States 
during the first quarter of 19?4 suggests that it may be optimistic.kl/ 
It was suggested earlier that the direct impact of the increased 
price of oil and fuels on the general price level, while varying 
between Latin America's oil-deficit countries, did not present an 
alarming prospect as a whole. Additionally, while it was impossible 
to quantify the conclusion, the direct impact of increased energy 
costs on production and employment on the region's oil-deficit 
countries poses an immediate threat, but not one of dire proportions. 
In contrast, however, the impact of increased oil prices on 
the international financial position of Latin America's oil-deficit 
countries is so severe that it does threaten, in turn, the viability 
of production and employment in many of them, and far more than the 
threat stemming directly from the increased price of oil. 
kO/ The drain in foreign exchange due to. the increased cost of 
capital imports into the region's oil-deficit countries is 
examined in detail in the Symposium paper entitled: Incremento 
• de las necesidades de inversión originados en el aumento del 
precio del petróleo. 
kl/ "US Reports GNP Declines by 5-8 per cent", International Herald 
Tribune, April 9, 19?4, p.7. The figures on which the 5.S~per 
cent decline is based are preliminary. Durable goods expenditures 
declined by US$ 1.1 billion largely due to the drop in the level 
of automobile sales, a fact which is, undoubtedly, heavily related 
to the increased price of motor gasoline in the US market. 
/In five 
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In five country cases, for example, the oil import bill in 
197^ will probably be greater than those countries' holdings of 
gold, foreign exchange, SDK's, and their reserve position in the 
International Monetary Fund. Either they acquire additional 
international credits immediately, or they must curtail the volume 
of their oil (and other) imports, assuming no inordinate increase 
in export earnings. And, if this eventuality emerges in these 
countries, then production and employment could decline sharply, 
one source of moderation on this account being the way in which the 
reduced level of imported petroleum is allocated in the economy. 
While .the prospects are not as bleak as this in the region's other 
oil-deficit countries, this threat to output and employment is 
certainly there in many of them, especially when the increased cost 
of other imports due to the higher oil prices is considered in addition 
to their increased oil import bill. Should aggregate demand in the 
developed countries stagnate, then the threat to output, employment, 
and the value of their currencies is present in all of them. 
6. International perspective and problems 
The problem of higher oil prices cannot be discussed either 
exclusively within the framework of Latin America's oil-deficit 
countries or without reference to other factors impinging on the 
prospects for economic growth in the international economy. The 
direct threat to output and employment in Latin America's? oil-deficit 
countries stemming from the sharp increase in energy cor has its 
counterpart in every world region as it does for both the developed 
and developing countries. When the problem of sharply increased 
energy prices is put into a broader, international perspective, it 
is apparent that the threat to world output and employment is a grave 
one, and, particularly for the developing countries of Latin America 
and elsewhere. 
Even prior to the increase in world oil prices recorded in 
late 1973, the World Bank had revised downward its estimate of the 
rate of growth in real GNP in the OECD countries for 197^« In 
/comparison with 
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comparison with, the 6.6 per cent growth recorded in 1973» the 
forecast rate of growth for 197^ was revised downward to 3.8 per 
cent. Nevertheless, it was still "believed in December 1973» that, 
due largely to favourable terras of trade and strong growth in 
export earnings, the developing countries could achieve an average 
growth rate of about 6 per cent during 1973-1980, meeting the 
target rate of the United Nations Second Development Decade. 
These expectations were shattered with the increase in world 
oil prices in January 1974. The World Bank's estimate of OPEC 
Government revenues (total and per barrel) are presented in table 27 
and 28: they show these revenues rising from US$ 23 billion to 
ÜS& 85 billion during 1973-1974, and then, to US$ 100 billion and 
USif 171 billion in 1975 and 1980, respectively. 
Estimates of the surplus on current account of the OPEC 
Governments in 1974 vary viidely, with one observer placing the range 
between US$ 50-USll 66 billion.42/ If this sum is not cycled back 
into international financial channels, it would constitute a massive 
and immediate depressant on world output and employment. The World 
Bank estimates that, in 1974, the deficit on current account in the 
OECD countries will be about USÍ» 44 billion, and the resource gap 
of the developing countries requiring international financing will 
be on the order of US# 2.6 billion (US$ 6.8 billion in 1975)« 
In March 1974, the World Bank revised its forecast of growth 
rates for the OECD countries and for a sample of 40 developing 
countries for the period 197^-1980. This revised forecast assumes, 
inter alia, that the immense payments problem of the OECD countries 
will be handled in such a way that serious economic disruption stemming 
from the management of this problem will be avoided. 
42/ J.P. Grant, Energy Shock: an d the Development Prospect, 
(draft versionT, February 19 ?V"Tpages unnumbere'd). Grant also 
estimates a need for recycling about US$ 10-US$ 20 billion 
.annually in investment and aid by the industrial and OPEC 
countries to the non-oil-exporting developing economies over 
•the next several years. 
/Table 19 
Tufcle # 
ESTIMATED OPEC B/ GOVERNKEifT REVENUES, SEIECTED YEilRS, I9SO-I9OO (Revised to reflect new prices 
announced on 23 Deoetober lg73 
(U5$ m-p,H,ons) and effective 1 January 1974) 
Country i960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
1975 1980 
Low Medium High Low ¡tedium High 
Saudi Arabia 355 655 1 200 2 101 2 988 4 915 19 4oo 22 150 22 850 23 500 36 300 43 450 50 550 
Kuvait 465 671 895 1 439 1 600 2 130 7 945 8 450 8 700 9 000 10 250 12 250 14 300 
Abu Dhabi b/ *• 33 233 4l8 538 1 035 4 800 6 400 - 6 550 6 750 12 400 14 750 17 150 
Qatar 54 69 122 105 247 36o 1 425 1 600 1 650 1 700 2 400 2 900 3 350 
Iraq. 266 375 521 840 802 1 465 5 ?oo 7 300 7 550 7 750 13 650 16 750 19 800 
Iran 285 522 1 093 1 934 2 423 3 885 l4 930 16 600 17 100 17 600 25 650 30 700 35 750 
Algeria b/ M - 381 440 1 095 3 700 4 100 4 250 4 350 4 750 5 750 6 700 
Libya b/ 371 1 295 1 846 1 705 2 210 7 990 9 750 10 050 10 400 10 550 12 850 15 100 
Nigeria b/ m •* 4 l l 883 1 200 1 950 6 960 8 250 8 500 8 700 11 350 14 250 17 100 
Indonesia • •• 185 284 480 830 2 150 2 100 2 200 2 300 2 400 2 950 3 500 
Venezuela 877 1 135 1 4o6 1 751 1 933 2 800 10 010 10 200 10 550 10 850 12 100 14 500 16 900 






















Source: 1960-1970, Petroleum Information Foundation. . . -
1971-1980, Petroleum Economios Limited and Bank estimates. 
Both tables 27 and 28 ware taken from IBRD, Memorandum Sec. 11.74-24 from the Secretary, R.S. liel'amara, entitled Inplications of 
Inoreased Petroleuu Prices since the Beiginning of 1974, Tables 2a.and 2b. (reproduced in entirety). 
0/ In November 1973 Eouador beeaiae a member of OPEC and Gabon an Associate Ileaber; they are not inoluded in the present analysis. 
bj Libya and Abu Dhabi started production in I96I and I962 respectively. Algeria and Nigeria started production in 1958, but no comparsile 
figures are available for their earlier years at the present time. 
The data presented in this Table were published in esrly 1974. Since then, the projections presented in it may have been revised, 
and the Table is presented here with this reservation in mind. 
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Table 28 , 
ESTUiATED OPEC GOTER®!® HB5ETOE (Revised to reflect new prices 
PES. BARREL,SELECTED YEARS, I56O-I56O announced on 23 December 1973 
, . . . and effective 1 January 1974) (US'j par barrel) 
196b 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
1975 I98O 
Low Medium High Low Iledium High 
Sewit Arabic. 0.75 0.33 0.88 1,23 1.4p 1.91 6.99 7.38 7.61 7.83 8.75 10.47 12.19 
0.77 0*79 0.83 1.23 1.4o 1.89 6.97 7.35 7.58 7.80 8,71 10,43 12.15 
¿xiZtu&L y <M 0.33 0.92 1.24 1.4o 2.03 7.50 7.92 8.16 8.4o 9.38 11.19 13.00 
tet&r 0.86 0.C2 0,92 1.18 l,ko 1.99 . 7 .28 7.67 7.91 8.14 9.06 IO.85 12.64 
Iraq 0.79 0.82 0.96 1.42 1.60 2.21 7.61 8,03 8.28 8.53 9.38 U.50 13.61 
Una 0.80 0.81 0.G2 1.24 1.41 1.9° 7.06 7.45 7.68 7.90 8 .83 M.57 12.30 
A3fferia - - 1.07 1.62 1.83 2.74 9.2S 9.77 10.07 10.36 10.88 13.16 15.43 
Libya b/ - 0.84 1.09 1.87 2.13 3.07 9.51 10,00 10.33 10.65 10.90 13.24 15.58 
Nigeria b/ - l.o4 1.53 1.84 2.72 8.70 9.20 9M 9.75 10.60 13.30 16.00 
Indonesia 0/ 0.69 1 .03 1.42 1«57 5.06 4.79 5.02 5.25 4.25 5.27 6.29 
Venezuela 0.89 0.96 I.09 IM 1.60 2.30 8.17 8.62 8.89 9.15 10.20 12.23 14.25 
Sources: I960-I570, Petroleum Information Foundation» 
1371^1980, Petroleum Economics Waited and Bank estimates. 
a/ In November 1973 Ecuador became a member of OPEC and Gabon an Associate Member; they are not included in the 
present analysis. 
b/ Libya and Abu Dhabi started production in I96I and 1962 respectively. Algeria and Nigeria started production 
in 1258, but no comparable figures are available for their earlier years at the present time. 
¡¡/ Data for Indonesia are from the latest economic report op Indonesia and oover both the State oil enterpris® 
Pertanina and foreign Contractors. Pertaiaina pays little tax, and its share of total output is expected to 
rise in thefuture. Hence the Gaverment revenue per barrel from total exports rises little, although revenue 
froci foreign contractors' «»porta is expected to rise from about $ 1.57 1» 1972 to levels in I98O roughly 
comparable with those for exports from the Persian/}ulf. 
The data presented in this Table were published in early 1974. Since then, the projections presented in it 
may have been revised, end the Table is presented here with this reservation in mind. 
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The Bank's two alternative growth trajectories for the OSCD 
countries during 197^-1980 are shown in table 29» The implications 
of these alternative growth patterns were then drawn for the 
developing countries. It was concluded that, ovring largely to a 
reduction in the volume of exports, a weakening in commodity prices 
(table 3 0 ) , a n d a worsening in the terms of trade (table 31), the 
import capacity of the developing countries during 197^-1980 would 
deteriorate sharply (table 32). 
Assuming that there would be no change in the flow of capital 
to the developing economies, the following projections were then 
made for the growth in total real output in the developing economies 
during 1973-1980 (table 33). 
These figures show that, even if international monetary 
management in the OSCD countries were successful in avoiding economic 
disruption, the deceleration in the average rate of growth in total 
real output of the developing countries below levels forecasted only 
several months ago would be severe. Under the more optimistic of 
the two OSCD growth trajectories, the average rate of growth in 
total real output in the developing countries would be k a9 per cent 
during 1973-1980, l8 per cent below the rate anticipated in December 
1973» Under the other growth trajectory, the comparable growth rate 
would be 1.9 per cent, 68 per cent below the 6.0 per cent estimate 
made by the Bank in December 1973« 
These projections imply that, at best, some Latin American and 
other developing countries might achieve the 6 per cent output growth 
target of the Second Development Decade, but that many would not; 
and that, at worst, many of the developing countries in Latin America 
and elsewhere would face the prospect of negligible growth, or an 
actual decline, in the level of real output per capita during 1973-1980. 
k-3/ Refer to the Symposium paper which examines recent crude 




ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OP AHIUJAL RATES OP GROWTH 
Hi GDP CF DEVELOPED REGIONS, Vftk TO I98O 





High variant Low variant 
1974 1975 1976-1980 1974 1975 
1976-
1980 
Japan a/ and Oceania 8.5 10.3 4.0 6.0 7 .0 3.0 5.0 7.5 
i/estern Europe 4.3 6.0 2.0 2 .5 5.5 0.5 1.5 3.0 
tteited States, Canada 6 .1 6 .1 2.3 3.5 6.0 1.5 2.5 3.5 
Average, all CECD countries 5.7 6.6 2.4 3.5 6.0 1.3 2.5 3.9 
Source: IBRD, Memorandum dated 5March 1974 entitled: Interim Report on the Additional External Capital 
Requirements of Developing Countries to Deal with the Effects of the Increased Price of Oil and Other 
Commodities, Table 1, p. 3 (reproduced in entirety. 
&/ The alternative growth patterns for Japan, which show a higher long-term rate of growth in the Low Variant, 
reflect alternative adjustment patterns to lower onorgy use in industry, A. rapid adjustment might reduce 
gmrth in the early years but permit higher rates un later years, vjhereas a lesser degree of success might 
maintain a higher rate of growth in the early years but. lessen the growth potential in the long run» 
The dsts presented in this Table were published in early 197̂ - Since then, the projections presented in 




INDEXES OP ACTUAL AND FORECAST CCMICDITY PRICES, SELECTED YEARS, I972-I38O 
(Current US$ prices) 
1967,1969 c 100 
Cacmodity 
Actual prices 
1972 1973 January 1974 
Foreoast prices 
1374 1975 1980 
665 665 923 
l 8 l 181 181 
175 163 175 
116 121 128 
783 522 522 
215 185 209 
120 125 150 
231 231 271 
216 237 2C9 
264 299 239 
177 164 152 
235 216 196 
224 214 194 
123 123 117 
144 140 133 
240 233 205 
214 213 206 
206 205 200 
4l4 4l4 431 
284 268 289 
267 250 217 
121 126 l4o 
246 200 196 
250 261 275 
i n 159 205 1UÓ 113 146 
175 193 300 
155 138 172 
157 144 204 
168 168 235 
395 242 302 
200 220 300 









































Export price index (in US$) 
of equipment by origin: b/ 
France 





















































































































277 228 271 
232 198 
Source; International Bahlc for 
of Developing Countries 
a/ Not available, 
b/ Estimated for I973 and 1980, 
Reconstruction end Development, Additional Erfcernal Capital Requirements 
., March 5, 1974, Table III (reproduced in entirety). 
assumes no change in relative exohange rates after 1973. 
The data presented in this Table were published in early 1974« Since then, the projections 




TEEMS OP TRADE FOR 40 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ly/l^SO 
(19̂7-0.969 ~ 100) 
December 1973 tfa-oh 1974 Projections 



















1 9 7 2 
(Actual) V 5 106 106 105 106 106 105 106 106 
1973 
(Estimated) 123 122 111 123 122 H I 123 122 111 
1974 104 103 90 103 102 89 103 101 
1980 101+ 103 89 98 57 82 88 87 7 0 
Souroei Reproduced in its entirety from IBRD Memorandum dated 5 March 1974» oPcoita, Table V, p» 7* 
Motet High 'Income countries« 1971 Per capita OK? above $340j 
Middle Income: $200 .* $340j 
Lew Incomes belw $200» 
The data presented in this TnbW were published in early 197^. Since then, the projections presented 




AVERAGE iNNUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN THE IKPORE CAPACITY OF 
EXPORT EARNINGS OF I+O DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1 9 7 3 - 1 3 8 0 
Group December 1373 Pro jsotiona 
March 1374 Projections 
High Lew 
Variant Variant 
High Income 5>#0 7«5 4.7 
Middle Income 7«2 6,1 2.5 
Lew Incorna 3.9 2*6 -l.c 
Soureot Reproduced In Its entirety from IBRD Memorandum dated 5 t&roh l$7kt op«oit», Table VI, 
p« 8. 
Note; Higja Income countries« 1971 per capita GNP above $340; 
Middle Income» $200 - $340} 
Law Incomes beliv $200» 
Tho data presented in this Table were published is early 1974. Since then, tho projeotiong 





AVERAGE AliHUAL GROWTH RATES OP GDP OF 
40 D2;vr:L0PiiU COUKTRES, 1973-1980 
Group Deoenber 1973 projections 
March 1974 Projections 
High Low 
variant Variant 
High Income 7.3 6.5 3.9 
Middle Income 6.2 5.3 2.3 
Loir Income 3.3 2.4 -0.2 
of vrhioh: 
India 2.4 1.6 -0.7 
Other countries 4.9 3.8 0.7 
Average 6.0 4.9 1.9 
Source; Reproduced in its entirety from IBRD, Memorandum dated 5 March 1974, 
op.cit., Table 0, p«9* 
note: High Income countries: 1971 per capita Gi!P above $340; Middle Inoone: 
$200 » $34OJ Low. Income} below $200. 
The data presented in this Table were published in early 1974. Sinoe 
thovi, the proJ&ctiov.j presented in it may have be6n revised, and the Table 
is presented here with this reservation in mind. 
/Several broad 
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Several broad conclusions flow from this brief discussion of 
the prospects for growth in the world economy. Clearly, the extent 
to which the spectre of economic disruption in both the developed 
and developing economies can be avoided is directly dependent on 
the ability of the economically developed community to forge 
acceptable arrangements for channeling the trade surpluses of the 
OPEC countries, and particularly, the Arab oil exporting countries, 
into international investments. Since the bulk of these investments, 
if realized, would be made in the developed countries, the ability 
of the developed countries to avoid economic dislocation in the 
developing countries is, then, also dependent on their success in 
forging another set of arrangements for channeling to the developing 
economies a share of the massive capital inflows which the developing 
countries receive from the OPEC countries. If this is not accomplished, 
the reduced forecast rates of growth in real GNP for developing 
countries presented in table 33 could become a reality. 
Second, the problem posed by the huge surpluses on current ' 
account in the OPEC countries is clearly one which renders a piecemeal 
approach dangerous to pursue. It is an international problem jaer 
excellance. The major participants in forging the mechanisms required 
are the oil exporting countries, the developed countries, and the 
international loading institutions, including the International 
Monetary Fund,Vf/ the World Bank, the regional international banks, 
and the United Nations. It is still too early to judge whether the 
mechanisms now being considered by these parties will ultimately, 
bo sufficient, but it is reasonably clear that from the point of view 
of L-i in America's developing countries, the bull: cf the work still 
lies ahead. 
Third, within the group of developing economies, the terms 
of capital access must be distinguished. The relatively advanced 
economies in this group have access to international credit markets 
¥t/ Refer to the Symposium paper which focuses on international 
monetary arrangements and the energy crisis. 
/that the 
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that the lower income developing countries do not.4-5/ These poorer 
countries must rely on their meagre foreign reserves, the only 
other potential source of financial relief being an increased inflow 
of capital, largely on concessional terms, from foreign governments 
and international financial institutions. 
Table 34 presents a rough estimate of the international 
financial gap for ten Latin American countries in 1974 and 1975® 
Some countries have access to capital markets on conventional terms 
which could provide an important means for closing their financial 
gaps in 1974 and 1975. But, this is not the case with the majority 
of Latin America's oil-deficit countries, and many of them will 
require additional credits on semi-concessional and concessional 
terms, if serious economic disruption is to be avoided. Table 35 
presents the scale of additional financing, and the terms on which 
it is required, for all developing countries in 197^ and 1975» 
Finally, although implicit in the previous discussion, the idea 
must be made explicit that the need for additional assistance by 
Latin American and other oil-deficit developing countries is one which, 
obviously immediate, will also continue at high levels over em 
extented period. If the current structure of world energy costs is 
projected, the economic problem created for those countries is a 
structural one, and this will require pervasive changes in the structure 
of product output, capital and other resource inputs. These kinds 
of change require relatively long periods to be realized, and hence, 
the enduring character of additional capital assistance. It is one 
thing to identify the need for the region's oil-deficit countries to 
accelerate the exploitation of domestic energy resources above rates 
anticipated only several months ago; it is quite another thing for 
developing countries to marshall the incremental capital resources to 
effect this substitution of domestic for foreign energy resources. 
45/ Even in this case, however, some of the higher income developing 
countries may find that their access to these capital markets may 
be strained. These countries will be competing with the developed 
countries in the Euro-dollar and Euro-bond markets, for example, 
and in addition, the credit worthiness of many higher-income 
developing countries will be adversely affected by the balance of 
payments implications of high oil prices, making it relatively 
more difficult for such countries• to market their bonds abroad in 
national markets. /Table 34 
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Table & 
ESTIMATES CF I f l k AI® 1975 BALANCE CP PAKE NTS DEFICITS OF TEIÎ LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 
PCSSIBIE SOURCES OP FINANCED- FCA SUCH DEFICITS, AID REÏÎAINIÏI} GAP TO BS FINANCED 
(¡aillons of dollars) 
Country 
Current estimate 
of resouroe gap 
Increase Increase 
in 1?7"+ in 1J75 
over 1973 over 1973 
(1) (2) 
Estia&ted increases 
in net capital 
trsiisfers aval la 
ble to meet ~ 
resource gap a/ 
Inorease Increase 
in 1974 In 1975 
























Argentina 544 4oo 5é 112 488 288 260 131 220 157 
Bolivia -79 -92 -28 -37 -51 -55 l4d/ 25¿/ - -
Brazil 601 1 180 -269 -263 870 1 443 1 296 1 122 - 321 
Chile 0/ -5 -68 -269 -tal 343 158 85 106 258 
Colombia -25 0 -4 -9 -21 9 1 0 7 à / m y - -
Daainieca Republic - 8 S4 10 25 -18 69 44 13 - 50 
Guatemala 87 132 19 30 68 102 42 34 26 68 
Mexico 206 83 70 128 136 ~45 271 191 -
Peru - I09 -18 • -30 -48 "79 30 118 127 m M 
Uruguay 48 105 -11 2 59 103 32e/ Oe/ 27 103 
Source: Abstracted from information presented in EBRD Memorandum dated 5 Karch 1971', op.clt., Anne:: B», Table IX» 
e/ Includes net transfers of publio and long-term capital, net direot foreign investment, public and private 
transfers, and workers remittances. Excludes autonomous private flows, reserve changos, short-term capital, 
and private long-torm borrowing» 
bj See technical note in source document. 
0/ These estimates make no allowance for any possible debt relief. A H data are provisional estimates, 
d/ Reserves on3y, since oountry is considered an oil exporter and therefore not presumed eligible for IMF 
Speoial Oil Facility, 
e/ Bff facility only. 
The data presented in this Table were published in early 1974. Since then, the projections presented in 




RBSOtBCE GAP CP THE DEVELOPII® COUNTRIES TO BE FINANCED Ei 1974 AI® 1975, 
BY TYPE GP CREDIT TERI'B REaUIRED 
(In Sdlllozis of dollars) 
The ̂ 0 countries 
Resource gap -to be financed: 
in 1974 
in 1J75 
All developing countries 
Resource gap to be financed: 
in 1974 
in 1575 
Source: IBRD Memorandum dated 5 JIaroh 1974, op.clt., Table 10, p. 17 (reproduced in 
its entirety). 
The data presented in this Table were published in early 1974. Sinoe then, the 
projections presented in it may heve been revised, end the Table is presented here 






1.1 0.4 0.6 2.1 
3.1 0,9 1.8 5.8 
1.3 0.5 0.8 2.6 
3 . 7 1 . 0 2 . 1 6 . 8 
/7. The 
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7« The need for re-evaluating national 
economic prospects 
The prospects for economic growth in each Latin American 
country which existed even less than one year ago have been 
profoundly altered by the increased cost of internationally traded 
crude recorded in late 1973» This revision in growth prospects 
applies not only to the nineteen oil-deficit countries in the region, 
but also to the five oil-exporting countries in the region as well. 
While both face the common problem of domestic inflation, the 
first group faces the wrenching task of planning for economic growth 
with a now drastically reduced level of investable resources, a 
revised set of production costs and prices throughout the economy, 
and an altered set of consumer product preferences. On the other 
hand, the oil-surplus countries of the region face the enviable problem 
of managing efficiently a substantially greater volume of resources 
than were thought available loss than a year ago, again, within the 
context of altered costs of production, prices,and an altered set 
of consumer preferences.46/ ' 
The key challenge facing the region's oil-deficit countries 
- although in widely differing degrees, depending on the country - is 
an enduring one: how to cope with the threat to domestic production 
and employment stemming from the hemorrhaging of foreign reserves in 
payment for oil imports. Success in the immediate future, will hinge 
largely on the degree to which additional external assistance can be 
secured and non-essential oil imports curtailed, on the one hand, and 
on the skill of domestic fiscal and monetary policy in combating 
inflation and recessionary forces, on the other. 
As longer periods of time are considered, the successful 
confrontation of this continuing problem will require policy action 
along a broad front, essentially focused on four basic tasks: first, 
the need for promoting export earnings; second, the need for revising 
import and domestic investment policy to take advantage of the now 
h6/ The fiscal impact of the increased cost of oil on the region's 
oil-deficit countries is considered in other Symposium papers. 
/possibilities for 
- 106 -
possibilities for import-substitution created by the new structure 
of world energy costs; third, the need for cutting imports in such 
a way as to minimize the threat to domestic production and employment; 
and, finally as is the case in the immediate future, the need for 
increasing the inflow of foreign credits through arrangements with 
the oil-exporting countries, the developed countries, and the 
international lending institutions. 
If the current structure of world oil prices continues, the 
oil-importing countries would find that varying portions of their 
capital stocks - made under conditions of substantially lower energy 
costs - would have been rendered economically less valuable. On the 
other hand, many investments that were rejected as not economically 
viable in the past era of lower energy costs, would now be economically 
viable. In the energy sector, for example, many hydropower projects 
that were not economically defensible only a year ago would now be 
highly desirable if the present structure of energy costs is projected 
into the future; while, on the other hand, the incentive to invest in 
fuel oil-fired power plants would be sharply reduced. Likewise, the 
pattern of economic viability of secondary industries has been 
radically altered by the sharp increase in world oil costs, creating 
opportunities for new import substitution based industries, and 
seriously challenging the viability of other established, energy-
intensive industries. In transportation, the higher cost of energy 
triggers the need for reviewing the relative merits of mass transport 
projects as well as the desirability, from the public point of view, 
of present patterns of rail and road freight movements in many 
countries.by/ 
bj/ These subjeets and others are discussed in the Symposium 
paper: El Efecto del Nuevo Precio del Petróleo en el 
Transporte de Latinoamérica. 
/It is 
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It is clear that the potential scope of desired structural 
change inherent in the projection of current energy costs would 
easily generate monumental requirements for foreign and domestic 
capital. The source of pressure in this situation is clear: tha 
higher cost of imported oil, which is, on the one hand, the root 
cause of these increased investment requirements is, on the other 
hand, to a great extent, also the causo of the present inability of 
those countries to undertake these investments on the scale required. 
In this context, the degree of success in the area of international 
trade and financial policy will heavily condition tho degree to 
which a domestic investment policy, oriented to structural change, 





SOME MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY LATIN 
AMERICAN OIL-DEFICIT COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
In approaching this discussion, it is important, at the outset, 
to identify two basic and interrelated fields of policy concern» 
The first is the field of energy—sector policy, focused on measures 
which should be adopted mainly in the energy sector, within the 
context of general economic policy, in reaction to the expected 
price of world crude oil. The second field is macroeconomic policy, 
oriented to broad economic variables,.such as the level and composition 
of domestic output; employment; prices; imports and exports; savings 
and investment. 
These two fields are obviously interrelated. Decisions in the 
field of energy policy must be taken vrithin the broader context of 
macroeconomic policy as well as irith respect to policy formulation 
in other sectors of the economy (e.g., transportation, industry, and 
agriculture). Pricing policy on refined oil products, for example, 
will, obviously, have its macroeconomic implications for the level, 
sectoral and product composition of domestic production., employment, 
foreign reserves, and so on. Conversely, macroeconomic policies, in 
the area of international finance will impact on prices, inputs, and 
output in the erergy sector. 
This chapter focuses on policy options open at the level of the 
energy sector, given the presumed macroeconomic mandate to minimize 
the cffects of higher oil prices on domestic output and employment 
during the survey period (i.e., 197^-1980). Moreover, this orientation 
is to the policy options open from the point of view of Latin America's 
oil-deficit countries, since these are the ones for which the increased 




Four other issues need'to be clarified: first, the expected 
price of world crude oil through 1980 on which this discussion will 
rest; second, the specific objectives of energy sector policy as 
discussed in this chapter; third, the level of generality on which 
this discussion of energy sector policy will be conducted; and, fourth, 
the organizational fraraev/ork that will be used to discuss this 
subject. 
It is important to specify the assumption being made about the 
future price of world crude oil (1974-1980) and, of course, the reasons 
for this assumption. The current price of the world's key crude oil, 
Saudi Arabian light, is, now, probably, in the range of US& 9.00/barrel, 
FOB, Persian Gulf. The assumption made here is that the price 
(in 1974- dollars) of this crude oil through 1980 will not exceed 
US& 10.00/barrel. This is US% 0.l4/barrel above the US$ 9.86/barrel 
weighted-average price emerging from a 40:60/oil company:Saudi Arabian 
government participation agreement, with a 93 per cent buy-back price, 
and a company margin of US$ 0.50/barrel on buy-back sales; together 
with the US$ 7.65/barrel figure, cited earlier, covering tax-plus-
cost-and-margin on company sales of equity crude oil. 
Additionally, it is assumed that the price of this crude oil 
during 1974-1980 will be no lower than US$ 6.62/barrel (in 1974 dollars), 
which is the result of applying a 5 P er cent per annum rate of decline 
to the US$ 9.00/barrel figure just cited.48/ 
In summary, the price of this pivot world crude oil is not expectec 
to rise above US$ 9.00/barrel (in 1974 dollars) during 1974-1980. Its 
lower limit is taken as USS 6.62/barrel. Thus, the potential decline 
in the market price of this crude oil over the rest of the decade is 
48/ During 1957-1970, the estimated market price (in current prices) 
of Saudi Arabian crude oil declined at an average rate of 3»2 per 
cent per annum. During this period, the major international 
oil companies exerted a strong, but declining influence on the 
price of internationally traded crude oil. During 1974-1980, 
the prospects are for this control to be heavily concentrated 
in the hands of the oil-exporting countries and the major 
international oil companies. Refer to Chapter I for a discussion 
on the major factors conditioning the decline in the price of 
world crude oil during 1957-1970. 
/believed to 
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believed to be absolutely greater than the potential increase, assuming 
current prices to be in the range of US$ 9.00/barrel. But, even at 
a minimum, the international market price of Saudi Arabian crude oil 
(FOB) is expected to be far higher than levels recorded prior to 197^-
The reasons underlying the selection of this range require 
explanation«, World crude oil prices falling in this range would, 
of course, stimulate the production of substitutes for imported oil 
by the oil-deficit countries as well as stepped-up defficiencies in 
their use of energy resources. Additionally, at a price of US$ 10.00/ 
barrel, the pressure on some oil-exporting countries to offer hidden 
discounts would be intense. The US$ 10.00/barrel figure for Saudi 
Arabian crude oil was taken as an upper limit in the belief that, 
for two reasons, the major oil-exporting countries would consider it 
financially disadvantageous for them to exceed it as a reference 
price: first, because of the presumed expectation by many oil-exporting 
governments that the scale of the substitution which would be triggered 
would work to their financial disfavour at prices in excess of this 
f i g u r e a n d , second, that, as price rises above this level, the 
pressure on some oil exporters to extend discounts could be irresistible, 
threatening a loss in control over world crude oil supply by the oil-
exporting countries, and raising the spectre of a decline in crude 
oil prices for sellers in the international market. 
b9/ With price expectations in excess of (and, probably, even below) 
US$ 10.00/barrel, the adoption of national energy policies based 
on the objective of self-sufficiency in energy supplies would 
probably be pervasive among the energy-importing countries, 
especially in the developed countries. Aside from an emphasis 
on increased supplies of indigenous energy supplies of crude 
oil, natural gas, and hydropoiver, one could also expect a step-
up in the rate of reliance on nuclear power, the introduction 
of new energy-conversion technologies (e.g., coal liquification 
and gasification), the tapping of hitherto unconventional sources 
of oil supply (e.g., tar sands), together with increased R/D 
in many other areas bearing on the longer-run growth in the 
world oil imports (e.g., battery-fired automobiles). After the 
fact, many of these investments, oriented to the objective of 
national self-sufficiency in energy supplies, may actually turn 
out to be economic white elephants. But, that would not deny 
the strong downward pressure on world crude oil prices which they 




The source of the downward pressure on price in this case is the 
large gap that exists between the price and supply cost of crude oil 
in the vforld market. The major instrument for releasing this pressure 
is price-cutting, not only by the established crude oil exporters, 
but by the new entrants into the world crude oil market that these 
high crude oil prices will inevitably induce. On the other hand, 
the heavy concentration of the world's proven oil reserves in a 
relatively few countries and the continuing importance of the 
international majors would, probably, moderate the tempo of price 
reductions for the world's major crude oils, even if a price-cutting 
trend did set in. 
With regard to the specific objectives of energy sector policy 
in the region's oil-deficit countries, the expected continuance of 
the increased price of imported crude oil (above recent historical 
levels) means a sustained, higher level of their per-unit energy 
costs and a sustained, heavy drain on their foreign reserves, 
threatening, in turn, their prospects for economic growth. Within 
this context, the objectives of the possible lines of action considered 
in this chapter are an economically defensible reduction in the unit 
cost of, and foreign exchange payments for, energy supplies in the 
region's oil-deficit countries below levels that would be implied 
by reliance on previously existing policies in the face of this 
expected price range for imported crude oil. To the extent that 
these two objectives are realized, the threat to domestic output 
and employment in these countries from the increased cost of imported 
crude oil nay be mitigated, which, it is assumed, will be a key 
objective of ms.croecon.omic policy in the region's col~ueficit 
countries. Conversely, to the extent that opportunities are not 
seized for reducing the per-unit costs of, and the drain in foreign 
exchange for meeting domestic energy requirements, the ensuing economic 




It is obviously not feasible to discuss on an abstract level 
the subject of energy sector policy in a way that would apply on a 
detailed level to each of the region's oil-deficit countries 
simultaneously. For example, the policy recommendation to increase 
the production of indigenous crude oil would be absurd for the 
fourteen of the region's nineteen oil-deficit countries that do not 
now have this option«¿0/ 
The diversity of the region's oil-deficit countries, not only 
in terms of their energy sectors, but in terras of their economic 
structures as well, must be stressed at the outset. The energy 
sectors of these countries vary widely by the level and composition 
of energy production and consumption (table 18), by the importance 
of foreign trade in energy sources (table 36), by the scale of 
domestic refining capacity (table 37) and the degree of reliance 
on imported oil (table 9), by the structure of refined product 
consumption and refinery output (table 38), by the extent of control 
of the State over the energy industries (table 11), by the cost of 
supply of indigenous energy sources, by the scaly and consumption of 
known reserves of indegenous energy resources, by the level and 
structure of energy prices, by the structure of taxes levied on 
energy products and the assignation of industry costs over refined 
oil products (table lb), and by the national policy parameters which 
condition the formulation of energy-sector policy (e.g., receptivity 
to foreign capital in the domestic oil irdustry). These country-
by-country differences in the structure of the energy sector, taken 
in conjunction with the patently broad differences in economic 
structure and national policies in these same countries, stresses 
the need for tailoring a detailed discussion of energy policy to the 
individual country. 





JHP CRTS (CIP) AÏ© EXPORTS (FOB) GF OÙfflE OIL, REFINED OIL KC0UCTS, AÜ3 iTATlRAL GAS 
BT SEIECED LATIN AL-SERICAN. COWTTRIES, I960, 1965, AMD 1970-1972 
(Millions of US if) 
I960 1965 W O 1 3 7 1 W Z 
ôiuxtry 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Iaports Exports Imports Exports 
Argentina 123.6 0 . 2 1 0 2 . 9 8.4 75.0 7.8 9 8 . 6 8 . 0 64.2 5.2 
Bolivia 1 . 8 A / 3.4 1.5 0.7 1 . 0 I3.2 1,4 23.9 1 . 6 41.6 
Brazil 259.8 - 249.7 «m 280,0 16.7 475.4 2 8 . 6 570.I 57.4 
Colombia am . 73.4 - 96.9 «• 74.2 M 74.6 - 59.1 
Costa Rioa 6.2 • - 8.5 - 1 1 . 7 0.9 I5.I 1 . 8 20.1 M> 
Chile 38.1 - 2 1 , 8 - 4 9 . 9 - 77.6 - 68.4 -
Ecuador 3.8 - 6.7 0 . 6 16.8 0 , 8 2 0 , 6 1.5 21.0 61,0 
El Salvador 6.8a/ m 10.1 3.6 4.7 l.l 13.0 1 . 0 12.8 1.6 
Guatemala 13.5 - 15.1 m 15.9 - 14 . 3 0,2 ... ... 
Honduras 6,0 - 1 2 . 2 - 14.7 6 , 2 17.5 2.9 1 9 . 2 6.9 
Jamaica 17.9 - 2 5 . 2 7.5 32.6 8.1 34o0b/ 8.5b/ 5 2 . 1 9.2 
Mexico 20.5 12.4 25.7 4o,l 6 9 . 6 3 6 . 6 I I 5 . 2 3 0 . 8 1 4 9 . 7 2 3 . 0 
Panama ç/ ll.Cte/ A» 40.3 23.7 62.1 2 1 , 5 6 6 . 2 25.I 6 7 . 9 21.5 
Paraguay y 3.4 m 4.9 - 6 a - 6.3 5 . 9 
Peru 15.7 I 7 . 6 24.3 8 . 5 2 6 , 9 7.6 53.5 5.4 5 1 . 1 7.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 92.7 229.6 234.5 329.4 2 8 8 . 0 371.3 361.4 437.2 343.9 4 0 7 . 0 
Uruguay 28.7a/ - 24.0 m- 33 «0 - 3 2 . 2 - 3lU5 -
Venezuela 2 149.0 - 2 305.0 - 2 3 9 8 . O - 2 98O.O - 2 9 2 3 . 7 
Total 2 485.6 807.4 2 824.4 9 8 8 . 0 2 964.0 I h02c? 3 629.5 1 482.5 3 624,8 
Sources ECLA, on the basis of official data, end ARP2L, op,oit. (Table 11)« 
a/ 1961. 
b/ Estimate. 








IJéO I965 2570 '1971 1972 
Argentina 237.5 423.5 456.2 6 2 9 . 6 6 0 1 . 6 
Bolivia 11.2 12.2 23.I 2 2 . 8 2 1,7 
Brasi 1 208.I 364.9 504.6 564.0 7 1 8,3 
Coloni) ia 78.2 .99.9 137.6 173.7 172,1 
Chi le 48.0 83.6 111,0 136.0 ' 123.5 
Ecuador 13.2 1 9 . 2 35,3 36.3 35.5 
Paraguay : - - 5.0 5.0 5 . 0 
Perù 48.6 63.2 91.5 105.6 1 0 1.5 
Uruguay 2 8 . 0 35.0 4o„o 43,0 4o,o 
Venezuela 6 8 0 , 0 1 199.9 1 526.1 1 ?f/5,9 1 499.0 
Mexico 393.0 421.0 574.2 592» 0 624.5 
Costa Rica - 8.0 8.0 8,0 7.6 
SI Salvador 12.5 1 3.0 13.6 14.0 
Guatemala - 1 3 . 0 2 6 . 0 2 6 . 3 26,0 
Honduras - " l4,o 14.7 14,0 
Nicaragua - 5.6 2 2 . 0 13.9 13,2 
Panama - 55.0 75.0 75.0 75.0, 
Cuba 86„9 85,6 93,0 93»0 93.3 
Haiti - - •* - -
Jam alca ** 26,4 36,0 35.0 31.0 
Domini oan Republio - - - - 16.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 295.0 385.0 438.0 4Ô+.2 441.0 
Total 2 1 2 7 . 7 3 314.5 4 2 2 9 . 6 4 427,6 4 673.5 
Source: Oil and Gas Journal (various Issues), 
/Table 38 
Table 38 
INLAND C013SUHPTI0H AND REFINERY OUTPUT CP SELECTED REFINED OIL JRODUCTS 
IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 
(a? X 103) 
Liquefied gas Gasolines Kerosene Diesel and gas oils Fuel oils Total 
Country Prodms Consump Produo Consitip Produo Consunp Produo Consump Produo Consuup Produ£ Consuap 
tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion 
Argentina 1 202 1 647 6 0 8 1 6 066 1 372 1 335 6 6 1 5 6 514 . 9 4o4 9 94o 24 674 25 502 
Bolivia 19 19 335 311 147 137 1 2 0 1 0 1 173 117 794 685 
Brasil 2 053 2 760 1 1 620 1 2 054 1 7 0 6 1 656 8 858 7 956 11 8 6 1 9 636 3 6 098 34 062 
Colombia 318 3 1 8 3 2 1 2 2 7 6 6 7X5 7 0 0 I 654 1 065 2 878 1 193 8 777 6 042 
Chile 854 696 1 896 1 861 752 754 830 509 1 561 1 858 5 893 6 078 
Ecuador 8 10 568 6l4 193 IG9 357 336 458 390 . 1 584 1 539 
Mexico 2 342 4 330 8 920 9 91U 2 1+15 2 I+50 5 485 6 o4o 8 286 7 950 2 7 448 30 69+ 
Peru 1 3 0 1 2 5 1 7H0 1 O58 946 938 1 057 1 o4l 1 517 1 662 5 390 5 624 
Uruguay 4 7 69 3^3 353 235 245 393 445 816 865 1 834 1 977 
Venezuela a/ 600 500 4 741 4 695 2 859 963 8 6 1 0 1 7 9 3 39 468 3 809 56 2 7 8 1 1 7 6 0 
•Total 7 573 10 474 39 456 4o 492 11 3'+0 SJâî 33 979 26 200 76 422 37 420 1 6 8 770 1 2 3 953 
Source: ECLA, 0:1 the basis of official data» 
oj Consumption includes bunker sales. 
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A country-by-country approach to the discussion of energy sector 
policy obviously cannot be taken in this brief paper« Instead, a 
more general approach must be adopted« It will examine the policy 
options that are potentially open, in general, in the region's 
oil-deficit countries in their attempt to achieve the two objectives 
of energy -sector policy just specified» 
For purposes of discussion, the energy sector policies open, 
in general, to Latin America's oil-deficit countries for coping 
with the expected price of world crude oil through 1980 should 
be examined in the following two broad categories: 
.(a) Action oriented to decreasing the demand for imported 
oil; 
(b) Action oriented to reducing the supply cost of imported 
oil and which should be considered in a broad context 
of international trade relations. 
The former is mainly reviewed in this study. 
1. Options oriented to decreasing the demand for 
—m— •»••••—n • a, ».-ir- 1- yri_ f» r -oi - ri— inrmii wmf n—r- —-r - — -» -——• imported crude oil 
The assumptions that the price structure for world crude oil 
through 1980 will be based on a price for Saudi Arabian light 
ranging between TJS$ 6.62-USI 10.00/barrel, FOB, Persian Gulf, in 
197^ prices, means that the drain of foreign reserves on oil account 
now impacting the region's oil-deficit countries - although varying 
wiedely by country - is expected to be an enduring one. 
If the previously existing structure of refined product prices 
in the domestic economy does not respond to this situation, then, 
in some of the region's fourteen oil-deficit/non-oil-producing 
countries, that drain cannot endure too long simply because they 
will quickly reach the point that their foreign reserves will not 
be sufficient to satisfy the physical demand for oil imports generated 
under the old structure of refined product prices. At that point, 
which is already imminent in some of these countries, drastic action 
will be required in the energy sector to minimize the constraint 
imposed on total output and employment by the cost of imported oil. 
/In the 
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In the region's five oil«deficit/oil-producing countries, this threat, 
while already predictable, is less immediate, although, again, the 
immediacy varies widely by country: in the case of Chile, it is 
already evident, while in the case of Argentina and Brazil, it is 
further removed. 
The first imperative, then, is to reduce the demand for imported 
crude oil and imported refined products, but in such a way as to 
minimize the threat to domestic production and employment, 
With the exception of Guyana and Haiti, each of the region's 
oil-deficit countries satisfy their domestic requirements for refined 
oil products by refining imported crude oil (and, in five countries, 
indigenous crude oil as well), closing the difference between refinery 
output and domestic requirements in the foreign market (and by 
inventory changes). Typically, refining strategy in these countries 
is based on the objective of minimizing imports of motor gasoline 
so that, in effect, the production of motor gasolines given a more 
or less inflexible refinery technology, determines the domestically 
produced supply of other refined products. For several reasons, 
operating on the domestic demand for motor gasoline is of particular 
strategic importance for countries seeking to minimize their drain 
of foreign reserves on oil account: 
- First, this product typically accounts for about one-third 
of refined product consumption in Lhe region's oil-deficit 
countries. 
- Second, it represents the major potential for cut-backs in 
domestic oil consumption with relatively less of a threat 
to domestic production and consumption than in the case of 
other refined oil products. By comparison, if supplies of 
fuel oil, diesel oil, or petrochemical naphthas, for example, 
were physically restricted in the economy, the threat to 
total output and employment would be far more serious. 
/- Third, 
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- Third, although reduction in the demand for motor gasoline 
might cause imbalances between the requirement for "essential" 
refined oil products and their domestically produced supplies, 
this problem can be dealt with through imports of those 
deficit volumes. Additionally, the mix of crude oils can 
be changed in line with revised refinery target yields; 
. and further improved, in this regard, by the importation 
of spiked crude oil. 
One difficulty in operating on the demand for motor gasoline 
is that, even if the incremental cost of imported crude oil were 
passed forward, through existing cost allocation and tax systems, to 
consumers, the resulting increase in the price of motor gasoline may 
not constitute much of a brake on the rate of its consumption (i.e., 
even at its higher price, consumers would find it financially desirable 
to use it in satisfying their private transportation requirements, 
for example). The rough calculations presented in Chapter II suggest 
that, with an increase in the cost of imported crude oil from 
US5? 2.20 in early 1973 to USS 10.00/barrel (FOB, Persian Gulf), in 
197^, the price of motor gasoline would rise from about US3 O.ll/litre 
to TJS$ 0.18/litre, including a mark-up on the increased cost of that 
crude oil. This higher price for motor gasoline may not constrict 
its consumption significantly, leaving, to that extent, unchecked 
the foreign exchange drain on oil account. This problem can be 
attacked by setting a physical target for motor gasoline supply in 
the economy (derived as a function of projected foreign reserve 
balances), and rationing this volume of motor gasoline by the price 
mechanism through increased taxation of motor gasoline. This approach 
would increase the cost of private road transportation, inducing a 
substitution of lower-unit cost public transportation for private 
transportation services, and husbanding foreign exchange on current 
energy account in the process. Facilitating a relative shift over 
time from private to public transportation services would, of course, 
call for forward planning on a co-ordinated basis between policy-makers 
and technicians in the transportation and energy sectors.51/ 
'pi/ " ' Refer to Symposium paper entitled: El efecto del nuevo precio del 
Petroleo en el Transporte Latino a mericano. 
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A second major way for restricting the growth in the domestic 
demand for imported oil is an increase in the supply of lower-cost 
indigenous energy substitutes. Given the assumptions made earlier 
about the price of imported crude oil, the implication is clear that 
many energy-supply projects, based on indigenous fuels, that were 
not economically viable in the past will be viable now, both financially 
and economically. 
The problem in this area of action is essentially one of timing, 
since it will take several years before such projects become operational. 
Economically defensible investments in hydropower and nuclear facilities, 
natural gas transmission and distribution facilities, coal production 
and marketing projects, for example, have long lead-times, and they 
cannot be expected to provide much in the way of economic relief 
in the region's oil-deficit countries during the seventies. The 
major difficulty is not in identifying such projects, but rather, as 
discussed in Chapter II, in financing them. 
In the immediate future, however, a complete review is required 
of energy projects novr in the pipeline. It may be possible to convert 
some electric power generating projects, for example, from a previously 
planned reliance on refined oil products to indigenous fuels, or to 
eliminate some oil-based projects now for a reliance on indigenous, 
lower cost fuels in the relatively near future. Additionally, it 
may be possible to reduce imports of pleasure automobiles in some 
countries, conserving foreign exchange not only on oil account but, 
in a quantitative sense, quite importantly, on capital account as 
well. 
Much of the potential for indigenous fuel substitution is 
concentrated in the electric power industry.p2/ The revision of prices 
for refined oil products discussed previously has its counterpart need 
in this industry as well, and, again, under the mandate to conserve 
52/ The implications of the increased cost of world oil to the 
region's electric power industry are discussed in the Symposium 
paper entitled: Los nuevos precios del petróleo y la industria 
eléctrica en América Latina. 
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foreign exchange and lot/er unit-energy costs in such a way as not to 
threaten domestic production and employment. Given the cost of heating 
equipment and the structure of household electricity tariffs, changes 
in the price of refined oil products could induce inter-fuel 
substitutions that, from the point of view of conserving foreign 
exchange, could be undesirable.5j5/ In a strategic sense, the major 
candidate for increases in electricity tariffs is the quantitatively 
important household sector (table 15), because relatively major 
economies are possible in this component of the market without too • 
much of a threat to output and employment. The need is particularly 
strong in the oil-deficit countries to the extent, that their electric 
power industry is based on oil-fired generating plants. 
Aside from the substitution of indegenous energy sources for 
oil in the generation of electric power, the increased cost of world 
oil has made investments in upgrading the efficiency of electrical 
transmission and distribution systems even more attractive than in 
the past. Table 15 indicates the relatively high ratio of system 
losses to generated power in the region's oil-deficit countries. 
Again, as in the case of projects oriented to the increased use of 
indigenous fuels in generating electric power, the major problem 
involved in efficiency-upgrading projects is not so much in identifying 
them as in financing them. 
A particular premium is attached to the increased supply of 
lower-cost indigenous crude oil, and, hero, the prospects vary widely 
between the region's oil-deficit countries„54/ As noted previously, 
only five of them produce crude oil. These countries can increase 
their production and development activities immediately, reducing 
53/ For example, if kerosene prices were increased sharply in order 
to dampen the growth in. oil imports while household electricity 
tariffs were not changed, consumers might shift out of kerosene 
heating to electric heating. If the power industry, in this case, 
were heavily reliant on fuel oil and diesel-fired plants, this 
could generate a counterproductive increase in the demand for 
imported oil. 
¿4/ Refer to an extended treatment of Latin America's oil resources 
in the Symposium paper on this subject. 
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the claim on foreign reserves of imported oil. Given the expected 
range of world crude oil prices through 1980, production from existing 
fields and development of known fields can be accelerated sharply 
and, despite rising unit costs, still be economically defensible 
over a broad range of incremental output. To the extent that the 
production of indigenous crude oil can be increased rapidly in the 
context of strong downward pressure on domestic oil consumption, it 
might even be possible, in one or two of the region's oil-deficit 
countries, to sell some supplies of indigenously produced crude oil 
at its opportunity cost in the world market. 
The remaining fourteen oil-deficit countries face the choice 
of continuing reliance on imported oil, launching indigenous exploration 
programmes, or, as will be discussed subsequentlyinvesting in oil 
projects abroad. The lack of geologic knowledge, in many of these 
countries, of their oil (and energy) reserves, taken together with 
the long lead-time involved, even when an oil exploration programme 
is successful, implies that the region's non-oil producing countries 
cannot rely on this source of economic relief in any significant 
way during the seventies. 
The third way of decreasing the demand for imported oil is 
through efficiency increases in the energy systems that will remain 
committed to its use. Other than electrical generation, transmission, 
and distribution facilities in the power industry as just noted, the 
major energy systems involved here are the automobile, truck, bus, 
locomotive, ship, aeroplane, industrial boiler, and home heating 
system. Laws have been passed in the United States, for example, 
reducing maximum driving speeds to increase average distance achieved 
per litre of motor gasoline input, and proposals have been made to 
permit tax deductions for improving home insulation systems. The 
list could be expanded easily: inspection programmes could be introduced 
with a purpose of upgrading the thermal efficiency of automobiles, 
trucks, and buses, etc.; the cruising speed of aircraft could be 
regulated with a purpose of increasing their efficiency of energy use; 
inspection programmes could be introduced, designed to increase the 
efficiency of fuel use in industry, and so on. 
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By and large, these kinds of proposals have received more praise 
than they deserve. At best, they will probably secure little, if 
any, in the way of economically defensible savings of oil beyond 
what would be secured by the natural reactions of consumers to 
increased prices for refined oil products. The incentive to increase 
the efficiency with which consumers use a fuel ie a function inter 
alia of its price, and it is far simpler for governments to achieve 
the goal of increased efficiency in oil consumption by operating on 
the price of refined oil products directly rather than by instituting 
grand programmes trying to force consumer behaviour to this end. 
At relatively low prices for motor gasoline and diesel oil, for 
example, the financial incentive for engine tune-ups is not as strong 
as at relatively higher prices. As the price of electricity, kerosene, 
natural gas, and other household fuels is increased, so is the 
incentive to economize in their use. 
One area for efficiency gains that does warrant immediate 
examination is the possibility for the government to transport 
relatively more of its freight by train than by cruck. Capacity 
conditions permitting, this could generate desirable economies in 
energy-input per unit of freight transported and conserve foreign 
exchange.55/ Additionally, over longer periods of time, it may be 
economically feasible, in some countries, to install diesel-electric 
locomotives and trolley-bus systems, for example, and to gear the 
expansion of hydropower facilities to the introduction of these energy 
systems. Again, co-ordination between the energy and transportation 
sectors is essential in evaluating such possibilities. 
Another area for potential efficiency gains is the interconnexion 
of domestic electric power systems. The higher cost of oil makes 
investments in such interconnexions even more feasible now than in 
55/ This possibility, together with a variety of others, for 
economizing on fuel use in the transportation sector are 
discussed in the Symposium paper: El efecto del nuevo_jprecjio 
del petr6leo en el transporte latinoamericano. 
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the past. In countries using hydropower (and other indigenous fuels) 
together with imported oil in generating electric power, such 
investments would retard the rate of increase in (or lower absolutely) 
unit-energy costs and, in the bargain, conserve oil„ Even in systems 
wholly reliant on oil-fired generating plants, unit-oil requirements 
could be reduced by concentrating generation in larger-scale and 
more efficient plants. Again, the lead-time involved in such 
projects may not permit economies in oil consumption that would be 
very significant during this decade, and the problem may not be so 
much in identifying such innovations as in arranging for their 
financing. 
One broad imperative flows from the previous discussion: the 
need to deal v/ith the problem of restructuring the prices of final 
energy flows to consumers on an integrated basis, not only in the 
context of refined oil product prices, but between these products 
and other energy sources (i.e., electricity, natural gas, and coal) 
as well. Within the oil industry, the price of motor gasoline cannot 
rationally be set in isolation from the price c.f diesel oil; or the 
price of household kerosene without reference to the price of other 
petroleum liquids sold to the household heating market. Similarly, 
the price of fuel oil cannot be fixed in isolation from the price 
of natural gas and coal in the industrial boiler market; nor the 
price of petrochemical naphthas without respect to the price of natural 
gas sales to the petrochemical industry«. 
In short, what is required is a co-ordinated approach to the 
now-intensified requirement for energy planning in the economies of 
the region's oil-deficit countries, proceeding from an overall strategy 
of economic development to the critical assumption on world crude 
oil prices over time, to desired patterns of fuel use and, then, to 
the investment required in the energy sector (and in other key sectors, 
such as transportation, as well) and focusing explicitly on the 
structure of energy prices required to support those patterns of fuel 
use over time. This need is evident throughout the world of oil-
deficit countries. But, in some Latin American countries, the rigidity 
/of fuel 
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of fuel use patterns and the relatively small volumes of 7inon-
essential" energy consumption makes a co-ordinated approach to 
energy planning essential if the major surgery that lies ahead in 
the use of energy supplies in these countries is to be pursued 
efficiently» 
There are two other major lines of action open now for planning 
in this area: first, the joint development by Latin American countries 
of their hydropower reserves; and, second, interconnexions of 
electrical systems across national frontiers•> 
By the substitution of hydropower for oil-based supplies of . 
electricity and by the substitution of lower for higher-cost energy 
inputs, the region's oil-deficit countries can potentially retard 
the rate of increase in the cost of supply of domestically produced 
electricity, and, in the process, conserve foreign exchange»56/ 
But, once again, these two kinds of projects realistically 
cannot be expected to provide much of a depressant on the rate of 
growth in the demand for imported oil during the seventies» The 
lead-time is too long for this, and, especially in the case of 
multi-national projects for the development of hydro-reserves, 
many of the oil-deficit countries may find the capital requirements 
prohibitive unless external assistance is provided on semi-
concessional or concessional terms. But, this does not deny the 
importance of initiating planning now for the possible introduction 
of such projects in the future. 
56/ The recent record of progress and the prospects for further 
co-operation in the joint development of hydropower capacity 
in the area and for system interconnexions are discussed 
in the Symposium paper focusing on the ramifications of 
the energy crisis to the region's electric power industries. 
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2. Observations on some lines of action which may contribute 
to reducing the_cost of crude oil 
The previously discussed policy measures had as their immediate 
objective an economically defensible retardation in the rate of 
growth in the demand for imported oil. The instruments potentially 
open for achieving this objective included excise taxes on refined 
oil products, the substitution of indigenous fuels for imported 
oil, efficiency gains in the use of refined oil products, and, 
internationally, regionally-oriented hydropower and interconnexion 
projects. 
The aspects or policy considered in this section are oriented 
to the immediate objective of securing supplies of imported oil 
at lower unit costs in order to retard the rate of increase in 
per-unit energy costs and to conserve foreign exchange. 
Several options are open to the region's oil-deficit countries 
in attempting to reduce the cost of their imported oil: first, the 
normal playing-off of sellers by buyers in the international oil 
market; second, the application of excise taxes on refined oil 
products (noted in the previous section in another connexion); and, 
third, measures based on the use of greater centralized control by 
Latin American governments over their domestic oil industries. 
The playing-off of sellers by buyers (and not just by Latin 
American buyers) in the vrorld oil market constitutes one of the 
major hopes of the oil-deficit countries for securing reductions 
in the price of their imported oil supplies. Prior to the seventies, 
this involved, for the most part, pitting the international major 
oil companies against one another and each of them against the 
international minors and oil exporting governments, which were long 
on crude oil and short on downstream outlets for it. Since then, 
control over the supply of world crude oil has shifted progressively 
to the oil-exporting countries. 
The prospect is for the oil-exporting countries to increase 
their control even further during the rest of the decade and,, in 
many countries, to remain closely allied with the international oil 
/companies in 
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companies in terms of their underlying commercial need for each 
other. Hence, at the margin, the success of buyers in the international 
oil market will, as in the past, reflect their skill in playing-off 
the oil companies against one another, but it will reflect, more and 
more at the margin, the successful development of other methods of 
operation, such as direct purchases from the governments of oil-
producing countries .£7/ In this way, as well as avoiding 
intermediaries, more comprehensive trade operations may be carried 
out between governments, which will enable the buyers to effect 
additional exports and place them in a more favourable position 
vis-a-vis oil purchases. 
From the point of viex* of the oil company operating in the 
oil-exporting country, the minimum price it must secure, if supply 
is to continue, is tax-paid-cost, with cost now including the 
impact of the acquisition cost of "buy-back!! crude oil in countries 
where, such crude oil arrangements exist between the oil company 
and the host country and, of course, where they are executed.' 
Tax-paid-cost of Saudi Arabian equity crude oil, for example, is 
about US® 7.15/barrel (i.e., US$ 7.00 tax and US5 0.15 cost per 
barrel? refer to table 6); and for buy-back crude oil the cost 
of acquisition to the oil company is on the order of US3 10„S3/barrel 
(i.e., 93 per cent of posted price, or 0.93 x US3 11.65/barrel). 
With a 40:60/company: country selling mix prevailing, the weighted 
average minimum price for this crude oil, below which supply would 
cease, would be US® 9-35/barrel, FOB, Persian Gulf (i.e., 0*k0 x 
US$ 7.15 plus 0.60 x US?, 10.33/barrel). Between US3 9.36 and 
US$ 10.83/barrel, the host government, if it chose to, could sell 
its crude oil to the international oil company under the participation 
57/ In early 1973, a contract was signed providing for the direct 
sale of a portion of Abu Dhabi's participation crude oil to 
a Japanese shipping and trading company. Deliveries would 
begin in 1973 at a level of about 30,000 barrels/day, reaching 
more than one-half million barrels per day in I9S0. Refer to: 
World Petroletim Report, 197k (Vol. XX), p. kl„ Direct sales 
of participation "crude oil such as this constitute a major 
vehicle for obtaining more favourable prices. 
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agreement ; and with market price above US$ 10.83/barrel, the 
government might choose to sell it independently. In other words, 
if this set of supply conditions did define the situation, the 
oil company operating in Saudi Arabia could continue supplying crude 
oil (equity and buy-back combined) until the point that price declined 
to about US$ 9.36/barrel;58/ but,- below this level, the government 
would apparently have to reduce its revenues per barrel, if sales 
by the oil company were to continue. 
Two implications seem clear: first, strong reductions in the 
price of internationally traded crude oil from present levels would 
eventually require the assent of host governments to reductions 
in average revenue per barrel; and, second, the action oriented to 
securing this assent would be the bargaining between either (a) the 
oil-deficit countries and the oil companies in oil exporting countries 
directly, or (b) between the oil-exporting and oil-importing countries 
directly, or both. 
Essentially the problem facing the region's oil-deficit countries 
is the practical one of meeting the physical and financial requirements 
for their continuing oil imports, on the one hand, without foreclosing 
the possibility of securing reductions in the future unit-costs of 
those imports, on the other. One major issue involved in striking 
this balance is the treatment of crude oil imports under long-term 
purchase contracts. 
A consideration of the forces discussed earlier in this chapter 
suggest that the probability of a decline in crude oil prices from 
present levels during the seventies is higher than for an increase, 
which in turn suggests that two important measures should be considered: 
first, the inclusion in any long-term oil supply contract concluded 
by the region's oil-deficit countries of clauses stipulating that 
Obviously, this does not imply that the oil company would sell 
its crude oil at average tax-paid cost for equity and participation 
crude oil, nor, as noted earlier, that the host government 
would exercise its full entitlement to its participation 
volumes of crude oil. 
52/ 
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prices should be revised in line with any changes in the international 
markets; and, second, the introduction of legislation to this effect 
in the region's oil-deficit countries in which oil import commitments 
can presently be made by refinery affiliates of international oil 
companies without the approval of the central government. 
The imposition of excise taxes on refined oil products, 
especially in countries with large oil markets, may induce a downward 
movement in oil import prices, if they are levied along a broad 
front by large-scale crude oil importing countries. The move is a 
necessary one in many of Latin America's oil-deficit countries due 
to the erosion of their foreign reserves, as discussed previously. 
In this context, excise taxes on refined oil products also have the 
potential advantage that sellers may decide to absorb the taxes, 
lowering the acquisition cost of oil imports. 
The third route for trying to secure reductions in the unit cost 
of imported oil involves t\tfO kinds of action: first, centralization 
of oil imports in the hands of the oil-deficit governments, where 
this control is not presently existent; second, reduction in the 
unit cost of crude oil as booked into the refining affiliate of an 
integrated international oil company at prices above those in the 
arms-length, competitive segment of the international oil market.59/ 
Where the sole domestic buyer of imported oil is an affiliate 
of an international oil company, there is no competition between it 
and its parent crude oil exporting company, and the price of the 
crude oil transferred is not a price in an economic sense. 
Centralization of oil imports in State hands has the potential 
advantage of reducing the price of oil imports by introducing 
competition between the crude oil buyer (now the State) and the crude 
The potential usefulness of these options does not extend to 
all oil-deficit countries in the region because many of them 
do not have a foreign sector in their domestic oil industry 
(refer to table 10). Nevertheless, those options are open 
potentially to many of the oil-deficit countries in the region, 
particularly in Central America and in the Caribbean. 
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oil seller. Additionally, where domestically owned companies are 
purchasing their refined oil product requirements directly, but in 
a piecemeal fashion, centralization of such purchases in State hands 
may provide a means of reducing the average cost of imported oil. 
In a small country, however, the centralization of oil purchases 
may not be sufficient to secure the better prices obtained by large-
scale buyers as a result of their stronger bargaining power. The 
possibility might therefore be explored of a small country with a 
limited import capacity, which is nevertheless in State hands, 
combining its oil purchases with those of a large-scale imported in 
the region also operating through State enterprises. 
If the price of crude oil, as booked into the domestic refining 
affiliate of an international oil company, is above the price of that 
crude oil as recorded in the arms-length component of the international 
oil market, one option immediately open to the government for closing 
this gap is to legally establish the price in the most competitive 
component of the world oil market as the reference price for booking 
imported crude oil into the domestic refinery, and, at the same time, 
allowing the refinery a margin sufficiently above cost to ensure a 
continued supply of refined oil products to the domestic market . Such 
an approach could potentially stem the drain in foreign exchange on oil 
account and increase the tax contribution of the foreign, integrated 
oil refinery to the central government, without necessarily impeding 
the flow of refined oil products to the domestic market. 
In addition to the kind of action referred to, there are others 
that are more closely related to international co-operation in the 
fields of trade, finance and the economy in general. These aspects 
are not dealt with here as they would require a much wider context 
extending beyond the specific objectives pursued in this document. 
3» Summary 
This chapter examined a variety of energy-sector policy actions 
open now to the region's oil-deficit countries to confront a situation 
in which the price of world crude oil is based on a range of US$ 6.62-
US$ 10.000/barrel, for Saudi Arabian crude oil, FOB, Persian Gulf. 
/Actions were 
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Actions were divided into two classes: first, those designed to 
reduce the demand for imported crude oilj and, second, those designed 
to decrease the supply price of imported crude oil. 
These options were considered from the point of view of the 
region's oil-deficit countries, since these are the ones which have 
been negatively impacted by the increased price of world oil. 
The objective of energy sector policy action specified was 
to minimize, in an economically defensible way, increases in the unit 
cost of energy supplies in the economy as well as the foreign exchange 
drain for energy (i.e., oil) imports that would occur if the old 
structure of energy sector policies were continued in the face of 
the increased cost of world oil. This objective was supportive of 
the broad, macroeconomic mandate to minimize the threat to domestic 
output and employment inherent in the "energy crisis". 
With regard to actions oriented to decreasing the demand for 
oil imports, three lines of action were examined: first, excise 
taxes on refined oil products, and, particularly, on motor gasoline 
as well as on other products, restrictions in the physical supply 
of which would not constitute a threat to domestic output and 
employments second, substitution of indigenous fuels for imported 
oil« and, third, measures designed to increase the efficiency with 
which oil (and energy in general) is used in the economy. 
The case for increased excise taxes on motor gasoline and some 
other refined oil products is particularly strong in the region's 
oil-deficit countries which are now, or prospectively will be, in 
a difficult position in terms of foreign reserves. More generally 
however, there are important reasons for passing forward to consumers 
the higher cost of oil within a structure of cost allocation and 
tax incidence designed to minimize the threat to output and employment. 
Reductions in the demand for imported oil can be secured relatively 
quickly under this option, especially if coupled with sharp increases 
in excise taxes on motor gasoline and other refined products not 
critical in the sense of their link to output and employment. 
/By comparison, 
- 1 3 2 -
By comparison, the substitution of indigenous fuels for imported 
oil was found to provide little in the way of potential relief during 
the seventies, even if the region's oil-deficit countries could 
secure the large volumes of capital required for projects serving 
this purpose» In a strategic sense, the options in this area have 
a longer term importance. 
Finally, there were a number of measures which governments 
could take to promote efficiency gains, other than a basic reliance 
on the price mechanism for this purpose. But, again, some of these 
measures have relatively long lead times. On the other hand, shifting 
public freight from road to rail media presents an opportunity, 
in many of the region's oil-deficit countries, for relatively immediate 
gains in the efficiency of oil use. 
Two other options bearing on the demand for imported oil were 
examined: multi-national development of hydroelectric resources and 
interconnexion of electrical systems across national frontiers. Both 
are essentially longer-term in their potential impact on oil imports, 
and both raise the problem of securing considerable amounts of capital 
for their realization, 
On the supply side, options were examined for reducing the cost 
of oil imports: first, the normal response of buyers to play-off 
sellers in the world oil market; second, increased taxation of 
refined oil products; third, centralization of oil imports in State 
hands in countries where this is not presently the case; and, fourth, 
applicable only in some of the oil-deficit countries, the replacement 
of transfer prices by competitive prices as the basis for costing 
crude oil into the domestic refining affiliate of an international 
oil company. Each of these measures is relatively immediate in 
terms of its potential impact. 


